[X2Go-Commits] [nx-libs] 05/05: 40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX.

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. x2go pushed a commit to branch 3.5.0.x in repository nx-libs. commit 4587881130db36125c6b800e8f7e3fa0a3c5c9fb Author: Mike Gabriel <mike.gabriel@das-netzwerkteam.de> Date: Sat Feb 14 16:40:07 2015 +0100 40 patches, fixing several X.Org CVEs in NX. * Security fixes: - Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time. - X.Org CVE-2011-2895: 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch - X.Org CVE-2011-4028: 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch - X.Org CVE-2013-4396: 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch - X.Org CVE-2013-6462: 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-0209: 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-0210: 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-0211: 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8092: 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8097: 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8095: 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8096: 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8099: 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8100: 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8102: 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8101: 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8093: 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch - X.Org CVE-2014-8098: 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch - Security fixes with no assigned CVE: 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch --- debian/changelog | 67 +++ ...ess-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch | 29 + ...1-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch | 29 + ...fter-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch | 74 +++ ...62-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch | 30 + ...09-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch | 43 ++ ...09-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch | 46 ++ ...10-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch | 73 +++ ...-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch | 27 + ...10-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch | 158 +++++ ...11-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch | 65 ++ ...10-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch | 137 +++++ ...11-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch | 48 ++ ...11-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch | 34 ++ ...10-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch | 38 ++ ...10-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch | 75 +++ ...10-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch | 61 ++ ...10-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch | 112 ++++ ...alloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch | 43 ++ ...-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch | 42 ++ ...er-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch | 53 ++ ...-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch | 205 +++++++ ...-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch | 46 ++ ...ated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch | 80 +++ ...ted-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch | 114 ++++ ...lidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch | 29 + ...ted-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch | 184 ++++++ ...k-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch | 40 ++ ...lidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch | 146 +++++ ...lidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch | 32 + ...idated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch | 45 ++ ...-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch | 76 +++ ...-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch | 163 +++++ ...nal-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch | 41 ++ ...safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch | 96 +++ ...checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch | 132 +++++ ...-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch | 215 +++++++ ...el-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch | 53 ++ ...checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch | 413 +++++++++++++ ...checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch | 290 +++++++++ ...maining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch | 622 ++++++++++++++++++++ debian/patches/series | 40 ++ 42 files changed, 4346 insertions(+) diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index 6d3a9f1..a85cdec 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -121,6 +121,73 @@ nx-libs (2:3.5.0.29-0x2go2) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium launched as x2goagent, use X2Go-specific paths for the keystrokes.cfg file. (Fixes: #744). + [ Michael DePaulo ] + * Security fixes: + - Rebase loads of X.Org patches (mainly from RHEL-5) against NX. If not + all patches from a CVE patch series appear here, then it means that + the affected file/code is not used in NX at build time. + + - X.Org CVE-2011-2895: + 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch + - X.Org CVE-2011-4028: + 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch + - X.Org CVE-2013-4396: + 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch + - X.Org CVE-2013-6462: + 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-0209: + 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch + 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-0210: + 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch + 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch + 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch + 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch + 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch + 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch + 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-0211: + 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch + 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch + 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch + 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8092: + 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch + 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch + 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch + 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8097: + 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8095: + 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8096: + 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8099: + 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8100: + 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch + 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8102: + 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8101: + 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8093: + 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch + 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch + 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch + 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch + 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch + - X.Org CVE-2014-8098: + 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch + 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch + 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch + 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch + 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch + + - Security fixes with no assigned CVE: + 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch + + [ Mihai Moldovan ] * Change string "X2go" to "X2Go" where appropriate. diff --git a/debian/patches/1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch b/debian/patches/1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..162bb21 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From af55da1e9c1a6a352b24823a8f7062c288ffbbc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 19:15:20 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 01/40] LZW decompress: fix for CVE-2011-2895 From + xorg/lib/Xfont commit d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 + + Specially crafted LZW stream can crash an application using libXfont + that is used to open untrusted font files. With X server, this may + allow privilege escalation when exploited +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c +index a4c5468..553b315 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/decompress.c +@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ BufCompressedFill (BufFilePtr f) + */ + while ( code >= 256 ) + { ++ if (stackp - de_stack >= STACK_SIZE - 1) ++ return BUFFILEEOF; + *stackp++ = file->tab_suffix[code]; + code = file->tab_prefix[code]; + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch b/debian/patches/1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5437ca --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From df4a3b7270539843ae76275485ca76efcdf361d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 19:16:38 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 02/40] Fix CVE-2011-4028: File disclosure vulnerability. + upstream xorg/xserver commit 6ba44b91e37622ef8c146d8f2ac92d708a18ed34 + +use O_NOFOLLOW to open the existing lock file, so symbolic links +aren't followed, thus avoid revealing if it point to an existing +file. +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/utils.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/utils.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/utils.c +index 9b2431a..79e49d5 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/utils.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/utils.c +@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ LockServer(void) + /* + * Read the pid from the existing file + */ +- lfd = open(LockFile, O_RDONLY); ++ lfd = open(LockFile, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW); + if (lfd < 0) { + unlink(tmp); + FatalError("Can't read lock file %s\n", LockFile); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch b/debian/patches/1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cb1d0d --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 72790a55862f9a2232ba0cd7b072bbe3887cd820 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 20:01:27 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 03/40] Avoid use-after-free in dix/dixfonts.c: doImageText() + [CVE-2013-4396] from xorg/Xserver + http://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2013-October/002332.html + +Save a pointer to the passed in closure structure before copying it +and overwriting the *c pointer to point to our copy instead of the +original. If we hit an error, once we free(c), reset c to point to +the original structure before jumping to the cleanup code that +references *c. + +Since one of the errors being checked for is whether the server was +able to malloc(c->nChars * itemSize), the client can potentially pass +a number of characters chosen to cause the malloc to fail and the +error path to be taken, resulting in the read from freed memory. + +Since the memory is accessed almost immediately afterwards, and the +X server is mostly single threaded, the odds of the free memory having +invalid contents are low with most malloc implementations when not using +memory debugging features, but some allocators will definitely overwrite +the memory there, leading to a likely crash. +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dixfonts.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dixfonts.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dixfonts.c +index 193f555..42fd647 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dixfonts.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dixfonts.c +@@ -1559,6 +1559,7 @@ doImageText(ClientPtr client, register ITclosurePtr c) + GC *pGC; + unsigned char *data; + ITclosurePtr new_closure; ++ ITclosurePtr old_closure; + + /* We're putting the client to sleep. We need to + save some state. Similar problem to that handled +@@ -1571,6 +1572,7 @@ doImageText(ClientPtr client, register ITclosurePtr c) + err = BadAlloc; + goto bail; + } ++ old_closure = c; + *new_closure = *c; + c = new_closure; + +@@ -1578,6 +1580,7 @@ doImageText(ClientPtr client, register ITclosurePtr c) + if (!data) + { + xfree(c); ++ c = old_closure; + err = BadAlloc; + goto bail; + } +@@ -1589,6 +1592,7 @@ doImageText(ClientPtr client, register ITclosurePtr c) + { + xfree(c->data); + xfree(c); ++ c = old_closure; + err = BadAlloc; + goto bail; + } +@@ -1602,6 +1606,7 @@ doImageText(ClientPtr client, register ITclosurePtr c) + FreeScratchGC(pGC); + xfree(c->data); + xfree(c); ++ c = old_closure; + err = BadAlloc; + goto bail; + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch b/debian/patches/1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cc44d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From ac6694378e0ed4bdffa6e1318c9d4beda24a6b0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 20:12:25 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 04/40] CVE-2013-6462: unlimited sscanf overflows stack buffer + in bdfReadCharacters() from xorg/lib/libXfont + http://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2014-January/002389.html + +Fixes cppcheck warning: + [lib/libXfont/src/bitmap/bdfread.c:341]: (warning) + scanf without field width limits can crash with huge input data. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/bitmap/bdfread.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/bitmap/bdfread.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/bitmap/bdfread.c +index a6f0c1e..bccabd7 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/bitmap/bdfread.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/bitmap/bdfread.c +@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ bdfReadCharacters(FontFilePtr file, FontPtr pFont, bdfFileState *pState, + char charName[100]; + int ignore; + +- if (sscanf((char *) line, "STARTCHAR %s", charName) != 1) { ++ if (sscanf((char *) line, "STARTCHAR %99s", charName) != 1) { + bdfError("bad character name in BDF file\n"); + goto BAILOUT; /* bottom of function, free and return error */ + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch b/debian/patches/1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8097e30 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From f53f2474d5d33cca04c4c7744ecc50cec41ba94f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 20:28:30 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 05/40] CVE-2014-0209: integer overflow of realloc() size in + FontFileAddEntry() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 2f5e57317339c526e6eaee1010b0e2ab8089c42e +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +FontFileReadDirectory() opens a fonts.dir file, and reads over every +line in an fscanf loop. For each successful entry read (font name, +file name) a call is made to FontFileAddFontFile(). + +FontFileAddFontFile() will add a font file entry (for the font name +and file) each time it’s called, by calling FontFileAddEntry(). +FontFileAddEntry() will do the actual adding. If the table it has +to add to is full, it will do a realloc, adding 100 more entries +to the table size without checking to see if that will overflow the +int used to store the size. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/fontdir.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/fontdir.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/fontdir.c +index 8f75d8b..899ff05 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/fontdir.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/fontdir.c +@@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ FontFileAddEntry(FontTablePtr table, FontEntryPtr prototype) + if (table->sorted) + return (FontEntryPtr) 0; /* "cannot" happen */ + if (table->used == table->size) { ++ if (table->size >= ((INT32_MAX / sizeof(FontEntryRec)) - 100)) ++ /* If we've read so many entries we're going to ask for 2gb ++ or more of memory, something is so wrong with this font ++ directory that we should just give up before we overflow. */ ++ return NULL; + newsize = table->size + 100; + entry = (FontEntryPtr) xrealloc(table->entries, + newsize * sizeof(FontEntryRec)); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch b/debian/patches/1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..522a967 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 36f1dae749acb065eaefca56d42d19ef6822a001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 20:53:14 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 06/40] CVE-2014-0209: integer overflow of realloc() size in + lexAlias() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 05c8020a49416dd8b7510cbba45ce4f3fc81a7dc + +lexAlias() reads from a file in a loop. It does this by starting with a +64 byte buffer. If that size limit is hit, it does a realloc of the +buffer size << 1, basically doubling the needed length every time the +length limit is hit. + +Eventually, this will shift out to 0 (for a length of ~4gig), and that +length will be passed on to realloc(). A length of 0 (with a valid +pointer) causes realloc to free the buffer on most POSIX platforms, +but the caller will still have a pointer to it, leading to use after +free issues. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/dirfile.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/dirfile.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/dirfile.c +index f390391..3a2fead 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/dirfile.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fontfile/dirfile.c +@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group. + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/stat.h> + #include <errno.