[X2Go-Commits] [vcxsrv] 19/24: Upgraded to openssl 1.0.2a

3 May 2015

diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES
index b5b3dd2..3044aa7 100644
--- a/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,46 +2,170 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
+ Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
+
+  *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
+
+     If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
+     invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
+     occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
+
+     This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
+     University.
+     (CVE-2015-0291)
+     [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
+
+     OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
+     feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
+     NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
+     OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
+     using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
+     socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
+     However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
+     fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
+     (CVE-2015-0290)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
+
+     The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
+     initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
+     over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
+     an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
+     that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
+     that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
+     ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
+     that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
+     server.
 
-  *) SRTP Memory Leak.
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
+     (CVE-2015-0207)
+     [Matt Caswell]
 
-     A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
-     sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
-     to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
-     exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
-     1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
-     whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
-     have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+  *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
 
-     The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
-     (CVE-2014-3513)
-     [OpenSSL team]
+     The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+     made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+     certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+     certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+     application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+     OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+     (CVE-2015-0286)
+     [Stephen Henson]
 
-  *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+  *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
 
-     When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
-     integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
-     ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
-     causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
-     tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
-     attack.
-     (CVE-2014-3567)
-     [Steve Henson]
+     The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+     dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+     algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
+     certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
+     certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+     application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+     OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
 
-  *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+     This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2015-0208)
+     [Stephen Henson]
 
-     When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
-     could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
-     configured to send them.
-     (CVE-2014-3568)
-     [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+  *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
 
-  *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
-     Client applications doing fallback retries should call
-     SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
-     (CVE-2014-3566)
-     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+     Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+     memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+     strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+     Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+     components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+     functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+     not affected.
+     (CVE-2015-0287)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+     The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+     correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+     missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+     Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+     otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+     affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+     (CVE-2015-0289)
+     [Emilia K�sper]
+
+  *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+     A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+     servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+     a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K�sper
+     (OpenSSL development team).
+     (CVE-2015-0293)
+     [Emilia K�sper]
+
+  *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
+
+     If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
+     ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
+     being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
+     (CVE-2015-1787)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
+
+     Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
+     with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
+     - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
+     automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
+     - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
+     SSL_client_methodv23)
+     - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
+     the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
+
+     If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
+     have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
+     output may be predictable.
+
+     For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
+     succeed on an unpatched platform:
+
+     openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
+     (CVE-2015-0285)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+     A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+     could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+     free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+     or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+     for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+     sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+     This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+     commit 517073cd4b.
+     (CVE-2015-0209)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+     The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+     the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+     This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2015-0288)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
 
   *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
      ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
@@ -378,6 +502,29 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
 
+  *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+     message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+     dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+     Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3571)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+     dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+     could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+     sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+     by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+     Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0206)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+     built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+     method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+     dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3569)
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
   *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
      ECDH ciphersuites.
 
@@ -395,6 +542,17 @@
      (CVE-2015-0204)
      [Steve Henson]
 
+  *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+     An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+     without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+     authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+     which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+     containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+     Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+     this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0205)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
      SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
 
@@ -439,6 +597,17 @@
      (CVE-2014-8275)
      [Steve Henson]
 
+   *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+      results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+      with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+      way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+      Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+      fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+      Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+      the OpenSSL core team.
+      (CVE-2014-3570)
+      [Andy Polyakov]
+
    *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
@@ -598,18 +767,6 @@
      bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
- Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [xx XXX xxxx]
-
-  *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
- 
-     Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
-     verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
-     DigestInfo structures.
-
-     Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
-
-     [Steve Henson]
-
  Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
 
   *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
@@ -1107,63 +1264,6 @@
        Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
-
-  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
-
-     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
-     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
-     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
-
-     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
-     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
-     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K�sper for the initial patch.
-     (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K�sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
-     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
-     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
-     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
-     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
-     (This is a backport)
-     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
-
-  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
-
-  [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
-  OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
-
-  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
-     to fix DoS attack.
-
-     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
-     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
-     (CVE-2012-2333)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
-     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
-
-  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
-     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
-     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
-
-     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
-     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
-     (CVE-2012-2110)
-     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
-
  Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
 
   *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
@@ -2154,228 +2254,6 @@
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
 
- Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
-
-  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
-
-     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
-     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
-     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
-
-     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
-     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
-     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K�sper for the initial patch.
-     (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K�sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
-     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
-     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
-     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
-     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
-     (This is a backport)
-     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
-
-  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
-
-  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
-     to fix DoS attack.
-
-     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
-     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
-     (CVE-2012-2333)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
-     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
-
-  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
-     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
-     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
-     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
-     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
-
-  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
-     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
-     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
-
-     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
-     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
-     (CVE-2012-2110)
-     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
-
-  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
-     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
-     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
-     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
-     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
-     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
-     an MMA defence is not necessary.
-     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
-     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
-     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
-     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
-
-  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
-     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
-     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
-     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
-     [Antonio Martin]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
-
-  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
-     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
-     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
-     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
-     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
-     paper describing this attack can be found at:
-                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
-     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
-     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
-     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
-     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
-     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
-     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
-
-  *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
-     [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
-
-  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
-     (CVE-2011-4576)
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
-     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
-     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
- 
-  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
-     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
-     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
-     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
-
-  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
-     [Emilia K�sper (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
-     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
-     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
-     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
-
-     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
-     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
-     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
-     the last update always remained unused).
-     [Emilia K�sper (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
-     for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
-     [Bodo Moeller]
-
-  *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
-     by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
-
-	http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
-
-     [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
-
-  *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
-     [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
-     escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
-     ambiguous.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
-
-  *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
-     and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
-     Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
-     Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
-     Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
-     [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
-
-  *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
-     overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
-     be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
-     the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
-     some broken encodings work correctly.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
-     is also one of the inputs.
-     [Emilia K�sper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
-
-  *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
-     Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
-     after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
-     etc are non-op.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
-
-  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
-  OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
-
-  *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
-     access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
-     [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
-
-  *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
-     common in certificates and some applications which only call
-     SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) VMS fixes: 
-     Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
-     Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
-     Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
-     [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
-
  Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
 