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + static Bool AddFileNameAliases ( FontDirectoryPtr dir ); + static int ReadFontAlias ( char *directory, Bool isFile, +@@ -373,6 +374,9 @@ lexAlias(FILE *file, char **lexToken) + int nsize; + char *nbuf; + ++ if (tokenSize >= (INT_MAX >> 2)) ++ /* Stop before we overflow */ ++ return EALLOC; + nsize = tokenSize ? (tokenSize << 1) : 64; + nbuf = (char *) xrealloc(tokenBuf, nsize); + if (!nbuf) +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch b/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b716272 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 94c6de0649cd295044b1e4ff7265949c9c787519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 21:03:33 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 07/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length in + _fs_recv_conn_setup() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 891e084b26837162b12f841060086a105edde86d + +The connection setup reply from the font server can include a list +of alternate servers to contact if this font server stops working. + +The reply specifies a total size of all the font server names, and +then provides a list of names. _fs_recv_conn_setup() allocated the +specified total size for copying the names to, but didn't check to +make sure it wasn't copying more data to that buffer than the size +it had allocated. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index bac0b8e..0fdcc1d 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -2782,7 +2782,7 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn) + int ret; + fsConnSetup *setup; + FSFpeAltPtr alts; +- int i, alt_len; ++ unsigned int i, alt_len; + int setup_len; + char *alt_save, *alt_names; + +@@ -2809,9 +2809,9 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn) + } + if (setup->num_alternates) + { ++ size_t alt_name_len = setup->alternate_len << 2; + alts = (FSFpeAltPtr) xalloc (setup->num_alternates * +- sizeof (FSFpeAltRec) + +- (setup->alternate_len << 2)); ++ sizeof (FSFpeAltRec) + alt_name_len); + if (alts) + { + alt_names = (char *) (setup + 1); +@@ -2820,10 +2820,25 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn) + { + alts[i].subset = alt_names[0]; + alt_len = alt_names[1]; ++ if (alt_len >= alt_name_len) { ++ /* ++ * Length is longer than setup->alternate_len ++ * told us to allocate room for, assume entire ++ * alternate list is corrupted. ++ */ ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf (stderr, ++ "invalid alt list (length %lx >= %lx)\n", ++ (long) alt_len, (long) alt_name_len); ++#endif ++ free(alts); ++ return FSIO_ERROR; ++ } + alts[i].name = alt_save; + memcpy (alt_save, alt_names + 2, alt_len); + alt_save[alt_len] = '\0'; + alt_save += alt_len + 1; ++ alt_name_len -= alt_len + 1; + alt_names += _fs_pad_length (alt_len + 2); + } + conn->numAlts = setup->num_alternates; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch b/debian/patches/1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e303b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From a2c7cd9fef2d7d108e224ab47e77130dc98b249d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 21:33:30 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 08/40] Don't crash when we receive an FS_Error from the font + server (Guillem Jover). from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + bfb8a71f4f7e5c5ed4278cb3ee271bf9990d276d + +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 0fdcc1d..c159b2b 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -2366,7 +2366,7 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + _fs_free_props (&binfo->info); + + rep = (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (rep == 0) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch b/debian/patches/1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b06b86 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +From 50e80a06c84375e39af02b24f01a949cb565a49d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 21:39:55 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 09/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated lengths when reading replies + from font server from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + cbb64aef35960b2882be721f4b8fbaa0fb649d12 + +Functions to handle replies to font server requests were casting replies +from the generic form to reply specific structs without first checking +that the reply was at least as long as the struct being cast to. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index c159b2b..ca10aa4 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -94,6 +94,12 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group. + (pci)->descent || \ + (pci)->characterWidth) + ++/* ++ * SIZEOF(r) is in bytes, length fields in the protocol are in 32-bit words, ++ * so this converts for doing size comparisons. ++ */ ++#define LENGTHOF(r) (SIZEOF(r) >> 2) ++ + extern void ErrorF(const char *f, ...); + + static int fs_read_glyphs ( FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec ); +@@ -209,9 +215,22 @@ _fs_add_rep_log (FSFpePtr conn, fsGenericReply *rep) + rep->sequenceNumber, + conn->reqbuffer[i].opcode); + } ++ ++#define _fs_reply_failed(rep, name, op) do { \ ++ if (rep) { \ ++ if (rep->type == FS_Error) \ ++ fprintf (stderr, "Error: %d Request: %s\n", \ ++ ((fsError *)rep)->request, #name); \ ++ else \ ++ fprintf (stderr, "Bad Length for %s Reply: %d %s %d\n", \ ++ #name, rep->length, op, LENGTHOF(name)); \ ++ } \ ++} while (0) ++ + #else + #define _fs_add_req_log(conn,op) ((conn)->current_seq++) + #define _fs_add_rep_log(conn,rep) ++#define _fs_reply_failed(rep,name,op) + #endif + + static Bool +@@ -693,13 +712,15 @@ fs_read_open_font(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + int ret; + + rep = (fsOpenBitmapFontReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error || ++ (rep->length != LENGTHOF(fsOpenBitmapFontReply))) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; + if (rep) + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); + fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont); ++ _fs_reply_failed (rep, fsOpenBitmapFontReply, "!="); + return BadFontName; + } + +@@ -835,13 +856,15 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + int ret; + + rep = (fsQueryXInfoReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error || ++ (rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsQueryXInfoReply))) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; + if (rep) + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); + fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont); ++ _fs_reply_failed (rep, fsQueryXInfoReply, "<"); + return BadFontName; + } + +@@ -962,13 +985,15 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + FontInfoRec *fi = &bfont->pfont->info; + + rep = (fsQueryXExtents16Reply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error || ++ (rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsQueryXExtents16Reply))) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; + if (rep) + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); + fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont); ++ _fs_reply_failed (rep, fsQueryXExtents16Reply, "<"); + return BadFontName; + } + +@@ -1833,13 +1858,15 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + unsigned long minchar, maxchar; + + rep = (fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error || ++ (rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply))) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; + if (rep) + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); + err = AllocError; ++ _fs_reply_failed (rep, fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply, "<"); + goto bail; + } + +@@ -2243,12 +2270,14 @@ fs_read_list(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + int err; + + rep = (fsListFontsReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error || ++ (rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsListFontsReply))) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; + if (rep) + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); ++ _fs_reply_failed (rep, fsListFontsReply, "<"); + return AllocError; + } + data = (char *) rep + SIZEOF (fsListFontsReply); +@@ -2366,12 +2395,15 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + _fs_free_props (&binfo->info); + + rep = (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret); +- if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error) ++ if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error || ++ ((rep->nameLength != 0) && ++ (rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsListFontsWithXInfoReply)))) + { + if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK) + return StillWorking; + binfo->status = FS_LFWI_FINISHED; + err = AllocError; ++ _fs_reply_failed (rep, fsListFontsWithXInfoReply, "<"); + goto done; + } + /* +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch b/debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba88342 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 2d724c1a0416895dd39bf33678f42cbb4c51b1ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 21:43:42 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 10/40] CVE-2014-0211: Integer overflow in + fs_get_reply/_fs_start_read from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 0f1a5d372c143f91a602bdf10c917d7eabaee09b + +fs_get_reply() would take any reply size, multiply it by 4 and pass to +_fs_start_read. If that size was bigger than the current reply buffer +size, _fs_start_read would add it to the existing buffer size plus the +buffer size increment constant and realloc the buffer to that result. + +This math could overflow, causing the code to allocate a smaller +buffer than the amount it was about to read into that buffer from +the network. It could also succeed, allowing the remote font server +to cause massive allocations in the X server, possibly using up all +the address space in a 32-bit X server, allowing the triggering of +other bugs in code that fails to handle malloc failure properly. + +This patch protects against both problems, by disconnecting any +font server trying to feed us more than (the somewhat arbitrary) +64 mb in a single reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index ca10aa4..7762653 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group. + */ + #define LENGTHOF(r) (SIZEOF(r) >> 2) + ++/* Somewhat arbitrary limit on maximum reply size we'll try to read. */ ++#define MAX_REPLY_LENGTH ((64 * 1024 * 1024) >> 2) ++ + extern void ErrorF(const char *f, ...); + + static int fs_read_glyphs ( FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec ); +@@ -630,6 +633,21 @@ fs_get_reply (FSFpePtr conn, int *error) + + rep = (fsGenericReply *) buf; + ++ /* ++ * Refuse to accept replies longer than a maximum reasonable length, ++ * before we pass to _fs_start_read, since it will try to resize the ++ * incoming connection buffer to this size. Also avoids integer overflow ++ * on 32-bit systems. ++ */ ++ if (rep->length > MAX_REPLY_LENGTH) ++ { ++ ErrorF("fserve: reply length %d > MAX_REPLY_LENGTH, disconnecting" ++ " from font server\n", rep->length); ++ _fs_connection_died (conn); ++ *error = FSIO_ERROR; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + ret = _fs_start_read (conn, rep->length << 2, &buf); + if (ret != FSIO_READY) + { +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch b/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96b7b97 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From c6aebf9284855a0e24ad9c5ffdd36aa65e16bec7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:08:09 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 11/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in + fs_read_query_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f + +fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server. The reply +contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated. This +can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in +_fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c +index 9ff54f5..d41e0b8 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c +@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd, + for (i = 0; i < nprops; i++, dprop++, is_str++) + { + memcpy(&local_off, off_adr, SIZEOF(fsPropOffset)); ++ if ((local_off.name.position >= pi->data_len) || ++ (local_off.name.length > ++ (pi->data_len - local_off.name.position))) ++ goto bail; + dprop->name = MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.name.position], + local_off.name.length, 1); + if (local_off.type != PropTypeString) { +@@ -130,15 +134,20 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd, + dprop->value = local_off.value.position; + } else { + *is_str = TRUE; ++ if ((local_off.value.position >= pi->data_len) || ++ (local_off.value.length > ++ (pi->data_len - local_off.value.position))) ++ goto bail; + dprop->value = (INT32) MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.value.position], + local_off.value.length, 1); + if (dprop->value == BAD_RESOURCE) + { +- xfree (pfi->props); +- pfi->nprops = 0; +- pfi->props = 0; +- pfi->isStringProp = 0; +- return -1; ++ bail: ++ xfree (pfi->props); ++ pfi->nprops = 0; ++ pfi->props = 0; ++ pfi->isStringProp = 0; ++ return -1; + } + } + off_adr += SIZEOF(fsPropOffset); +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 7762653..2a6f6c9 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -865,6 +865,7 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + FSFpePtr conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private; + fsQueryXInfoReply *rep; + char *buf; ++ long bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */ + fsPropInfo *pi; + fsPropOffset *po; + pointer pd; +@@ -895,7 +896,10 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + + buf = (char *) rep; + buf += SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply); +- ++ ++ bufleft = rep->length << 2; ++ bufleft -= SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply); ++ + /* move the data over */ + fsUnpack_XFontInfoHeader(rep, pInfo); + +@@ -903,19 +907,51 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + _fs_init_fontinfo(conn, pInfo); + + /* Compute offsets into the reply */ ++ if (bufleft < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo)) ++ { ++ ret = -1; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo)\n", ++ bufleft); ++#endif ++ goto bail; ++ } + pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf; + buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo); ++ bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset); + ++ if (bufleft < pi->data_len) ++ { ++ ret = -1; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n", ++ bufleft, pi->data_len); ++#endif ++ goto bail; ++ } + po = (fsPropOffset *) buf; + buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset); ++ bufleft -= pi->data_len; + ++ { ++ ret = -1; ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n", ++ bufleft, pi->data_len); ++#endif ++ goto bail; ++ } + pd = (pointer) buf; + buf += pi->data_len; ++ bufleft -= pi->data_len; + + /* convert the properties and step over the reply */ + ret = _fs_convert_props(pi, po, pd, pInfo); ++ bail: + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); +- ++ + if (ret == -1) + { + fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch b/debian/patches/1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc1dea6 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From bb7abd9da9badc6cb825c636867cbef827141f36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:19:01 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 12/40] CVE-2014-0211: integer overflow in + fs_read_extent_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + c578408c1fd4db09e4e3173f8a9e65c81cc187c1 + +fs_read_extent_info() parses a reply from the font server. +The reply contains a 32bit number of elements field which is used +to calculate a buffer length. There is an integer overflow in this +calculation which can lead to memory corruption. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 12 +++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 2a6f6c9..639964c 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group. + #include "fservestr.h" + #include <X11/fonts/fontutil.h> + #include <errno.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + #include <time.h> + #define Time_t time_t +@@ -1060,7 +1061,16 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + numInfos *= 2; + haveInk = TRUE; + } +- ci = pCI = (CharInfoPtr) xalloc(sizeof(CharInfoRec) * numInfos); ++ if (numInfos >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(CharInfoRec))) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXExtents16: numInfos (%d) >= %ld\n", ++ numInfos, (INT_MAX / sizeof(CharInfoRec))); ++#endif ++ pCI = NULL; ++ } ++ else ++ pCI = malloc(sizeof(CharInfoRec) * numInfos); + + if (!pCI) + { +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch b/debian/patches/1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63ba2b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From a0bed4d9fce8ffc96f13ca13b95d2a7913d20719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:23:51 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 13/40] CVE-2014-0211: integer overflow in fs_alloc_glyphs() + from xorg/lib/libXfont commit a42f707f8a62973f5e8bbcd08afb10a79e9cee33 + +fs_alloc_glyphs() is a malloc wrapper used by the font code. +It contains a classic integer overflow in the malloc() call, +which can cause memory corruption. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c +index d41e0b8..afa2c32 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c +@@ -762,7 +762,12 @@ fs_alloc_glyphs (FontPtr pFont, int size) + FSGlyphPtr glyphs; + FSFontPtr fsfont = (FSFontPtr) pFont->fontPrivate; + +- glyphs = xalloc (sizeof (FSGlyphRec) + size); ++ if (size < (INT_MAX - sizeof (FSGlyphRec))) ++ glyphs = xalloc (sizeof (FSGlyphRec) + size); ++ else ++ glyphs = NULL; ++ if (glyphs == NULL) ++ return NULL; + glyphs->next = fsfont->glyphs; + fsfont->glyphs = glyphs; + return (pointer) (glyphs + 1); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch b/debian/patches/1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d65f8a --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From d2b96c5d59766f96181de95da1906fd6e32785ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:26:16 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 14/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in + fs_read_extent_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + a3f21421537620fc4e1f844a594a4bcd9f7e2bd8 + +Looping over the extents in the reply could go past the end of the +reply buffer if the reply indicated more extents than could fit in +the specified reply length. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 639964c..79de4f3 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -1069,6 +1069,16 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + #endif + pCI = NULL; + } ++ else if (numExtents > ((rep->length - LENGTHOF(fsQueryXExtents16Reply)) ++ / LENGTHOF(fsXCharInfo))) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXExtents16: numExtents (%d) > (%d - %d) / %d\n", ++ numExtents, rep->length, ++ LENGTHOF(fsQueryXExtents16Reply), LENGTHOF(fsXCharInfo)); ++#endif ++ pCI = NULL; ++ } + else + pCI = malloc(sizeof(CharInfoRec) * numInfos); + +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch b/debian/patches/1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93e7d32 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From ece51493f1d970f45e53588e33a700464a42fbab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:27:47 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 15/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in + fs_read_glyphs() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 520683652564c2a4e42328ae23eef9bb63271565 + +fs_read_glyphs() parses a reply from the font server. The reply +contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated. +This can cause out of bound reads when looping over the glyph +bitmaps in the reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 79de4f3..26218e5 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -1916,6 +1916,7 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + FontInfoPtr pfi = &pfont->info; + fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply *rep; + char *buf; ++ long bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */ + fsOffset32 *ppbits; + fsOffset32 local_off; + char *off_adr; +@@ -1947,9 +1948,33 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + buf = (char *) rep; + buf += SIZEOF (fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply); + ++ bufleft = rep->length << 2; ++ bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply); ++ ++ if ((bufleft / SIZEOF (fsOffset32)) < rep->num_chars) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXBitmaps16: num_chars (%d) > bufleft (%ld) / %d\n", ++ rep->num_chars, bufleft, SIZEOF (fsOffset32)); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto bail; ++ } + ppbits = (fsOffset32 *) buf; + buf += SIZEOF (fsOffset32) * (rep->num_chars); ++ bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsOffset32) * (rep->num_chars); + ++ if (bufleft < rep->nbytes) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsQueryXBitmaps16: nbytes (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n", ++ rep->nbytes, bufleft); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto bail; ++ } + pbitmaps = (pointer ) buf; + + if (blockrec->type == FS_LOAD_GLYPHS) +@@ -2007,7 +2032,9 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + */ + if (NONZEROMETRICS(&fsdata->encoding[minchar].metrics)) + { +- if (local_off.length) ++ if (local_off.length && ++ (local_off.position < rep->nbytes) && ++ (local_off.length <= (rep->nbytes - local_off.position))) + { + bits = allbits; + allbits += local_off.length; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch b/debian/patches/1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5bc8c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From ef439da38d3a4c00a4e03e7d8f83cb359cd9a230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:35:21 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 16/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in + fs_read_list() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + 5fa73ac18474be3032ee7af9c6e29deab163ea39 + +fs_read_list() parses a reply from the font server. The reply +contains a list of strings with embedded length fields, none of +which are validated. This can cause out of bound reads when looping +over the strings in the reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 26218e5..60d9017 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -2365,6 +2365,7 @@ fs_read_list(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + FSBlockedListPtr blist = (FSBlockedListPtr) blockrec->data; + fsListFontsReply *rep; + char *data; ++ long dataleft; /* length of reply left to use */ + int length, + i, + ret; +@@ -2382,16 +2383,30 @@ fs_read_list(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + return AllocError; + } + data = (char *) rep + SIZEOF (fsListFontsReply); ++ dataleft = (rep->length << 2) - SIZEOF (fsListFontsReply); + + err = Successful; + /* copy data into FontPathRecord */ + for (i = 0; i < rep->nFonts; i++) + { ++ if (dataleft < 1) ++ break; + length = *(unsigned char *)data++; ++ dataleft--; /* used length byte */ ++ if (length > dataleft) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsListFonts: name length (%d) > dataleft (%ld)\n", ++ length, dataleft); ++#endif ++ err = BadFontName; ++ break; ++ } + err = AddFontNamesName(blist->names, data, length); + if (err != Successful) + break; + data += length; ++ dataleft -= length; + } + _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2); + return err; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch b/debian/patches/1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d92c4ee --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From b65259bf3bcca15b5069cb7a6c06f95a40f79813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:38:32 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 17/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in + fs_read_list_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit + d338f81df1e188eb16e1d6aeea7f4800f89c1218 + +fs_read_list_info() parses a reply from the font server. The reply +contains a number of additional data items with embedded length or +count fields, none of which are validated. This can cause out of +bound reads when looping over these items in the reply. +--- + nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +index 60d9017..6ba3ad4 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c +@@ -2500,6 +2500,7 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + FSBlockedListInfoPtr binfo = (FSBlockedListInfoPtr) blockrec->data; + fsListFontsWithXInfoReply *rep; + char *buf; ++ long bufleft; + FSFpePtr conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private; + fsPropInfo *pi; + fsPropOffset *po; +@@ -2536,7 +2537,8 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + } + + buf = (char *) rep + SIZEOF (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply); +- ++ bufleft = (rep->length << 2) - SIZEOF (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply); ++ + /* + * The original FS implementation didn't match + * the spec, version 1 was respecified to match the FS. +@@ -2544,19 +2546,71 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + */ + if (conn->fsMajorVersion <= 1) + { ++ if (rep->nameLength > bufleft) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsListFontsWithXInfo: name length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n", ++ (int) rep->nameLength, bufleft); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ /* binfo->name is a 256 char array, rep->nameLength is a CARD8 */ + memcpy (binfo->name, buf, rep->nameLength); + buf += _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength); ++ bufleft -= _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength); + } + pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf; ++ if (SIZEOF (fsPropInfo) > bufleft) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsListFontsWithXInfo: PropInfo length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n", ++ (int) SIZEOF (fsPropInfo), bufleft); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsPropInfo); + buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo); + po = (fsPropOffset *) buf; ++ if (pi->num_offsets > (bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset))) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsListFontsWithXInfo: offset length (%d * %d) > bufleft (%ld)\n", ++ pi->num_offsets, (int) SIZEOF (fsPropOffset), bufleft); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF (fsPropOffset); + buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF (fsPropOffset); + pd = (pointer) buf; ++ if (pi->data_len > bufleft) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsListFontsWithXInfo: data length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n", ++ pi->data_len, bufleft); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ bufleft -= pi->data_len; + buf += pi->data_len; + if (conn->fsMajorVersion > 1) + { ++ if (rep->nameLength > bufleft) { ++#ifdef DEBUG ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "fsListFontsWithXInfo: name length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n", ++ (int) rep->nameLength, bufleft); ++#endif ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ /* binfo->name is a 256 char array, rep->nameLength is a CARD8 */ + memcpy (binfo->name, buf, rep->nameLength); + buf += _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength); ++ bufleft -= _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength); + } + + #ifdef DEBUG +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch b/debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3177ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 37e7fb1f64b29ef06ec4d69ab0b7afa99c613383 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 18:54:03 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 18/40] unchecked malloc may allow unauthed client to crash + Xserver [CVE-2014-8091] + +authdes_ezdecode() calls malloc() using a length provided by the +connection handshake sent by a newly connected client in order +to authenticate to the server, so should be treated as untrusted. + +It didn't check if malloc() failed before writing to the newly +allocated buffer, so could lead to a server crash if the server +fails to allocate memory (up to UINT16_MAX bytes, since the len +field is a CARD16 in the X protocol). + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + os/rpcauth.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c +index 3c5cb59..a12931e 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/rpcauth.c +@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ authdes_ezdecode(char *inmsg, int len) + SVCXPRT xprt; + + temp_inmsg = (char *) xalloc(len); ++ if (temp_inmsg == NULL) { ++ why = AUTH_FAILED; /* generic error, since there is no AUTH_BADALLOC */ ++ return NULL; ++ } + memmove(temp_inmsg, inmsg, len); + + memset((char *)&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch b/debian/patches/1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..05d4919 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From c1225fe6451d7a5f3741ce0fff8f54e38e0a14da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 21:11:16 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 19/40] dix: integer overflow in ProcPutImage() [CVE-2014-8092 + 1/4] + +ProcPutImage() calculates a length field from a width, left pad and depth +specified by the client (if the specified format is XYPixmap). + +The calculations for the total amount of memory the server needs for the +pixmap can overflow a 32-bit number, causing out-of-bounds memory writes +on 32-bit systems (since the length is stored in a long int variable). + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + dix/dispatch.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c +index 6941456..5ad2f5a 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dix/dispatch.c +@@ -2071,7 +2071,9 @@ ProcPutImage(register ClientPtr client) + + tmpImage = (char *)&stuff[1]; + lengthProto = length; +- ++ if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height)) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if (((((lengthProto * stuff->height) + (unsigned)3) >> 2) + + (sizeof(xPutImageReq) >> 2)) != client->req_len) + return BadLength; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..619794f --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From d4c76981f7fddb364166464c571ed8d3de3086cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 23:30:14 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 20/40] dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() [CVE-2014-8092 2/4] + +GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies +them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over +all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a +potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with +a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly +calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory. + +This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname +lists for X access control are insane. + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + os/access.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c +index b6a70a7..0e9d138 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/os/access.c +@@ -1719,6 +1719,10 @@ GetHosts ( + { + nHosts++; + n += (((host->len + 3) >> 2) << 2) + sizeof(xHostEntry); ++ /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of ++ hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */ ++ if (n >= 1048576) ++ break; + } + if (n) + { +@@ -1730,6 +1734,8 @@ GetHosts ( + for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) + { + len = host->len; ++ if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n)) ++ break; + ((xHostEntry *)ptr)->family = host->family; + ((xHostEntry *)ptr)->length = len; + ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch b/debian/patches/1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a189cd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +From ed1e13a1f4e316bcf0dc0d4b2c16b1df3f075005 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 22:37:15 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 21/40] dix: integer overflow in RegionSizeof() [CVE-2014-8092 + 3/4] + +RegionSizeof contains several integer overflows if a large length +value is passed in. Once we fix it to return 0 on overflow, we +also have to fix the callers to handle this error condition + +v2: Fixed limit calculation in RegionSizeof as pointed out by jcristau. +v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> + +Conflicts: + dix/region.c + include/regionstr.h +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/regionstr.h | 10 +++++--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/mi/miregion.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/regionstr.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/regionstr.h +index 000bf3f..cf41170 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/regionstr.h ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/regionstr.h +@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ SOFTWARE. + + typedef struct _Region RegionRec, *RegionPtr; + ++#include <stddef.h> ++#include <limits.h> ++ + #include "miscstruct.h" + + /* Return values from RectIn() */ +@@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ extern RegDataRec miBrokenData; + #define REGION_BOX(reg,i) (®ION_BOXPTR(reg)[i]) + #define REGION_TOP(reg) REGION_BOX(reg, (reg)->data->numRects) + #define REGION_END(reg) REGION_BOX(reg, (reg)->data->numRects - 1) +-#define REGION_SZOF(n) (sizeof(RegDataRec) + ((n) * sizeof(BoxRec))) ++#define REGION_SZOF(n) (n < ((INT_MAX - sizeof(RegDataRec)) / sizeof(BoxRec)) ? sizeof(RegDataRec) + ((n) * sizeof(BoxRec)) : 0) + + /* Keith recommends weaning the region code of pScreen argument */ + #define REG_pScreen screenInfo.screens[0] +@@ -257,9 +260,10 @@ extern RegDataRec miBrokenData; + } \ + else \ + { \ ++ size_t rgnSize; \ + (_pReg)->extents = miEmptyBox; \ +- if (((_size) > 1) && ((_pReg)->data = \ +- (RegDataPtr)xalloc(REGION_SZOF(_size)))) \ ++ if (((_size) > 1) && ((rgnSize = REGION_SZOF(_size)) > 0) && \ ++ ((_pReg)->data = (RegDataPtr)xalloc(rgnSize))) \ + { \ + (_pReg)->data->size = (_size); \ + (_pReg)->data->numRects = 0; \ +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/mi/miregion.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/mi/miregion.c +index df33248..5ec4ec5 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/mi/miregion.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/mi/miregion.c +@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@ Equipment Corporation. + ((r1)->y1 <= (r2)->y1) && \ + ((r1)->y2 >= (r2)->y2) ) + +-#define xallocData(n) (RegDataPtr)xalloc(REGION_SZOF(n)) + #define xfreeData(reg) if ((reg)->data && (reg)->data->size) xfree((reg)->data) + + #define RECTALLOC_BAIL(pReg,n,bail) \ +@@ -209,8 +208,9 @@ if (!