   *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure
index 3cf4a7a..f776e23 100644
--- a/openssl/Configure
+++ b/openssl/Configure
@@ -188,18 +188,18 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
-"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
-"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
+"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
+"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "dist",		"cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
 
 # Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box
@@ -259,16 +259,16 @@ my %table=(
 
 #### IRIX 5.x configs
 # -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate.
-"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 #### IRIX 6.x configs
 # Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. If you need O32 ABI build, invoke
 # './Configure irix-cc -o32' manually.
-"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
-"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
+"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
+"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
 # N64 ABI builds.
-"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 
 #### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs.
 # Special notes:
@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ my %table=(
 ####
 # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
 # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
-"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ppc",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-ppc",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
 #######################################################################
 # Note that -march is not among compiler options in below linux-armv4
@@ -378,30 +378,30 @@ my %table=(
 #
 #       ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8
 #
-"linux-armv4",	"gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-armv4",	"gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support,
 # if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below
 # refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and
 # MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness.
-"linux-mips32",	"gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
-"linux64-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-mips32",	"gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
+"linux64-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 #### IA-32 targets...
-"linux-ia32-icc",	"icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
+"linux-ia32-icc",	"icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
 ####
-"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
+"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
 "linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux-x32",	"gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
-"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-x32",	"gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
+"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
 # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
 # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
@@ -415,16 +415,16 @@ my %table=(
 # ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it
 # doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc
 # sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1...
-"linux32-s390x",	"gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
+"linux32-s390x",	"gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
 #### SPARC Linux setups
 # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
 # assisted with debugging of following two configs.
-"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 # it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
 # -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
-"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 # GCC 3.1 is a requirement
-"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 #### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups
 # Special notes:
 # - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you
@@ -438,31 +438,31 @@ my %table=(
 #
 #					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
 #
-"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
-"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
+"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
+"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
 
-# Android: linux-* but without -DTERMIO and pointers to headers and libs.
+# Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs.
 "android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
 #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
-"BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-BSD-x86-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-sparcv8",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-BSD-x86-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-sparcv8",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
-"BSD-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 # -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
 # simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3,
 # triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
-"BSD-sparc64",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86_64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-sparc64",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86_64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
 "bsdi-elf-gcc",     "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
@@ -474,8 +474,8 @@ my %table=(
 
 # QNX
 "qnx4",	"cc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::(unknown):::${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:",
-"QNX6",       "gcc:-DTERMIOS::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"QNX6-i386",  "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"QNX6",       "gcc:::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"QNX6-i386",  "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
 # BeOS
 "beos-x86-r5",   "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lnet:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC -DPIC:-shared:.so",
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ my %table=(
 "SINIX-N","/usr/ucb/cc:-O2 -misaligned::(unknown)::-lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::",
 
 # SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe
-"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
+"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
 
 # OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe
 # You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ my %table=(
 "netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
 
 # DJGPP
-"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:",
+"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:",
 
 # Ultrix from Bernhard Simon <simon@zid.tuwien.ac.at>
 "ultrix-cc","cc:-std1 -O -Olimit 2500 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::",
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ my %table=(
 "newsos4-gcc","gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):NEWS4:-lmld -liberty:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::",
 
 ##### GNU Hurd
-"hurd-x86",  "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC",
+"hurd-x86",  "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC",
 
 ##### OS/2 EMX
 "OS2-EMX", "gcc::::::::",
diff --git a/openssl/Makefile b/openssl/Makefile
index f814f52..c6b9e9d 100644
--- a/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.2
+VERSION=1.0.2a
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.2
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS
index 35f3e3f..682c583 100644
--- a/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,22 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
+
+      o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291)
+      o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290)
+      o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207)
+      o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286)
+      o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208)
+      o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287)
+      o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289)
+      o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293)
+      o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787)
+      o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285)
+      o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209)
+      o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288)
+      o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]:
 
       o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
@@ -54,6 +70,7 @@
 
       o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
       o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
       o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
       o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
       o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
@@ -113,19 +130,6 @@
       o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
       o SRP support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
-
-      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
-      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
-
-      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
-
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
 
       o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
@@ -198,62 +202,6 @@
       o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
       o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
-
-      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
-      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
-
-      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
-      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
-      o Various DTLS fixes.
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
-      o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
-      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
-      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
-      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
-      o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
-      o Various DTLS fixes.
-      o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added.
-      o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
-      o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
-
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
 
       o CFB cipher definition fixes.
diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README
index 7878f38..8ce093d 100644
--- a/openssl/README
+++ b/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2 22 Jan 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/openssl/apps/apps.c b/openssl/apps/apps.c
index e6bb48f..b0acbc7 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/apps.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/apps.c
@@ -574,6 +574,11 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
         char *prompt = NULL;
 
         prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
+        if(!prompt) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+            UI_free(ui);
+            return 0;
+        }
 
         ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD;
         UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
@@ -583,6 +588,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
                                      PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
         if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
             buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
+            if(!buff) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+                UI_free(ui);
+                OPENSSL_free(prompt);
+                return 0;
+            }
             ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff,
                                       PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf);
         }
@@ -2775,7 +2786,7 @@ void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x,
         return;
     if (checkhost) {
         BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n",
-                   checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL)
+                   checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1
                    ? "" : " NOT");
     }
 
diff --git a/openssl/apps/ca.c b/openssl/apps/ca.c
index f0a19cf..d64ec4f 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/ca.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/ca.c
@@ -563,10 +563,18 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
         len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
         tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if(!tofree) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
         strcpy(tofree, s);
 #else
         len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
         tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+        if(!tofree) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
         BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len);
         BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len);
 #endif
@@ -2813,6 +2821,11 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
     ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
     tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
 
+    if(!tmp) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     p = strchr(tmp, ',');
 
     rtime_str = tmp;
@@ -2830,6 +2843,10 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
 
     if (prevtm) {
         *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+        if(!*prevtm) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+            goto err;
+        }
         if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str);
             goto err;
@@ -2870,6 +2887,10 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
                 goto err;
             }
             comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
+            if(!comp_time) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
             if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) {
                 BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str);
                 goto err;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/cms.c b/openssl/apps/cms.c
index 2c8ada6..2c92253 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/cms.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/cms.c
@@ -463,6 +463,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
             if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) {
                 cms_key_param *nparam;
                 nparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(cms_key_param));
+                if(!nparam) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+                    goto argerr;
+                }
                 nparam->idx = keyidx;
                 nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
                 nparam->next = NULL;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/dgst.c b/openssl/apps/dgst.c
index adb7a06..95e5fa3 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/dgst.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/dgst.c
@@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
     in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
     bmd = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
+    if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) {
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
     if (debug) {
         BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback);
         /* needed for windows 3.1 */
@@ -304,11 +309,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
         goto end;
     }
 
-    if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) {
-        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-        goto end;
-    }
-
     if (out_bin == -1) {
         if (keyfile)
             out_bin = 1;
@@ -460,6 +460,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
             ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
             goto end;
         }
+        if (!sigbuf) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
         siglen = BIO_read(sigbio, sigbuf, siglen);
         BIO_free(sigbio);
         if (siglen <= 0) {
diff --git a/openssl/apps/openssl.c b/openssl/apps/openssl.c
index 112ed7e..6873145 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/openssl.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/openssl.c
@@ -428,10 +428,6 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
     if (arg.data != NULL)
         OPENSSL_free(arg.data);
 
-    if (bio_err != NULL) {
-        BIO_free(bio_err);
-        bio_err = NULL;
-    }
 #if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (__INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64)
     /* Free any duplicate Argv[] storage. */
     if (free_Argv) {
@@ -440,6 +436,10 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
 #endif
     apps_shutdown();
     CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
+    if (bio_err != NULL) {
+        BIO_free(bio_err);
+        bio_err = NULL;
+    }
 
     OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 }
diff --git a/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c b/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c
index 4d80f82..643507f 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c
@@ -189,11 +189,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
     if (infile == NULL)
         BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
     else {
-        if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0)
-            if (in == NULL) {
-                perror(infile);
-                goto end;
-            }
+        if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load input file\n");
+            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+            goto end;
+        }
     }
 
     if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)
diff --git a/openssl/apps/rsautl.c b/openssl/apps/rsautl.c
index 0030aca..d642f9a 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/rsautl.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/rsautl.c
@@ -268,6 +268,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
     rsa_in = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize * 2);
     rsa_out = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize);
+    if (!rsa_in || !rsa_out) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+        ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+        goto end;
+    }
 
     /* Read the input data */
     rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2);
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
index d5756c0..f6e6bcd 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -456,8 +456,13 @@ int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
     if (ncurves <= 0)
         return 1;
     curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int));
+    if(!curves) {
+        BIO_puts(out, "Malloc error getting supported curves\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
     SSL_get1_curves(s, curves);
 
+
     BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: ");
     for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
         if (i)
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/openssl/apps/s_client.c
index b1152aa..8fa2b73 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_client.c
@@ -560,6 +560,11 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
     PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
     int l;
 
+    if(!pass) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin;
     cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user";
     if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) {
@@ -1295,12 +1300,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 #endif
     if (exc)
         ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
-    /*
-     * DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( Setting
-     * read ahead solves this problem.
-     */
-    if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
-        SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
 
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/openssl/apps/s_server.c
index baa2455..a8491ac 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_server.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
     }
     if (s_debug)
         BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n",
-                   identity ? (int)strlen(identity) : 0, identity);
+                   (int)strlen(identity), identity);
 
     /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */
     if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) {
@@ -696,6 +696,8 @@ static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi)
     EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
 
     wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + 1024);
+    if (!wbuf)
+        return 0;
     wbuf->alloced = 1024;
     wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
 
@@ -750,9 +752,11 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
         num = num + num;        /* double the size */
         if (num < inl)
             num = inl;
-        OPENSSL_free(wbuf);
         wbuf =
             (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
+        if(!wbuf)
+            return 0;
+        OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
 
         wbuf->alloced = num;
         wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
@@ -1736,12 +1740,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
         SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
     if (exc)
         ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
-    /*
-     * DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( Setting
-     * read ahead solves this problem.
-     */
-    if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
-        SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
 
     if (state)
         SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
@@ -1821,12 +1819,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
             SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
         if (exc)
             ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc);
-        /*
-         * DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-(
-         * Setting read ahead solves this problem.
-         */
-        if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
-            SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx2, 1);
 
         if (state)
             SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback);
@@ -2877,7 +2869,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
 