(pReg)->data || (((pReg)->data->numRects + (n)) > (pReg)->data->size)) \ + #define DOWNSIZE(reg,numRects) \ + if (((numRects) < ((reg)->data->size >> 1)) && ((reg)->data->size > 50)) \ + { \ +- RegDataPtr NewData; \ +- NewData = (RegDataPtr)xrealloc((reg)->data, REGION_SZOF(numRects)); \ ++ size_t NewSize = REGION_SZOF(numRects); \ ++ RegDataPtr NewData = \ ++ (NewSize > 0) ? (RegDataPtr)xrealloc((reg)->data, NewSize) : NULL; \ + if (NewData) \ + { \ + NewData->size = (numRects); \ +@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ miRegionCreate(rect, size) + int size; + { + register RegionPtr pReg; +- ++ size_t newSize; + pReg = (RegionPtr)xalloc(sizeof(RegionRec)); + if (!pReg) + return &miBrokenRegion; +@@ -349,7 +349,9 @@ miRegionCreate(rect, size) + else + { + pReg->extents = miEmptyBox; +- if ((size > 1) && (pReg->data = xallocData(size))) ++ newSize = REGION_SZOF(size); ++ if ((size > 1) && (newSize > 0) && ++ (pReg->data = xalloc(newSize))) + { + pReg->data->size = size; + pReg->data->numRects = 0; +@@ -371,6 +373,8 @@ miRegionInit(pReg, rect, size) + BoxPtr rect; + int size; + { ++ size_t newSize; ++ + if (rect) + { + pReg->extents = *rect; +@@ -379,7 +383,9 @@ miRegionInit(pReg, rect, size) + else + { + pReg->extents = miEmptyBox; +- if ((size > 1) && (pReg->data = xallocData(size))) ++ newSize = REGION_SZOF(size); ++ if ((size > 1) && (newSize > 0) && ++ (pReg->data = xalloc(newSize))) + { + pReg->data->size = size; + pReg->data->numRects = 0; +@@ -423,11 +429,13 @@ miRectAlloc( + int n) + { + RegDataPtr data; ++ size_t rgnSize; + + if (!pRgn->data) + { + n++; +- pRgn->data = xallocData(n); ++ rgnSize = REGION_SZOF(n); ++ pRgn->data = (rgnSize > 0) ? xalloc(rgnSize) : NULL; + if (!pRgn->data) + return miRegionBreak (pRgn); + pRgn->data->numRects = 1; +@@ -435,7 +443,8 @@ miRectAlloc( + } + else if (!pRgn->data->size) + { +- pRgn->data = xallocData(n); ++ rgnSize = REGION_SZOF(n); ++ pRgn->data = (rgnSize > 0) ? xalloc(rgnSize) : NULL; + if (!pRgn->data) + return miRegionBreak (pRgn); + pRgn->data->numRects = 0; +@@ -449,7 +458,8 @@ miRectAlloc( + n = 250; + } + n += pRgn->data->numRects; +- data = (RegDataPtr)xrealloc(pRgn->data, REGION_SZOF(n)); ++ rgnSize = REGION_SZOF(n); ++ data = (rgnSize > 0) ? xrealloc(pRgn->data, rgnSize) : NULL; + if (!data) + return miRegionBreak (pRgn); + pRgn->data = data; +@@ -476,8 +486,10 @@ miRegionCopy(dst, src) + } + if (!dst->data || (dst->data->size < src->data->numRects)) + { ++ size_t newSize = REGION_SZOF(src->data->numRects); + xfreeData(dst); +- dst->data = xallocData(src->data->numRects); ++ ++ dst->data = newSize > 0 ? xalloc(newSize) : NULL; + if (!dst->data) + return miRegionBreak (dst); + dst->data->size = src->data->numRects; +@@ -1667,6 +1679,7 @@ miRectsToRegion(nrects, prect, ctype) + register BoxPtr pBox; + register int i; + int x1, y1, x2, y2; ++ size_t newSize; + + pRgn = miRegionCreate(NullBox, 0); + if (REGION_NAR (pRgn)) +@@ -1691,7 +1704,8 @@ miRectsToRegion(nrects, prect, ctype) + } + return pRgn; + } +- pData = xallocData(nrects); ++ newSize = REGION_SZOF(nrects); ++ pData = newSize > 0 ? xalloc(newSize) : NULL; + if (!pData) + { + miRegionBreak (pRgn); +@@ -2206,8 +2220,9 @@ miRegionDataCopy( + } + if (!dst->data || (dst->data->size < src->data->numRects)) + { ++ size_t newSize = REGION_SZOF(src->data->numRects); + xfreeData(dst); +- dst->data = xallocData(src->data->numRects); ++ dst->data = newSize > 0 ? xalloc(newSize) : NULL; + if (!dst->data) + return miRegionBreak (dst); + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch b/debian/patches/1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3dddcb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 82d7279ebfa04f319e68145b3adbf65716e59584 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:44:46 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 22/40] dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE() + [CVE-2014-8092 4/4] + +Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients +in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during +checks. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +RHEL5: add #include <stdint.h> for uint64_t +v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h +index 1b8fc42..d82979c 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h +@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ SOFTWARE. + #ifndef DIX_H + #define DIX_H + ++#include <stdint.h> ++ + #include "gc.h" + #include "window.h" + #include "input.h" +@@ -73,7 +75,8 @@ SOFTWARE. + + #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ + if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ +- (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \ ++ ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ ++ ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \ + return(BadLength) + + #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\ +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch b/debian/patches/1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b9beb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 985ca320f841bd9a3efc484f92436b3d65ec1b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:12:04 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 23/40] dbe: unvalidated lengths in DbeSwapBuffers calls + [CVE-2014-8097] + +ProcDbeSwapBuffers() has a 32bit (n) length value that it uses to read +from a buffer. The length is never validated, which can lead to out of +bound reads, and possibly returning the data read from out of bounds to +the misbehaving client via an X Error packet. + +SProcDbeSwapBuffers() swaps data (for correct endianness) before +handing it off to the real proc. While doing the swapping, the +length field is not validated, which can cause memory corruption. + +v2: reorder checks to avoid compilers optimizing out checks for overflow +that happen after we'd already have done the overflowing multiplications. +v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + dbe/dbe.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c +index c0d6131..5a1e9b0 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/dbe/dbe.c +@@ -725,8 +725,8 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(client) + DbeSwapInfoPtr swapInfo; + xDbeSwapInfo *dbeSwapInfo; + int error; +- register int i, j; +- int nStuff; ++ unsigned int i, j; ++ unsigned int nStuff; + + + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); +@@ -734,11 +734,13 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(client) + + if (nStuff == 0) + { ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); + return(Success); + } + + if (nStuff > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec)) + return BadAlloc; ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq, nStuff * sizeof(xDbeSwapInfo)); + + /* Get to the swap info appended to the end of the request. */ + dbeSwapInfo = (xDbeSwapInfo *)&stuff[1]; +@@ -1289,7 +1291,7 @@ SProcDbeSwapBuffers(client) + ClientPtr client; + { + REQUEST(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); +- register int i, n; ++ unsigned int i, n; + xDbeSwapInfo *pSwapInfo; + + +@@ -1297,6 +1299,9 @@ SProcDbeSwapBuffers(client) + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); + + swapl(&stuff->n, n); ++ if (stuff->n > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec)) ++ return BadAlloc; ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq, stuff->n * sizeof(xDbeSwapInfo)); + + if (stuff->n != 0) + { +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch b/debian/patches/1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..884fa43 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From fde1375e373137ac52d0530b819bf9df64ab14c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 10:54:41 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 24/40] Xi: unvalidated lengths in Xinput extension + [CVE-2014-8095] + +Multiple functions in the Xinput extension handling of requests from +clients failed to check that the length of the request sent by the +client was large enough to perform all the required operations and +thus could read or write to memory outside the bounds of the request +buffer. + +This commit includes the creation of a new REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE +macro in include/dix.h for the common case of needing to ensure a +request is large enough to include both the request itself and a +minimum amount of extra data following the request header. + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + Xi/chgdctl.c + Xi/chgfctl.c + Xi/xiallowev.c + Xi/xichangecursor.c + Xi/xichangehierarchy.c + Xi/xigetclientpointer.c + Xi/xigrabdev.c + Xi/xipassivegrab.c + Xi/xiproperty.c + Xi/xiquerydevice.c + Xi/xiquerypointer.c + Xi/xiselectev.c + Xi/xisetclientpointer.c + Xi/xisetdevfocus.c + Xi/xiwarppointer.c + +[RHEL5: Xi/xi* files are XI2 ] +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgdctl.c | 4 ++-- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgfctl.c | 2 ++ + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/sendexev.c | 3 +++ + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h | 4 ++++ + 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgdctl.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgdctl.c +index 63a3c9c..144a51e 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgdctl.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgdctl.c +@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ SProcXChangeDeviceControl(client) + + REQUEST(xChangeDeviceControlReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); +- REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq, sizeof(xDeviceCtl)); + swaps(&stuff->control, n); + return(ProcXChangeDeviceControl(client)); + } +@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceControl(client) + CARD32 *resolution; + + REQUEST(xChangeDeviceControlReq); +- REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq, sizeof(xDeviceCtl)); + + len = stuff->length - (sizeof(xChangeDeviceControlReq) >>2); + dev = LookupDeviceIntRec (stuff->deviceid); +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgfctl.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgfctl.c +index fe8bd1f..3ffac39 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgfctl.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/chgfctl.c +@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ ProcXChangeFeedbackControl(client) + xStringFeedbackCtl *f = ((xStringFeedbackCtl *) &stuff[1]); + if (client->swapped) + { ++ if (len < (sizeof(xStringFeedbackCtl) + 3) >> 2) ++ return BadLength; + swaps(&f->num_keysyms,n); + } + if (len != ((sizeof(xStringFeedbackCtl)>>2) + f->num_keysyms)) +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/sendexev.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/sendexev.c +index 9b441f2..0b2a701 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/sendexev.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xi/sendexev.c +@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@ ProcXSendExtensionEvent (client) + return Success; + } + ++ if (stuff->num_events == 0) ++ return ret; ++ + /* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */ + + first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]); +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h +index d82979c..9fe575e 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/include/dix.h +@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ SOFTWARE. + if ((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len )\ + return(BadLength) + ++#define REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE(req, extra) \ ++ if (((sizeof(req) + ((uint64_t) extra)) >> 2) > client->req_len ) \ ++ return(BadLength) ++ + #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ + if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ + ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch b/debian/patches/1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..342728e --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From 0d53194f7ef5980a7cd78950a4f3eb2b56e65746 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 17:18:54 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 25/40] xcmisc: unvalidated length in SProcXCMiscGetXIDList() + [CVE-2014-8096] + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xcmisc.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xcmisc.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xcmisc.c +index c7bb72d..0a9a090 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xcmisc.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xcmisc.c +@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ SProcXCMiscGetXIDList(client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xXCMiscGetXIDListReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXCMiscGetXIDListReq); + + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->count, n); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch b/debian/patches/1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d458a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +From 2abde565df5de98800cec428fe612cb979063c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 19:23:17 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 26/40] Xv: unvalidated lengths in XVideo extension swapped + procs [CVE-2014-8099] + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + Xext/xvdisp.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xvdisp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xvdisp.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xvdisp.c +index 21ab0b6..b361c0f 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xvdisp.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/Xext/xvdisp.c +@@ -1347,6 +1347,7 @@ SProcXvQueryExtension(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvQueryExtensionReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryExtensionReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + return ProcXvQueryExtension(client); + } +@@ -1356,6 +1357,7 @@ SProcXvQueryAdaptors(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvQueryAdaptorsReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryAdaptorsReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->window, n); + return ProcXvQueryAdaptors(client); +@@ -1366,6 +1368,7 @@ SProcXvQueryEncodings(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvQueryEncodingsReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryEncodingsReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + return ProcXvQueryEncodings(client); +@@ -1376,6 +1379,7 @@ SProcXvGrabPort(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvGrabPortReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGrabPortReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->time, n); +@@ -1387,6 +1391,7 @@ SProcXvUngrabPort(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvUngrabPortReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvUngrabPortReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->time, n); +@@ -1398,6 +1403,7 @@ SProcXvPutVideo(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvPutVideoReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvPutVideoReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1418,6 +1424,7 @@ SProcXvPutStill(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvPutStillReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvPutStillReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1438,6 +1445,7 @@ SProcXvGetVideo(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvGetVideoReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGetVideoReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1458,6 +1466,7 @@ SProcXvGetStill(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvGetStillReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGetStillReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1478,6 +1487,7 @@ SProcXvPutImage(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvPutImageReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xvPutImageReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1502,6 +1512,7 @@ SProcXvShmPutImage(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvShmPutImageReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvShmPutImageReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1529,6 +1540,7 @@ SProcXvSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); + return ProcXvSelectVideoNotify(client); +@@ -1539,6 +1551,7 @@ SProcXvSelectPortNotify(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvSelectPortNotifyReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSelectPortNotifyReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + return ProcXvSelectPortNotify(client); +@@ -1549,6 +1562,7 @@ SProcXvStopVideo(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvStopVideoReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvStopVideoReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -1560,6 +1574,7 @@ SProcXvSetPortAttribute(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvSetPortAttributeReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSetPortAttributeReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->attribute, n); +@@ -1571,6 +1586,7 @@ SProcXvGetPortAttribute(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvGetPortAttributeReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGetPortAttributeReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swapl(&stuff->attribute, n); +@@ -1582,6 +1598,7 @@ SProcXvQueryBestSize(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvQueryBestSizeReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryBestSizeReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + swaps(&stuff->vid_w, n); +@@ -1596,6 +1613,7 @@ SProcXvQueryPortAttributes(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvQueryPortAttributesReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryPortAttributesReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + return ProcXvQueryPortAttributes(client); +@@ -1606,6 +1624,7 @@ SProcXvQueryImageAttributes(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvQueryImageAttributesReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryImageAttributesReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->id, n); + swaps(&stuff->width, n); +@@ -1618,6 +1637,7 @@ SProcXvListImageFormats(ClientPtr client) + { + register char n; + REQUEST(xvListImageFormatsReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvListImageFormatsReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->port, n); + return ProcXvListImageFormats(client); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch b/debian/patches/1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9540dde --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 6c820648ba4be98c94f61516e83f13edf5ed98db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:30:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 27/40] render: check request size before reading it + [CVE-2014-8100 1/2] + +Otherwise we may be reading outside of the client request. + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> + +Conflicts: + render/render.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c +index d25d497..ebbce81 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c +@@ -283,10 +283,11 @@ ProcRenderQueryVersion (ClientPtr client) + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderQueryVersionReq); + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq); ++ + pRenderClient->major_version = stuff->majorVersion; + pRenderClient->minor_version = stuff->minorVersion; + +- REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq); + rep.type = X_Reply; + rep.length = 0; + rep.sequenceNumber = client->sequence; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch b/debian/patches/1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b90b03c --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +From 9c3842a4f72b4cca28ac1d5c14441787c7dd6e6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 19:51:29 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 28/40] render: unvalidated lengths in Render extn. swapped + procs [CVE-2014-8100 2/2] + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +Conflicts: + render/render.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c +index ebbce81..eee21db 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/render/render.c +@@ -2014,6 +2014,7 @@ SProcRenderQueryVersion (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderQueryVersionReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq); + + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->majorVersion, n); +@@ -2026,6 +2027,7 @@ SProcRenderQueryPictFormats (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderQueryPictFormatsReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryPictFormatsReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); + } +@@ -2035,6 +2037,7 @@ SProcRenderQueryPictIndexValues (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->format, n); + return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); +@@ -2051,6 +2054,7 @@ SProcRenderCreatePicture (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderCreatePictureReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreatePictureReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->pid, n); + swapl(&stuff->drawable, n); +@@ -2065,6 +2069,7 @@ SProcRenderChangePicture (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderChangePictureReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderChangePictureReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->picture, n); + swapl(&stuff->mask, n); +@@ -2077,6 +2082,7 @@ SProcRenderSetPictureClipRectangles (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderSetPictureClipRectanglesReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderSetPictureClipRectanglesReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->picture, n); + SwapRestS(stuff); +@@ -2088,6 +2094,7 @@ SProcRenderFreePicture (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderFreePictureReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreePictureReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->picture, n); + return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); +@@ -2098,6 +2105,7 @@ SProcRenderComposite (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderCompositeReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCompositeReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->src, n); + swapl(&stuff->mask, n); +@@ -2118,6 +2126,7 @@ SProcRenderScale (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderScaleReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderScaleReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->src, n); + swapl(&stuff->dst, n); +@@ -2223,6 +2232,7 @@ SProcRenderCreateGlyphSet (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->gsid, n); + swapl(&stuff->format, n); +@@ -2234,6 +2244,7 @@ SProcRenderReferenceGlyphSet (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->gsid, n); + swapl(&stuff->existing, n); +@@ -2245,6 +2256,7 @@ SProcRenderFreeGlyphSet (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq); ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->glyphset, n); + return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); +@@ -2259,6 +2271,7 @@ SProcRenderAddGlyphs (ClientPtr client) + void *end; + xGlyphInfo *gi; + REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->glyphset, n); + swapl(&stuff->nglyphs, n); +@@ -2295,6 +2308,7 @@ SProcRenderFreeGlyphs (ClientPtr client) + { + register int n; + REQUEST(xRenderFreeGlyphsReq); ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderFreeGlyphsReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->glyphset, n); + SwapRestL(stuff); +@@ -2313,7 +2327,8 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs (ClientPtr client) + int size; + + REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq); +- ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq); ++ + switch (stuff->renderReqType) { + default: size = 1; break; + case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs16: size = 2; break; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch b/debian/patches/1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90bc324 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From c12a473f29cfadb62d38b0fffc36762d8e626676 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 20:02:20 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 29/40] xfixes: unvalidated length in + SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput [CVE-2014-8102] + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Conflicts: + xfixes/select.c +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/xfixes/select.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/xfixes/select.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/xfixes/select.c +index c72e19e..4b8bd01 100755 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/xfixes/select.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/xfixes/select.c +@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput (ClientPtr client) + register int n; + REQUEST(xXFixesSelectSelectionInputReq); + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesSelectSelectionInputReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->window, n); + swapl(&stuff->selection, n); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch b/debian/patches/1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a1757d --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From cea44678dd6a9418460ead314fb2106924b081f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 19:38:09 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 30/40] randr: unvalidated lengths in RandR extension swapped + procs [CVE-2014-8101] + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/randr/rrsdispatch.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/randr/rrsdispatch.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/randr/rrsdispatch.c +index 80d16b7..c4425ec 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/randr/rrsdispatch.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/randr/rrsdispatch.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SProcRRQueryVersion (ClientPtr client) + register int n; + REQUEST(xRRQueryVersionReq); + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRRQueryVersionReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->majorVersion, n); + swapl(&stuff->minorVersion, n); +@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ SProcRRGetScreenInfo (ClientPtr client) + register int n; + REQUEST(xRRGetScreenInfoReq); + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRRGetScreenInfoReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->window, n); + return (*ProcRandrVector[stuff->randrReqType]) (client); +@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ SProcRRSelectInput (ClientPtr client) + register int n; + REQUEST(xRRSelectInputReq); + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRRSelectInputReq); + swaps(&stuff->length, n); + swapl(&stuff->window, n); + swaps(&stuff->enable, n); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch b/debian/patches/1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d16d2e --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From 5c43bb2484414b37115dac56dc76f1ecf4c05837 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:36 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 31/40] glx: Be more paranoid about variable-length requests + [CVE-2014-8093 1/6] (v2) + +If the size computation routine returns -1 we should just reject the +request outright. Clamping it to zero could give an attacker the +opportunity to also mangle cmdlen in such a way that the subsequent +length check passes, and the request would get executed, thus passing +data we wanted to reject to the renderer. + +v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) +v2: backport to RHEL5 - fix swap paths +Reviewed-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> + +fixup swaps +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 4 ++-- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +index ca5eee8..02f3ba7 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ int __glXRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + /* variable size command */ + extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, False); + if (extra < 0) { +- extra = 0; ++ return BadLength; + } + if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + extra)) { + return BadLength; +@@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + */ + extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, False); + if (extra < 0) { +- extra = 0; ++ return BadLength; + } + /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ + if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) { +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +index 595e814..027cba7 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ int __glXSwapRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + /* variable size command */ + extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, True); + if (extra < 0) { +- extra = 0; ++ return BadLength; + } + if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + extra)) { + return BadLength; +@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + */ + extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, True); + if (extra < 0) { +- extra = 0; ++ return BadLength; + } + /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ + if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) { +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch b/debian/patches/1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af577aa --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +From cdf0c3e65670c797a4fd0617d44d2bdff4011815 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:37 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 32/40] glx: Be more strict about rejecting invalid image sizes + [CVE-2014-8093 2/6] + +Before this we'd just clamp the image size to 0, which was just +hideously stupid; if the parameters were such that they'd overflow an +integer, you'd allocate a small buffer, then pass huge values into (say) +ReadPixels, and now you're scribbling over arbitrary server memory. + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c | 14 +++++++------- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c | 14 +++++++------- + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c +index 845c46a..be804d8 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int __glXDisp_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + swapBytes = *(GLboolean *)(pc + 24); + lsbFirst = *(GLboolean *)(pc + 25); + compsize = __glReadPixels_size(format,type,width,height); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_LSB_FIRST, lsbFirst); +@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width, height, and depth would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,level,format,type,width,height,depth); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); + compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,height,1,1); + +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + if (compsize2 < 0) compsize2 = 0; + compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); + compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); +@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width and height would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,height,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetHistogram(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetMinmax(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + reset = *(GLboolean *)(pc + 13); + + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,2,1,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetColorTable(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c +index ff68ece..cdc6f16 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c +@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + swapBytes = *(GLboolean *)(pc + 24); + lsbFirst = *(GLboolean *)(pc + 25); + compsize = __glReadPixels_size(format,type,width,height); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_LSB_FIRST, lsbFirst); +@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width, height, and depth would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,level,format,type,width,height,depth); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); + compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,height,1,1); + +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + if (compsize2 < 0) compsize2 = 0; + compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); + compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); +@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width and height would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,height,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetHistogram(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetMinmax(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + reset = *(GLboolean *)(pc + 13); + + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,2,1,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetColorTable(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + * are illegal, but then width would still be zero anyway. + */ + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); +- if (compsize < 0) compsize = 0; ++ if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize,1); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch b/debian/patches/1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a043d21 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From d0fcbc8a6ca82df82c410d0f8f9062b05fa5ec8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:38 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 33/40] glx: Additional paranoia in __glXGetAnswerBuffer / + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER (v2) [CVE-2014-8093 3/6] + +If the computed reply size is negative, something went wrong, treat it +as an error. + +v2: Be more careful about size_t being unsigned (Matthieu Herrb) +v3: SIZE_MAX not SIZE_T_MAX (Alan Coopersmith) +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/unpack.h | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/unpack.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/unpack.h +index 723fb85..94bdae8 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/unpack.h ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/unpack.h +@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ extern xGLXSingleReply __glXReply; + ** pointer. + */ + #define __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(res,cl,size,align) \ +- if ((size) > sizeof(answerBuffer)) { \ ++ if (size < 0) return BadLength; \ ++ else if ((size) > sizeof(answerBuffer)) { \ + int bump; \ + if ((cl)->returnBufSize < (size)+(align)) { \ + (cl)->returnBuf = (GLbyte*)Xrealloc((cl)->returnBuf, \ +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch b/debian/patches/1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3fe45a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 1a9f23118787be611b6db51e4eac864c43c702d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:40 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 34/40] glx: Add safe_{add,mul,pad} (v3) [CVE-2014-8093 4/6] + (v4) + +These are paranoid about integer overflow, and will return -1 if their +operation would overflow a (signed) integer or if either argument is +negative. + +Note that RenderLarge requests are sized with a uint32_t so in principle +this could be sketchy there, but dix limits bigreqs to 128M so you +shouldn't ever notice, and honestly if you're sending more than 2G of +rendering commands you're already doing something very wrong. + +v2: Use INT_MAX for consistency with the rest of the server (jcristau) +v3: Reject negative arguments (anholt) + +v4: RHEL5: add limits.h, use inline + +v5: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h +index e8449b2..4047574 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h +@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ + #include "GL/glx_ansic.h" + + ++#include <limits.h> + /* + ** The X header misc.h defines these math functions. + */ +@@ -223,6 +224,46 @@ extern void glxSwapQueryServerStringReply(ClientPtr client, + /* + * Routines for computing the size of variably-sized rendering commands. + */ ++static __inline__ int ++safe_add(int a, int b) ++{ ++ if (a < 0 || b < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ if (INT_MAX - a < b) ++ return -1; ++ ++ return a + b; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ int ++safe_mul(int a, int b) ++{ ++ if (a < 0 || b < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ if (a == 0 || b == 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (a > INT_MAX / b) ++ return -1; ++ ++ return a * b; ++} ++ ++static __inline__ int ++safe_pad(int a) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ ++ if (a < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ if ((ret = safe_add(a, 3)) < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ return ret & (GLuint)~3; ++} + + extern int __glXTypeSize(GLenum enm); + extern int __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch b/debian/patches/1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17afae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +From 78b38a8a37e6105360c82a710ef62c92643ea4c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:41 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 35/40] glx: Length checking for GLXRender requests (v2) + [CVE-2014-8098 2/8] (v3) + +v2: +Remove can't-happen comparison for cmdlen < 0 (Michal Srb) + +v3: backport to RHEL5 hit old paths + +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +index 02f3ba7..831c65b 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -1443,7 +1443,7 @@ int __glXRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderReq; + while (left > 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; +- int extra; ++ int extra = 0; + void (* proc)(GLbyte *); + + /* +@@ -1454,6 +1454,9 @@ int __glXRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + cmdlen = hdr->length; + opcode = hdr->opcode; + ++ if (left < cmdlen) ++ return BadLength; ++ + /* + ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data. + */ +@@ -1480,22 +1483,19 @@ int __glXRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + client->errorValue = commandsDone; + return __glXBadRenderRequest; + } ++ ++ if (cmdlen < entry->bytes) { ++ return BadLength; ++ } ++ + if (entry->varsize) { + /* variable size command */ + extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, False); + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + extra)) { +- return BadLength; +- } +- } else { +- /* constant