         /* else we have data */
         if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) ||
-            ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 10) == 0))) {
+            ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) {
             char *p;
             X509 *peer;
             STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
@@ -3331,6 +3323,10 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
     unsigned char *p;
 
     sess = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(simple_ssl_session));
+    if(!sess) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen);
     sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL);
@@ -3338,6 +3334,16 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
     sess->id = BUF_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen);
 
     sess->der = OPENSSL_malloc(sess->derlen);
+    if(!sess->id || !sess->der) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
+
+        if(sess->id)
+            OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
+        if(sess->der)
+            OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
+        OPENSSL_free(sess);
+        return 0;
+    }
     p = sess->der;
     i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p);
 
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_time.c b/openssl/apps/s_time.c
index 5846f3a..a40997a 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_time.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_time.c
@@ -302,6 +302,10 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv)
             if (--argc < 1)
                 goto bad;
             maxTime = atoi(*(++argv));
+            if(maxTime <= 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n");
+                badop = 1;
+            }
         } else {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
             badop = 1;
@@ -550,7 +554,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
          nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read);
     printf
         ("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n",
-         nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxTime, bytes_read / nConn);
+         nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxTime,
+         bytes_read / (nConn?nConn:1));
 
     ret = 0;
  end:
diff --git a/openssl/apps/speed.c b/openssl/apps/speed.c
index 7dcd354..7b1acc1 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/speed.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/speed.c
@@ -2775,6 +2775,11 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
 
     inp = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1]);
     out = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024);
+    if(!inp || !out) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,"Out of memory\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
 
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
     EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, no_key, no_iv);
@@ -2859,7 +2864,10 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
         fprintf(stdout, "\n");
     }
 
-    OPENSSL_free(inp);
-    OPENSSL_free(out);
+end:
+    if(inp)
+        OPENSSL_free(inp);
+    if(out)
+        OPENSSL_free(out);
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/apps/srp.c b/openssl/apps/srp.c
index 47b45fb..c679448 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/srp.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/srp.c
@@ -435,10 +435,18 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
             len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
             tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if(!tofree) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
             strcpy(tofree, s);
 # else
             len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
             tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+            if(!tofree) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+                goto err;
+            }
             BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len);
             BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len);
 # endif
diff --git a/openssl/apps/x509.c b/openssl/apps/x509.c
index d005c82..864a60d 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/x509.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/x509.c
@@ -829,6 +829,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
                 z = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
                 m = OPENSSL_malloc(z);
+                if (!m) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+                    ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                    goto end;
+                }
 
                 d = (unsigned char *)m;
                 z = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x), &d);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile
index 709b1af..b94ca72 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ aesni-mb-x86_64.s:	asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
 
 aes-sparcv9.s: asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
-aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl
+aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl ../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
 
 aes-ppc.s:	asm/aes-ppc.pl
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
index ff0d164..2ddb086 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
@@ -1130,31 +1130,31 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
      * map cipher state to byte array block:
      */
     s0 =
-        (Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-        (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff])       ^
         rk[0];
     PUTU32(out     , s0);
     s1 =
-        (Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-        (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff])       ^
         rk[1];
     PUTU32(out +  4, s1);
     s2 =
-        (Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-        (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff])       ^
         rk[2];
     PUTU32(out +  8, s2);
     s3 =
-        (Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-        (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff])       ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff])       ^
         rk[3];
     PUTU32(out + 12, s3);
 }
@@ -1233,10 +1233,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
         while (1) {
             temp  = rk[3];
             rk[4] = rk[0] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
                 rcon[i];
             rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
             rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
@@ -1253,10 +1253,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
         while (1) {
             temp = rk[ 5];
             rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
                 rcon[i];
             rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
             rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
@@ -1275,10 +1275,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
         while (1) {
             temp = rk[ 7];
             rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ]) ^
                 rcon[i];
             rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
             rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
@@ -1288,10 +1288,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
             }
             temp = rk[11];
             rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff]);
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff]);
             rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
             rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
             rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
index 132b09a..c869ed7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
@@ -499,10 +499,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
         while (1) {
             temp  = rk[3];
             rk[4] = rk[0] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
                 rcon[i];
             rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
             rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
@@ -519,10 +519,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
         while (1) {
             temp = rk[ 5];
             rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
                 rcon[i];
             rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
             rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
@@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
         while (1) {
             temp = rk[ 7];
             rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
                 rcon[i];
             rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
             rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
@@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
             }
             temp = rk[11];
             rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
-                (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff]      ) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-                (Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 24);
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff]      ) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+                ((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] << 24);
             rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
             rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
             rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
@@ -676,22 +676,22 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
     prefetch256(Te4);
 
-    t[0] =  Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-    t[1] =  Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-    t[2] =  Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-    t[3] =  Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
 
     /* now do the linear transform using words */
     {   int i;
@@ -742,22 +742,22 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
      */
     for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) {
 #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS)
-        t[0] =  Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
-            Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-            Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-            Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-        t[1] =  Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
-            Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-            Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-            Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-        t[2] =  Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
-            Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-            Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-            Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-        t[3] =  Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
-            Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-            Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-            Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
 