size command */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes)) { +- return BadLength; +- } + } +- if (left < cmdlen) { ++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes, extra))) { + return BadLength; + } + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +index 027cba7..7174fda 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ int __glXSwapRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderReq; + while (left > 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; +- int extra; ++ int extra = 0; + void (* proc)(GLbyte *); + + /* +@@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ int __glXSwapRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + cmdlen = hdr->length; + opcode = hdr->opcode; + ++ if (left < cmdlen) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if ( (opcode >= __GLX_MIN_RENDER_OPCODE) && + (opcode <= __GLX_MAX_RENDER_OPCODE) ) { + entry = &__glXRenderSizeTable[opcode]; +@@ -531,22 +534,19 @@ int __glXSwapRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + client->errorValue = commandsDone; + return __glXBadRenderRequest; + } ++ ++ if (cmdlen < entry->bytes) { ++ return BadLength; ++ } ++ + if (entry->varsize) { + /* variable size command */ + extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, True); + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + extra)) { +- return BadLength; +- } +- } else { +- /* constant size command */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes)) { +- return BadLength; +- } + } +- if (left < cmdlen) { ++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes, extra))) { + return BadLength; + } + +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch b/debian/patches/1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..742a8bd --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +From ddb1235bc621d06bf28309be70c173ae06131edf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:42 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 36/40] glx: Integer overflow protection for non-generated + render requests (v3) [CVE-2014-8093 5/6] + +v2: +Fix constants in __glXMap2fReqSize (Michal Srb) +Validate w/h/d for proxy targets too (Keith Packard) + +v3: +Fix Map[12]Size to correctly reject order == 0 (Julien Cristau) + +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++--------------- + 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c +index 7ab02d2..9bf0d00 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c +@@ -167,16 +167,10 @@ int __glXTexEnvivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return __glXTexEnvfvReqSize( pc, swap ); + } + +-static int Map1Size( GLint k, GLint order) +-{ +- if (order <= 0 || k < 0) return -1; +- return k * order; +-} +- + int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + { + GLenum target; +- GLint order, k; ++ GLint order; + + target = *(GLenum*) (pc + 16); + order = *(GLint*) (pc + 20); +@@ -184,14 +178,15 @@ int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + target = SWAPL( target ); + order = SWAPL( order ); + } +- k = __glMap1d_size( target ); +- return 8 * Map1Size( k, order ); ++ if (order < 1) ++ return -1; ++ return safe_mul(8, safe_mul(__glMap1d_size(target), order)); + } + + int __glXMap1fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + { + GLenum target; +- GLint order, k; ++ GLint order; + + target = *(GLenum *)(pc + 0); + order = *(GLint *)(pc + 12); +@@ -199,20 +194,21 @@ int __glXMap1fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + target = SWAPL( target ); + order = SWAPL( order ); + } +- k = __glMap1f_size(target); +- return 4 * Map1Size(k, order); ++ if (order < 1) ++ return -1; ++ return safe_mul(4, safe_mul(__glMap1f_size(target), order)); + } + + static int Map2Size(int k, int majorOrder, int minorOrder) + { +- if (majorOrder <= 0 || minorOrder <= 0 || k < 0) return -1; +- return k * majorOrder * minorOrder; ++ if (majorOrder < 1 || minorOrder < 1) return -1; ++ return safe_mul(k, safe_mul(majorOrder, minorOrder)); + } + + int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + { + GLenum target; +- GLint uorder, vorder, k; ++ GLint uorder, vorder; + + target = *(GLenum *)(pc + 32); + uorder = *(GLint *)(pc + 36); +@@ -222,14 +218,13 @@ int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + uorder = SWAPL( uorder ); + vorder = SWAPL( vorder ); + } +- k = __glMap2d_size( target ); +- return 8 * Map2Size( k, uorder, vorder ); ++ return safe_mul(8, Map2Size(__glMap2d_size(target), uorder, vorder)); + } + + int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + { + GLenum target; +- GLint uorder, vorder, k; ++ GLint uorder, vorder; + + target = *(GLenum *)(pc + 0); + uorder = *(GLint *)(pc + 12); +@@ -239,8 +234,7 @@ int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + uorder = SWAPL( uorder ); + vorder = SWAPL( vorder ); + } +- k = __glMap2f_size( target ); +- return 4 * Map2Size( k, uorder, vorder ); ++ return safe_mul(4, Map2Size(__glMap2f_size(target), uorder, vorder)); + } + + int __glXPixelMapfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) +@@ -315,13 +309,16 @@ int __glXImageSize( GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, + GLint bytesPerElement, elementsPerGroup, groupsPerRow; + GLint groupSize, rowSize, padding, imageSize; + ++ if (w == 0 || h == 0 || d == 0) ++ return 0; ++ + if (w < 0 || h < 0 || d < 0 || + (type == GL_BITMAP && + (format != GL_COLOR_INDEX && format != GL_STENCIL_INDEX))) { + return -1; + } +- if (w==0 || h==0 || d == 0) return 0; + ++ /* proxy targets have no data */ + switch( target ) { + case GL_PROXY_TEXTURE_1D: + case GL_PROXY_TEXTURE_2D: +@@ -338,6 +335,12 @@ int __glXImageSize( GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, + return 0; + } + ++ /* real data has to have real sizes */ ++ if (imageHeight < 0 || rowLength < 0 || skipImages < 0 || skipRows < 0) ++ return -1; ++ if (alignment != 1 && alignment != 2 && alignment != 4 && alignment != 8) ++ return -1; ++ + if (type == GL_BITMAP) { + if (rowLength > 0) { + groupsPerRow = rowLength; +@@ -345,11 +348,13 @@ int __glXImageSize( GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, + groupsPerRow = w; + } + rowSize = (groupsPerRow + 7) >> 3; ++ if (rowSize < 0) ++ return -1; + padding = (rowSize % alignment); + if (padding) { + rowSize += alignment - padding; + } +- return ((h + skipRows) * rowSize); ++ return safe_mul(safe_add(h, skipRows), rowSize); + } else { + switch(format) { + case GL_COLOR_INDEX: +@@ -430,23 +435,25 @@ int __glXImageSize( GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, + default: + return -1; + } ++ /* known safe by the switches above, not checked */ + groupSize = bytesPerElement * elementsPerGroup; + if (rowLength > 0) { + groupsPerRow = rowLength; + } else { + groupsPerRow = w; + } +- rowSize = groupsPerRow * groupSize; ++ if ((rowSize = safe_mul(groupsPerRow, groupSize)) < 0) ++ return -1; + padding = (rowSize % alignment); + if (padding) { + rowSize += alignment - padding; + } +- if (imageHeight > 0) { +- imageSize = (imageHeight + skipRows) * rowSize; +- } else { +- imageSize = (h + skipRows) * rowSize; +- } +- return ((d + skipImages) * imageSize); ++ if (imageHeight > 0) ++ h = imageHeight; ++ h = safe_add(h, skipRows); ++ ++ imageSize = safe_mul(h, rowSize); ++ return safe_mul(safe_add(d, skipImages), imageSize); + } + } + +@@ -873,10 +880,9 @@ int __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + /* XXX Should rowLength be used for either or both image? */ + image1size = __glXImageSize( format, type, 0, w, 1, 1, + 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment ); +- image1size = __GLX_PAD(image1size); + image2size = __glXImageSize( format, type, 0, h, 1, 1, + 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment ); +- return image1size + image2size; ++ return safe_add(safe_pad(image1size), image2size); + + } + +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch b/debian/patches/1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7934b47 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From ad29acd7697e18333e164b1746f61c5a9e29a436 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:44 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 37/40] glx: Top-level length checking for swapped + VendorPrivate requests [CVE-2014-8098 4/8] + +v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com> +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +index 7174fda..2685355 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +@@ -797,10 +797,12 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXSwapVendorPrivate(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + xGLXVendorPrivateReq *req; + GLint vendorcode; + + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq); + + req = (xGLXVendorPrivateReq *) pc; + __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); +@@ -835,10 +837,12 @@ int __glXSwapVendorPrivate(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXSwapVendorPrivateWithReply(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq *req; + GLint vendorcode; + + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq); + + req = (xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq *) pc; + __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch b/debian/patches/1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5db4682 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch @@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ +From 8931066077a04999d973932e04da577bd6906c82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:47 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 38/40] glx: Length checking for non-generated single requests + (v2) [CVE-2014-8098 7/8] + +v2: +Fix single versus vendor-private length checking for ARB_imaging subset +extensions. (Julien Cristau) + +v3: +Fix single versus vendor-private length checking for ARB_imaging subset +extensions. (Julien Cristau) + +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> + +fix safe_Add +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2swap.c | 15 +++++++++++---- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- + 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2.c +index 9fee5ff..10152c3 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2.c +@@ -48,11 +48,14 @@ + + int __glXDisp_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + GLsizei size; + GLenum type; + __GLXcontext *cx; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 8); ++ + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -78,10 +81,12 @@ int __glXDisp_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDisp_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; + GLsizei size; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -106,7 +111,7 @@ int __glXDisp_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { +- ClientPtr client; ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + xGLXRenderModeReply reply; + __GLXcontext *cx; + GLint nitems=0, retBytes=0, retval, newModeCheck; +@@ -114,6 +119,8 @@ int __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + GLenum newMode; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); ++ + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -188,7 +195,6 @@ int __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** selection array, as per the API for glRenderMode itself. + */ + noChangeAllowed:; +- client = cl->client; + reply.length = nitems; + reply.type = X_Reply; + reply.sequenceNumber = client->sequence; +@@ -204,9 +210,11 @@ int __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDisp_Flush(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -219,10 +227,11 @@ int __glXDisp_Flush(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDisp_Finish(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; +- ClientPtr client; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -233,7 +242,6 @@ int __glXDisp_Finish(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __GLX_NOTE_FLUSHED_CMDS(cx); + + /* Send empty reply packet to indicate finish is finished */ +- client = cl->client; + __GLX_BEGIN_REPLY(0); + __GLX_SEND_HEADER(); + return Success; +@@ -302,7 +310,7 @@ char *__glXcombine_strings(const char *cext_string, const char *sext_string) + + int DoGetString(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc, GLboolean need_swap) + { +- ClientPtr client; ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; + GLenum name; + const char *string; +@@ -311,6 +319,8 @@ int DoGetString(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc, GLboolean need_swap) + char *buf = NULL, *buf1 = NULL; + GLint length = 0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); ++ + /* If the client has the opposite byte order, swap the contextTag and + * the name. + */ +@@ -327,7 +337,6 @@ int DoGetString(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc, GLboolean need_swap) + pc += __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE; + name = *(GLenum *)(pc + 0); + string = (const char *)glGetString(name); +- client = cl->client; + + /* + ** Restrict extensions to those that are supported by both the +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2swap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2swap.c +index dab98ad..4b8541b 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2swap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/single2swap.c +@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ + + int __glXDispSwap_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + GLsizei size; + GLenum type; + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + __GLXcontext *cx; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 8); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -82,11 +84,13 @@ int __glXDispSwap_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDispSwap_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; + GLsizei size; + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -113,7 +117,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { +- ClientPtr client; ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; + xGLXRenderModeReply reply; + GLint nitems=0, retBytes=0, retval, newModeCheck; +@@ -123,6 +127,8 @@ int __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_ARRAY_VARIABLES; + int error; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); ++ + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -201,7 +207,6 @@ int __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** selection array, as per the API for glRenderMode itself. + */ + noChangeAllowed:; +- client = cl->client; + reply.length = nitems; + reply.type = X_Reply; + reply.sequenceNumber = client->sequence; +@@ -222,10 +227,12 @@ int __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDispSwap_Flush(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; + int error; + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -239,11 +246,12 @@ int __glXDispSwap_Flush(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + int __glXDispSwap_Finish(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + { ++ ClientPtr client = cl->client; + __GLXcontext *cx; +- ClientPtr client; + int error; + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + ++ REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -255,7 +263,6 @@ int __glXDispSwap_Finish(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __GLX_NOTE_FLUSHED_CMDS(cx); + + /* Send empty reply packet to indicate finish is finished */ +- client = cl->client; + __GLX_BEGIN_REPLY(0); + __GLX_PUT_RETVAL(0); + __GLX_SWAP_REPLY_HEADER(); +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c +index be804d8..a156db5 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepix.c +@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ int __glXDisp_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + int error; + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 28); ++ + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -108,6 +110,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0, height=0, depth=1; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 20); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -204,6 +207,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0, height=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -227,13 +231,11 @@ int __glXDisp_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); + compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,height,1,1); + +- if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; +- if (compsize2 < 0) compsize2 = 0; +- compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); +- compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); ++ if ((compsize = safe_pad(compsize)) < 0) return BadLength; ++ if ((compsize2 = safe_pad(compsize2)) < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); +- __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize + compsize2,1); ++ __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,safe_add(compsize, compsize2),1); + __glXClearErrorOccured(); + glGetSeparableFilter( + *(GLenum *)(pc + 0), +@@ -269,6 +271,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0, height=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -328,6 +331,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetHistogram(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); ++ + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -376,6 +381,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetMinmax(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + int error; + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); ++ + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -419,6 +426,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetColorTable(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); ++ + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c +index cdc6f16..24f2e76 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/singlepixswap.c +@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ int __glXDispSwap_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + int error; + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 28); ++ + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -120,6 +122,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0, height=0, depth=1; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 24); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -190,6 +193,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetPolygonStipple(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer; + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *)pc)->contextTag); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { +@@ -230,6 +234,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0, height=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -257,13 +262,11 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,width,1,1); + compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target,1,format,type,height,1,1); + +- if (compsize < 0) return BadLength; +- if (compsize2 < 0) compsize2 = 0; +- compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); +- compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); ++ if ((compsize = safe_pad(compsize)) < 0) return BadLength; ++ if ((compsize2 = safe_pad(compsize2)) < 0) return BadLength; + + glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); +- __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,compsize + compsize2,1); ++ __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer,cl,safe_add(compsize, compsize2),1); + __glXClearErrorOccured(); + glGetSeparableFilter( + *(GLenum *)(pc + 0), +@@ -302,6 +305,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0, height=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -368,6 +372,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetHistogram(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -422,6 +427,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetMinmax(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +@@ -470,6 +476,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetColorTable(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + GLint width=0; + ++ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); + if (!cx) { + return error; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91433b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +From 9c558f9ca2c0d4e34fa71dff272ed1c39c22cd9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:43 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 39/40] glx: Length checking for RenderLarge requests (v2) + [CVE-2014-8098 3/8] (v3) + +This is a half-measure until we start passing request length into the +varsize function, but it's better than the nothing we had before. + +v2: Verify that there's at least a large render header's worth of +dataBytes (Julien Cristau) + +v3: backport to RHEL5 + +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> + +fixup swap +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++----------- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +index 831c65b..20c12f3 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -1535,6 +1535,8 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** duplicated there. + */ + ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq); ++ + req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc; + glxc = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error); + if (!glxc) { +@@ -1542,12 +1544,15 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return error; + } ++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ + dataBytes = req->dataBytes; + + /* + ** Check the request length. + */ +- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { ++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { + client->errorValue = req->length; + /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */ + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); +@@ -1557,7 +1562,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; +- int extra, cmdlen; ++ int extra = 0, cmdlen; + /* + ** This is the first request of a multi request command. + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. +@@ -1567,9 +1572,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + return __glXBadLargeRequest; + } + ++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE) ++ return BadLength; ++ + hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc; +- cmdlen = hdr->length; + opcode = hdr->opcode; ++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0) ++ return BadLength; + + /* + ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data. +@@ -1603,16 +1612,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) { +- return BadLength; +- } +- } else { +- /* constant size command */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) { +- return BadLength; +- } + } ++ ++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry.bytes is small */ ++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) { ++ return BadLength; ++ } ++ + /* + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. + */ +@@ -1641,6 +1647,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a + ** multi request command. + */ ++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */ + + /* + ** Check the request number and the total request count. +@@ -1659,7 +1666,13 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + /* + ** Check that we didn't get too much data. + */ +- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { ++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) { ++ client->errorValue = dataBytes; ++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); ++ return __glXBadLargeRequest; ++ } ++ ++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +@@ -1673,17 +1686,16 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete + ** the command. + */ +- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed +- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not +- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the +- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be +- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total +- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile, +- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow +- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server. ++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library ++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts. ++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be ++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the ++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving ++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below ++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to ++ ** be accepted by the server. + */ +- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != +- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) { ++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +index 2685355..2e228c0 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +@@ -587,6 +587,8 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** duplicated there. + */ + ++ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq); ++ + req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc; + __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->contextTag); +@@ -599,12 +601,15 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return error; + } ++ if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ + dataBytes = req->dataBytes; + + /* + ** Check the request length. + */ +- if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { ++ if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { + client->errorValue = req->length; + /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */ + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); +@@ -614,7 +619,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; +- int extra; ++ int extra = 0; + size_t cmdlen; + /* + ** This is the first request of a multi request command. +@@ -624,12 +629,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + client->errorValue = req->requestNumber; + return __glXBadLargeRequest; + } ++ if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE) ++ return BadLength; ++ + hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc; + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->length); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->opcode); +- cmdlen = hdr->length; + opcode = hdr->opcode; + ++ if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0) ++ return BadLength; ++ + if ( (opcode >= __GLX_MIN_RENDER_OPCODE) && + (opcode <= __GLX_MAX_RENDER_OPCODE) ) { + entry = &__glXRenderSizeTable[opcode]; +@@ -661,16 +671,12 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +- /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4 + extra)) { +- return BadLength; +- } +- } else { +- /* constant size command */ +- if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry->bytes + 4)) { +- return BadLength; +- } + } ++ /* the +4 is safe because we know entry->bytes is small */ ++ if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry->bytes + 4, extra))) { ++ return BadLength; ++ } ++ + /* + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. + */ +@@ -698,6 +704,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a + ** multi request command. + */ ++ int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */ + + /* + ** Check the request number and the total request count. +@@ -716,7 +723,13 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + /* + ** Check that we didn't get too much data. + */ +- if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { ++ if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) { ++ client->errorValue = dataBytes; ++ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); ++ return __glXBadLargeRequest; ++ } ++ ++ if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +@@ -730,17 +743,17 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete + ** the command. + */ +- /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed +- ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not +- ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the +- ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be +- ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total +- ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile, +- ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow +- ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server. ++ /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library ++ ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts. ++ ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be ++ ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the ++ ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving ++ ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below ++ ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to ++ ** be accepted by the server. + */ +- if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != +- __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) { ++ ++ if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXBadLargeRequest; +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch b/debian/patches/1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85181f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch @@ -0,0 +1,622 @@ +From 1ea1cd8c4f93b0c03e5b34fe174b3fc9f27c7dfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:13:48 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 40/40] glx: Pass remaining request length into ->varsize (v2) + [CVE-2014-8098 8/8] (V3) + +v2: Handle more multiplies in indirect_reqsize.c (Julien Cristau) + +v3: RHEL5 backport + +v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo) + +Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> +Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com> +Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> +--- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c | 6 +- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 7 +- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h | 90 +++++++++---------- + nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c | 125 ++++++++++++++------------- + 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +index 20c12f3..a1bb259 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmds.c +@@ -1490,7 +1490,7 @@ int __glXRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + if (entry->varsize) { + /* variable size command */ +- extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, False); ++ extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, False, left - __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE); + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +@@ -1563,6 +1563,7 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; + int extra = 0, cmdlen; ++ int left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq; + /* + ** This is the first request of a multi request command. + ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. +@@ -1608,7 +1609,8 @@ int __glXRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** be computed from its parameters), all the parameters needed + ** will be in the 1st request, so it's okay to do this. + */ +- extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, False); ++ extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, False, ++ left - __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE); + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +index 2e228c0..33a748a 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +@@ -541,7 +541,8 @@ int __glXSwapRender(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + + if (entry->varsize) { + /* variable size command */ +- extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, True); ++ extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, True, ++ left - __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE); + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +@@ -620,6 +621,7 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { + __GLXrenderSizeData *entry; + int extra = 0; ++ int left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq; + size_t cmdlen; + /* + ** This is the first request of a multi request command. +@@ -667,7 +669,8 @@ int __glXSwapRenderLarge(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc) + ** be computed from its parameters), all the parameters needed + ** will be in the 1st request, so it's okay to do this. + */ +- extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, True); ++ extra = (*entry->varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, True, ++ left - __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE); + if (extra < 0) { + return BadLength; + } +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h +index 4047574..193ebcb 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/glxserver.h +@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ extern __GLXprocPtr __glXProcTable[]; + */ + typedef struct { + int bytes; +- int (*varsize)(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); ++ int (*varsize)(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int left); + } __GLXrenderSizeData; + extern __GLXrenderSizeData __glXRenderSizeTable[]; + extern __GLXrenderSizeData __glXRenderSizeTable_EXT[]; +@@ -271,48 +271,48 @@ extern int __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, + GLint imageHeight, GLint rowLength, GLint skipImages, GLint skipRows, + GLint alignment); + +-extern int __glXCallListsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXBitmapReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXFogfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXFogivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXLightfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXLightivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXLightModelfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXLightModelivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXMaterialfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXMaterialivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexEnvfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexEnvivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexGendvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexGenfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexGenivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXMap1fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXPixelMapfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXPixelMapuivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXPixelMapusvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXDrawPixelsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXDrawArraysSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXPrioritizeTexturesReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexSubImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexSubImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXTexImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ); +-extern int __glXTexSubImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXConvolutionFilter1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXConvolutionFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXConvolutionParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXColorTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXColorSubTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXColorTableParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); ++extern int __glXCallListsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXBitmapReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXFogfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXFogivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXLightfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXLightivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXLightModelfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXLightModelivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXMaterialfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXMaterialivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexEnvfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexEnvivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexGendvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexGenfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexGenivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXMap1fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXPixelMapfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXPixelMapuivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXPixelMapusvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXDrawPixelsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXDrawArraysSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXPrioritizeTexturesReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexSubImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexSubImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXTexImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen ); ++extern int __glXTexSubImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXConvolutionFilter1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXConvolutionFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXConvolutionParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXColorTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXColorSubTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXColorTableParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); + + /* + * Routines for computing the size of returned data. +@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ extern int __glXConvolutionParameterfvSize(GLenum pname); + extern int __glXColorTableParameterfvSize(GLenum pname); + extern int __glXColorTableParameterivSize(GLenum pname); + +-extern int __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); +-extern int __glXPointParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap); ++extern int __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); ++extern int __glXPointParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen); + + #endif /* !