         /* now do the linear transform using words */
         {
@@ -812,28 +812,28 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
     prefetch256(Te4);
 
     *(u32*)(out+0) =
-        Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
         rk[0];
     *(u32*)(out+4) =
-        Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
         rk[1];
     *(u32*)(out+8) =
-        Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
         rk[2];
     *(u32*)(out+12) =
-        Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24 ^
         rk[3];
 #else
     *(u32*)(out+0) =
@@ -890,22 +890,22 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
 #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
     prefetch256(Td4);
 
-    t[0] =  Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
-    Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-    Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-    Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-    t[1] =  Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
-    Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-    Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-    Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-    t[2] =  Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
-    Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-    Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-    Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-    t[3] =  Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
-    Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-    Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-    Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+    t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+           (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
 
     /* now do the linear transform using words */ 
     {
@@ -967,22 +967,22 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
      */
     for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) {
 #if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS)
-        t[0] =  Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-        t[1] =  Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-        t[2] =  Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
-        t[3] =  Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
-        Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
-        Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
-        Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24;
+        t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff]       ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
+               (u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24;
 
     /* now do the linear transform using words */ 
     {
@@ -1046,27 +1046,27 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
     prefetch256(Td4);
 
     *(u32*)(out+0) =
-        (Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff])    ^
-        (Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0      ) & 0xff])    ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
         rk[0];
     *(u32*)(out+4) =
-        (Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff])     ^
-        (Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1      ) & 0xff])     ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
         rk[1];
     *(u32*)(out+8) =
-        (Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff])     ^
-        (Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2      ) & 0xff])     ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
         rk[2];
     *(u32*)(out+12) =
-        (Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff])     ^
-        (Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-        (Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-        (Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s3      ) & 0xff])     ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+        ((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
         rk[3];
 }
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
index 4a36aff..af79530 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
     case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
         result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
         break;
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
+        break;
     case V_ASN1_NULL:
         result = 0;             /* They do not have content. */
         break;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c
index 0578c88..724a10b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
     if (!OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &ttm))
         return -2;
 
-    if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &stm, &ttm))
+    if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &ttm, &stm))
         return -2;
 
     if (day > 0)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
index bb6ac95..68e791f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
@@ -795,6 +795,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT)
 
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void);
 void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
+void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
 int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str);
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a);
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
index 132a9ef..11b582d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
@@ -279,6 +279,9 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
 
     int tmp_tag, tmp_class;
 
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
     for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) {
         /* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */
         if (*p == ':') {
@@ -350,13 +353,17 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
         break;
 
     case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT:
+        if(!vstart) {
+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
+            return -1;
+        }
         if (!strncmp(vstart, "ASCII", 5))
             arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
         else if (!strncmp(vstart, "UTF8", 4))
             arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8;
         else if (!strncmp(vstart, "HEX", 3))
             arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX;
-        else if (!strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 3))
+        else if (!strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 7))
             arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST;
         else {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index 00733a6..0b61fc9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
     OPENSSL_free(a);
 }
 
+void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
+{
+    if (a && a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(a);
+}
+
 int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
 {
     int i;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
index f6cd4b2..a5d2da1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
                             goto end;
                     }
                 } else {
-                    if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 11) <= 0)
+                    if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 14) <= 0)
                         goto end;
                 }
                 M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
index 5817a2b..4a73ca9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
 
     derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
     p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
+    if(!p)
+        return 0;
+
     ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
     *pbuf = p;
     derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it);
@@ -229,6 +232,9 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
 
     derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
     p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
+    if(!p)
+        return 0;
+
     ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
     *pbuf = p;
     derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c
index 9075483..0a425cd 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
     if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
         PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
-        if (key->pkey->value.octet_string)
+        if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING
+            && key->pkey->value.octet_string != NULL)
             OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
                             key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
     }
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 4595664..7fd336a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -304,9 +304,16 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
             goto auxerr;
-
-        /* Allocate structure */
-        if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+        if (*pval) {
+            /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
+            i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+            if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+                tt = it->templates + i;
+                pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+                ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+                asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+            }
+        } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             goto err;
         }
@@ -386,6 +393,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
             goto auxerr;
 
+        /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+            if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+                ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+                seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+                pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+                ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+            }
+        }
+
         /* Get each field entry */
         for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
             const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
index d25c68c..7d2964f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
@@ -315,13 +315,16 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
     ASN1_STRING *str;
     int utype;
 
-    if (it && it->funcs) {
+    if (!it)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (it->funcs) {
         const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
         if (pf->prim_new)
             return pf->prim_new(pval, it);
     }
 
-    if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING))
+    if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
         utype = -1;
     else
         utype = it->utype;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
index 11d784c..7c54f9d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
             if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, fld, indent,
                                          it->templates, pctx))
                 return 0;
+            break;
         }
         /* fall thru */
     case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
@@ -289,6 +290,8 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
         for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
             const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
             seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1);
+            if(!seqtt)
+                return 0;
             tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt);
             if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld,
                                          indent + 2, seqtt, pctx))
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
index 1f10364..a5a403c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
@@ -98,46 +98,55 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
 
 static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
-        if(*pval) return 1;
-        else return 0;
+    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
+    if (*pval)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
 }
 
 static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        if(!*pval) return;
-        if(it->size & BN_SENSITIVE) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
-        else BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
-        *pval = NULL;
+    if (!*pval)
+        return;
+    if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
+        BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+    else
+        BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+    *pval = NULL;
 }
 
-static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                  const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        BIGNUM *bn;
-        int pad;
-        if(!*pval) return -1;
-        bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
-        /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
-        if(BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7) pad = 0;
-        else pad = 1;
-        if(cont) {
-                if(pad) *cont++ = 0;
-                BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
-        }
-        return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    int pad;
+    if (!*pval)
+        return -1;
+    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+    /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
+    if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
+        pad = 0;
+    else
+        pad = 1;
+    if (cont) {
+        if (pad)
+            *cont++ = 0;
+        BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
+    }
+    return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
 }
 
 static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
                   int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        BIGNUM *bn;
-        if(!*pval) bn_new(pval, it);
-        bn  = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
-        if(!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
-                bn_free(pval, it);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return 1;
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    if (!*pval)
+        bn_new(pval, it);
+    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
+        bn_free(pval, it);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
-
-
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
index f393619..3aed44a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
@@ -97,87 +97,100 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(ZLONG)
 
 static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        *(long *)pval = it->size;
-        return 1;
+    *(long *)pval = it->size;
+    return 1;
 }
 
 static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        *(long *)pval = it->size;
+    *(long *)pval = it->size;
 }
 
-static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        long ltmp;
-        unsigned long utmp;
-        int clen, pad, i;
-        /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
-        char *cp = (char *)pval;
-
-        /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
-        memcpy(<mp, cp, sizeof(long));
-
-        if(ltmp == it->size) return -1;
-        /* Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so
-         * we can cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading
-         * octet is set.
-         */
-        if(ltmp < 0) utmp = -ltmp - 1;
-        else utmp = ltmp;
-        clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp);
-        /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
-        if(!(clen & 0x7)) pad = 1;
-        else pad = 0;
-
-        /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
-        clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
-
-        if(cont) {
-                if(pad) *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0;
-                for(i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-                        cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff);
-                        if(ltmp < 0) cont[i] ^= 0xff;
-                        utmp >>= 8;
-                }
+    long ltmp;
+    unsigned long utmp;
+    int clen, pad, i;
+    /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
+    char *cp = (char *)pval;
+
+    /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
+    memcpy(<mp, cp, sizeof(long));
+
+    if (ltmp == it->size)
+        return -1;
+    /*
+     * Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so we can
+     * cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading octet is
+     * set.
+     */
+    if (ltmp < 0)
+        utmp = -ltmp - 1;
+    else
+        utmp = ltmp;
+    clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp);
+    /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
+    if (!(clen & 0x7))
+        pad = 1;
+    else
+        pad = 0;
+
+    /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
+    clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
+
+    if (cont) {
+        if (pad)
+            *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0;
+        for (i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff);
+            if (ltmp < 0)
+                cont[i] ^= 0xff;
+            utmp >>= 8;
         }
-        return clen + pad;
+    }
+    return clen + pad;
 }
 
 static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
                     int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        int neg, i;
-        long ltmp;
-        unsigned long utmp = 0;
-        char *cp = (char *)pval;
-        if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
-                ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Is it negative? */
-        if(len && (cont[0] & 0x80)) neg = 1;
-        else neg = 0;
-        utmp = 0;
-        for(i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-                utmp <<= 8;
-                if(neg) utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff;
-                else utmp |= cont[i];
-        }
-        ltmp = (long)utmp;
-        if(neg) {
-                ltmp++;
-                ltmp = -ltmp;
-        }
-        if(ltmp == it->size) {
-                ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        memcpy(cp, <mp, sizeof(long));
-        return 1;
+    int neg, i;
+    long ltmp;
+    unsigned long utmp = 0;
+    char *cp = (char *)pval;
+    if (len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Is it negative? */
+    if (len && (cont[0] & 0x80))
+        neg = 1;
+    else
+        neg = 0;
+    utmp = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        utmp <<= 8;
+        if (neg)
+            utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff;
+        else
+            utmp |= cont[i];
+    }
+    ltmp = (long)utmp;
+    if (neg) {
+        ltmp++;
+        ltmp = -ltmp;
+    }
+    if (ltmp == it->size) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(cp, <mp, sizeof(long));
+    return 1;
 }
 
 static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                        int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-        {
-        return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
-        }
+                      int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
index cd838e0..55319ac 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -172,8 +172,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
 {
     const unsigned char *q;
     X509 *ret;
+    int freeret = 0;
+
     /* Save start position */
     q = *pp;
+
+    if(!a || *a == NULL) {
+        freeret = 1;
+    }
     ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
     /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
     if (!ret)
@@ -186,7 +192,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
         goto err;
     return ret;
  err:
-    X509_free(ret);
+    if(freeret) {
+        X509_free(ret);
+        if (a)
+            *a = NULL;
+    }
     return NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index 5dc7630..c2cf6e6 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -592,7 +592,6 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
     int fplace = 0;
     int padlen = 0;
     int zpadlen = 0;
-    int caps = 0;
     long intpart;
     long fracpart;
     long max10;
@@ -630,8 +629,7 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
 
     /* convert integer part */
     do {
-        iconvert[iplace++] =
-            (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")[intpart % 10];
+        iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10];
         intpart = (intpart / 10);
     } while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert)));
     if (iplace == sizeof iconvert)
@@ -640,8 +638,7 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
 