__GLX_server_h__ */ +diff --git a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c +index 9bf0d00..dc3475e 100644 +--- a/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c ++++ b/nx-X11/programs/Xserver/GL/glx/rensize.c +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ + (((a & 0xff000000U)>>24) | ((a & 0xff0000U)>>8) | \ + ((a & 0xff00U)<<8) | ((a & 0xffU)<<24)) + +-int __glXCallListsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXCallListsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLsizei n = *(GLsizei *)(pc + 0); + GLenum type = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); +@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ int __glXCallListsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return n * __glCallLists_size( type ); + } + +-int __glXFogivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXFogivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 0); + if (swap) { +@@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ int __glXFogivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glFogiv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXFogfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXFogfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXFogivReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXFogivReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXLightfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXLightfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -83,12 +83,12 @@ int __glXLightfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glLightfv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXLightivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXLightivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXLightfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXLightfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXLightModelfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXLightModelfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 0); + if (swap) { +@@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ int __glXLightModelfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glLightModelfv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXLightModelivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXLightModelivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXLightModelfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXLightModelfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXMaterialfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXMaterialfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -111,12 +111,12 @@ int __glXMaterialfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glMaterialfv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXMaterialivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXMaterialivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXMaterialfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXMaterialfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXTexGendvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexGendvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int __glXTexGendvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 8 * __glTexGendv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXTexGenfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexGenfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -134,12 +134,12 @@ int __glXTexGenfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glTexGenfv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXTexGenivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexGenivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXTexGenfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXTexGenfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXTexParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -148,12 +148,12 @@ int __glXTexParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glTexParameterfv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXTexParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXTexParameterfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXTexParameterfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXTexEnvfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexEnvfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ int __glXTexEnvfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glTexEnvfv_size( pname ); /* defined in samplegl lib */ + } + +-int __glXTexEnvivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexEnvivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen ) + { +- return __glXTexEnvfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXTexEnvfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen ) + { + GLenum target; + GLint order; +@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int __glXMap1dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return safe_mul(8, safe_mul(__glMap1d_size(target), order)); + } + +-int __glXMap1fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXMap1fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen ) + { + GLenum target; + GLint order; +@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int Map2Size(int k, int majorOrder, int minorOrder) + return safe_mul(k, safe_mul(majorOrder, minorOrder)); + } + +-int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum target; + GLint uorder, vorder; +@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int __glXMap2dReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return safe_mul(8, Map2Size(__glMap2d_size(target), uorder, vorder)); + } + +-int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum target; + GLint uorder, vorder; +@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ int __glXMap2fReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return safe_mul(4, Map2Size(__glMap2f_size(target), uorder, vorder)); + } + +-int __glXPixelMapfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXPixelMapfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLint mapsize; + mapsize = *(GLint *)(pc + 4); +@@ -247,12 +247,12 @@ int __glXPixelMapfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * mapsize; + } + +-int __glXPixelMapuivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXPixelMapuivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXPixelMapfvReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXPixelMapfvReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXPixelMapusvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXPixelMapusvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLint mapsize; + mapsize = *(GLint *)(pc + 4); +@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ int __glXImageSize( GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, + } + + +-int __glXDrawPixelsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXDrawPixelsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchDrawPixelsHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchDrawPixelsHeader *) pc; + GLenum format = hdr->format; +@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int __glXDrawPixelsReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, skipRows, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXBitmapReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXBitmapReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchBitmapHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchBitmapHeader *) pc; + GLint w = hdr->width; +@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int __glXBitmapReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, skipRows, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXTexImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchTexImageHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchTexImageHeader *) pc; + GLenum target = hdr->target; +@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int __glXTexImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, skipRows, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXTexImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchTexImageHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchTexImageHeader *) pc; + GLenum target = hdr->target; +@@ -578,13 +578,14 @@ int __glXTypeSize(GLenum enm) + } + } + +-int __glXDrawArraysSize( GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXDrawArraysSize( GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchDrawArraysHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchDrawArraysHeader *) pc; + __GLXdispatchDrawArraysComponentHeader *compHeader; + GLint numVertexes = hdr->numVertexes; + GLint numComponents = hdr->numComponents; + GLint arrayElementSize = 0; ++ GLint x, size; + int i; + + if (swap) { +@@ -593,6 +594,13 @@ int __glXDrawArraysSize( GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + } + + pc += sizeof(__GLXdispatchDrawArraysHeader); ++ reqlen -= sizeof(__GLXdispatchDrawArraysHeader); ++ ++ size = safe_mul(sizeof(__GLXdispatchDrawArraysComponentHeader), ++ numComponents); ++ if (size < 0 || reqlen < 0 || reqlen < size) ++ return -1; ++ + compHeader = (__GLXdispatchDrawArraysComponentHeader *) pc; + + for (i=0; i<numComponents; i++) { +@@ -636,23 +644,24 @@ int __glXDrawArraysSize( GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return -1; + } + +- arrayElementSize += __GLX_PAD(numVals * __glXTypeSize(datatype)); ++ x = safe_pad(safe_mul(numVals, __glXTypeSize(datatype))); ++ if ((arrayElementSize = safe_add(arrayElementSize, x)) < 0) ++ return -1; + + pc += sizeof(__GLXdispatchDrawArraysComponentHeader); + } + +- return ((numComponents * sizeof(__GLXdispatchDrawArraysComponentHeader)) + +- (numVertexes * arrayElementSize)); ++ return safe_add(size, safe_mul(numVertexes, arrayElementSize)); + } + +-int __glXPrioritizeTexturesReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXPrioritizeTexturesReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLint n = *(GLsizei *)(pc + 0); + if (swap) n = SWAPL(n); + return(8*n); /* 4*n for textures, 4*n for priorities */ + } + +-int __glXTexSubImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexSubImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchTexSubImageHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchTexSubImageHeader *) pc; + GLenum format = hdr->format; +@@ -674,7 +683,7 @@ int __glXTexSubImage1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, skipRows, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXTexSubImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexSubImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchTexSubImageHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchTexSubImageHeader *) pc; + GLenum format = hdr->format; +@@ -698,7 +707,7 @@ int __glXTexSubImage2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, skipRows, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXTexImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchTexImage3DHeader *hdr = (__GLXdispatchTexImage3DHeader *) pc; + GLenum target = hdr->target; +@@ -735,7 +744,7 @@ int __glXTexImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + } + } + +-int __glXTexSubImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXTexSubImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchTexSubImage3DHeader *hdr = + (__GLXdispatchTexSubImage3DHeader *) pc; +@@ -772,7 +781,7 @@ int __glXTexSubImage3DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + } + } + +-int __glXConvolutionFilter1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXConvolutionFilter1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchConvolutionFilterHeader *hdr = + (__GLXdispatchConvolutionFilterHeader *) pc; +@@ -795,7 +804,7 @@ int __glXConvolutionFilter1DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXConvolutionFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXConvolutionFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchConvolutionFilterHeader *hdr = + (__GLXdispatchConvolutionFilterHeader *) pc; +@@ -841,7 +850,7 @@ int __glXConvolutionParameterfvSize(GLenum pname) + return __glXConvolutionParameterivSize(pname); + } + +-int __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -850,12 +859,12 @@ int __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glXConvolutionParameterivSize( pname ); + } + +-int __glXConvolutionParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXConvolutionParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { +- return __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize( pc, swap ); ++ return __glXConvolutionParameterivReqSize( pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchConvolutionFilterHeader *hdr = + (__GLXdispatchConvolutionFilterHeader *) pc; +@@ -904,7 +913,7 @@ int __glXColorTableParameterivSize(GLenum pname) + return __glXColorTableParameterfvSize(pname); + } + +-int __glXColorTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXColorTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchColorTableHeader *hdr = + (__GLXdispatchColorTableHeader *) pc; +@@ -939,7 +948,7 @@ int __glXColorTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXColorSubTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXColorSubTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + __GLXdispatchColorSubTableHeader *hdr = + (__GLXdispatchColorSubTableHeader *) pc; +@@ -962,7 +971,7 @@ int __glXColorSubTableReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment ); + } + +-int __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 4); + if (swap) { +@@ -971,13 +980,13 @@ int __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glXColorTableParameterfvSize(pname); + } + +-int __glXColorTableParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXColorTableParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + /* no difference between fv and iv versions */ +- return __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(pc, swap); ++ return __glXColorTableParameterfvReqSize(pc, swap, reqlen); + } + +-int __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + GLenum pname = *(GLenum *)(pc + 0); + if (swap) { +@@ -986,8 +995,8 @@ int __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) + return 4 * __glPointParameterfvEXT_size( pname ); + } + +-int __glXPointParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap ) ++int __glXPointParameterivReqSize(GLbyte *pc, Bool swap, int reqlen) + { + /* no difference between fv and iv versions */ +- return __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(pc, swap); ++ return __glXPointParameterfvARBReqSize(pc, swap, reqlen); + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series index efd6f29..c31d33d 100644 --- a/debian/patches/series +++ b/debian/patches/series @@ -72,5 +72,45 @@ 0991_fix-hr-typos.full+lite.patch 0991_fix-hr-typos.full.patch 0999_nxagent_unbrand-nxagent-brand-x2goagent.full.patch +1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch +1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch +1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch +1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch +1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch +1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch +1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch +1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch +1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch +1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch +1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch +1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch +1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch +1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch +1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch +1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch +1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch +1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch +1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch +1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch +1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch +1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch +1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch +1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch +1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch +1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch +1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch +1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch +1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch +1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch +1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch +1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch +1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch +1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch +1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch +1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch +1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch +1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch +1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch +1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch 0016_nx-X11_install-location.debian.patch 0102_xserver-xext_set-securitypolicy-path.debian.patch -- Alioth's /srv/git/_hooks_/post-receive-email on /srv/git/code.x2go.org/nx-libs.git