     /* convert fractional part */
     do {
-        fconvert[fplace++] =
-            (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")[fracpart % 10];
+        fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10];
         fracpart = (fracpart / 10);
     } while (fplace < max);
     if (fplace == sizeof fconvert)
@@ -713,6 +710,10 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
                 if (*maxlen == 0)
                     *maxlen = 1024;
                 *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
+                if(!*buffer) {
+                    /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
+                    return;
+                }
                 if (*currlen > 0) {
                     assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
                     memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
@@ -721,6 +722,10 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
             } else {
                 *maxlen += 1024;
                 *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+                if(!*buffer) {
+                    /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
+                    return;
+                }
             }
         }
         /* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 60083bf..7878fb1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void);
 # define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL                                  127
 # define BIO_F_CONN_STATE                                 115
 # define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ                            132
+# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE                           133
 # define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL                                  116
 # define BIO_F_FILE_READ                                  130
 # define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL                            129
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c
index 8715f5c..d3e8606 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_cb.c
@@ -70,14 +70,17 @@ long MS_CALLBACK BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
     MS_STATIC char buf[256];
     char *p;
     long r = 1;
+    int len;
     size_t p_maxlen;
 
     if (BIO_CB_RETURN & cmd)
         r = ret;
 
-    BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "BIO[%08lX]:", (unsigned long)bio);
-    p = &(buf[14]);
-    p_maxlen = sizeof buf - 14;
+    len = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"BIO[%p]: ",(void *)bio);
+
+    p = buf + len;
+    p_maxlen = sizeof(buf) - len;
+
     switch (cmd) {
     case BIO_CB_FREE:
         BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "Free - %s\n", bio->method->name);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c
index e8d3027..d9007aa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/bio/bio_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL), "CONN_CTRL"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_STATE), "CONN_STATE"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ), "DGRAM_SCTP_READ"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE), "DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL), "FILE_CTRL"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_READ), "FILE_READ"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL), "LINEBUFFER_CTRL"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index fcbae5f..388d90d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -1012,6 +1012,10 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
      */
     sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
     authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
+    if(!authchunks) {
+        BIO_vfree(bio);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
     memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
     ret =
         getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks,
@@ -1347,6 +1351,10 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
             optlen =
                 (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
             authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen);
+            if (!authchunks) {
+                BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR);
+                return -1;
+            }
             memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen));
             ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS,
                             authchunks, &optlen);
@@ -1413,10 +1421,15 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
      * yet, we have to save it and send it as soon as the socket gets dry.
      */
     if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) {
+        char *tmp;
         data->saved_message.bio = b;
+        if(!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
+            BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR);
+            return -1;
+        }
         if (data->saved_message.data)
             OPENSSL_free(data->saved_message.data);
-        data->saved_message.data = OPENSSL_malloc(inl);
+        data->saved_message.data = tmp;
         memcpy(data->saved_message.data, in, inl);
         data->saved_message.length = inl;
         return inl;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
index 0cdbd20..5361dc8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ x86_64-mont5.s:	asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
 x86_64-gf2m.s:	asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
-modexp512-x86_64.s:	asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
-	$(PERL) asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
 rsaz-x86_64.s:	asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
 rsaz-avx2.s:	asm/rsaz-avx2.pl 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
deleted file mode 100644
index bfd6e97..0000000
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1497 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# Copyright (c) 2010-2011 Intel Corp.
-#   Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com
-#           Jim Guilford
-#           Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com
-#           Maxim.Perminov@intel.com
-#
-# More information about algorithm used can be found at:
-#   http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-#
-# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-# are met:
-#
-# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-#
-# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-#    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-#    distribution.
-#
-# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-#    software must display the following acknowledgment:
-#    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-#    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-#
-# 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-#    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-#    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-#    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
-#
-# 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-#    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-#    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-#
-# 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-#    acknowledgment:
-#    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-#    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-#
-# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-# EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-# PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-# ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-# STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-# ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-# OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-# ====================================================================
-
-$flavour = shift;
-$output  = shift;
-if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
-
-my $win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
-( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
-die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
-
-open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
-*STDOUT=*OUT;
-
-use strict;
-my $code=".text\n\n";
-my $m=0;
-
-#
-# Define x512 macros
-#
-
-#MULSTEP_512_ADD	MACRO	x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, dst, src1, src2, add_src, tmp1, tmp2
-#
-# uses rax, rdx, and args
-sub MULSTEP_512_ADD
-{
- my ($x, $DST, $SRC2, $ASRC, $OP, $TMP)=@_;
- my @X=@$x;	# make a copy
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*0)($SRC2), %rax
-	 mul	$OP			# rdx:rax = %OP * [0]
-	 mov	($ASRC), $X[0]
-	 add	%rax, $X[0]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[0], $DST
-___
-for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	%rdx, $TMP
-
-	 mov	(+8*$i)($SRC2), %rax
-	 mul	$OP			# rdx:rax = %OP * [$i]
-	 mov	(+8*$i)($ASRC), $X[$i]
-	 add	%rax, $X[$i]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$TMP, $X[$i]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-___
-}
-
-#MULSTEP_512	MACRO	x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, dst, src2, src1_val, tmp
-#
-# uses rax, rdx, and args
-sub MULSTEP_512
-{
- my ($x, $DST, $SRC2, $OP, $TMP)=@_;
- my @X=@$x;	# make a copy
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*0)($SRC2), %rax
-	 mul	$OP			# rdx:rax = %OP * [0]
-	 add	%rax, $X[0]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[0], $DST
-___
-for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	%rdx, $TMP
-
-	 mov	(+8*$i)($SRC2), %rax
-	 mul	$OP			# rdx:rax = %OP * [$i]
-	 add	%rax, $X[$i]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$TMP, $X[$i]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-___
-}
-
-#
-# Swizzle Macros
-#
-
-# macro to copy data from flat space to swizzled table
-#MACRO swizzle	pDst, pSrc, tmp1, tmp2
-# pDst and pSrc are modified
-sub swizzle
-{
- my ($pDst, $pSrc, $cnt, $d0)=@_;
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	\$8, $cnt
-loop_$m:
-	 mov	($pSrc), $d0
-	 mov	$d0#w, ($pDst)
-	 shr	\$16, $d0
-	 mov	$d0#w, (+64*1)($pDst)
-	 shr	\$16, $d0
-	 mov	$d0#w, (+64*2)($pDst)
-	 shr	\$16, $d0
-	 mov	$d0#w, (+64*3)($pDst)
-	 lea	8($pSrc), $pSrc
-	 lea	64*4($pDst), $pDst
-	 dec	$cnt
-	 jnz	loop_$m
-___
-
- $m++;
-}
-
-# macro to copy data from swizzled table to  flat space
-#MACRO unswizzle	pDst, pSrc, tmp*3
-sub unswizzle
-{
- my ($pDst, $pSrc, $cnt, $d0, $d1)=@_;
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	\$4, $cnt
-loop_$m:
-	 movzxw	(+64*3+256*0)($pSrc), $d0
-	 movzxw	(+64*3+256*1)($pSrc), $d1
-	 shl	\$16, $d0
-	 shl	\$16, $d1
-	 mov	(+64*2+256*0)($pSrc), $d0#w
-	 mov	(+64*2+256*1)($pSrc), $d1#w
-	 shl	\$16, $d0
-	 shl	\$16, $d1
-	 mov	(+64*1+256*0)($pSrc), $d0#w
-	 mov	(+64*1+256*1)($pSrc), $d1#w
-	 shl	\$16, $d0
-	 shl	\$16, $d1
-	 mov	(+64*0+256*0)($pSrc), $d0#w
-	 mov	(+64*0+256*1)($pSrc), $d1#w
-	 mov	$d0, (+8*0)($pDst)
-	 mov	$d1, (+8*1)($pDst)
-	 lea	256*2($pSrc), $pSrc
-	 lea	8*2($pDst), $pDst
-	 sub	\$1, $cnt
-	 jnz	loop_$m
-___
-
- $m++;
-}
-
-#
-# Data Structures
-#
-
-# Reduce Data
-#
-#
-# Offset  Value
-# 0C0     Carries
-# 0B8     X2[10]
-# 0B0     X2[9]
-# 0A8     X2[8]
-# 0A0     X2[7]
-# 098     X2[6]
-# 090     X2[5]
-# 088     X2[4]
-# 080     X2[3]
-# 078     X2[2]
-# 070     X2[1]
-# 068     X2[0]
-# 060     X1[12]  P[10]
-# 058     X1[11]  P[9]  Z[8]
-# 050     X1[10]  P[8]  Z[7]
-# 048     X1[9]   P[7]  Z[6]
-# 040     X1[8]   P[6]  Z[5]
-# 038     X1[7]   P[5]  Z[4]
-# 030     X1[6]   P[4]  Z[3]
-# 028     X1[5]   P[3]  Z[2]
-# 020     X1[4]   P[2]  Z[1]
-# 018     X1[3]   P[1]  Z[0]
-# 010     X1[2]   P[0]  Y[2]
-# 008     X1[1]   Q[1]  Y[1]
-# 000     X1[0]   Q[0]  Y[0]
-
-my $X1_offset           =  0;			# 13 qwords
-my $X2_offset           =  $X1_offset + 13*8;			# 11 qwords
-my $Carries_offset      =  $X2_offset + 11*8;			# 1 qword
-my $Q_offset            =  0;			# 2 qwords
-my $P_offset            =  $Q_offset + 2*8;			# 11 qwords
-my $Y_offset            =  0;			# 3 qwords
-my $Z_offset            =  $Y_offset + 3*8;			# 9 qwords
-
-my $Red_Data_Size       =  $Carries_offset + 1*8;			# (25 qwords)
-
-#
-# Stack Frame
-#
-#
-# offset	value
-# ...		<old stack contents>
-# ...
-# 280		Garray
-
-# 278		tmp16[15]
-# ...		...
-# 200		tmp16[0]
-
-# 1F8		tmp[7]
-# ...		...
-# 1C0		tmp[0]
-
-# 1B8		GT[7]
-# ...		...
-# 180		GT[0]
-
-# 178		Reduce Data
-# ...		...
-# 0B8		Reduce Data
-# 0B0		reserved
-# 0A8		reserved
-# 0A0		reserved
-# 098		reserved
-# 090		reserved
-# 088		reduce result addr
-# 080		exp[8]
-
-# ...
-# 048		exp[1]
-# 040		exp[0]
-
-# 038		reserved
-# 030		loop_idx
-# 028		pg
-# 020		i
-# 018		pData	; arg 4
-# 010		pG	; arg 2
-# 008		pResult	; arg 1
-# 000		rsp	; stack pointer before subtract
-
-my $rsp_offset          =  0;
-my $pResult_offset      =  8*1 + $rsp_offset;
-my $pG_offset           =  8*1 + $pResult_offset;
-my $pData_offset        =  8*1 + $pG_offset;
-my $i_offset            =  8*1 + $pData_offset;
-my $pg_offset           =  8*1 + $i_offset;
-my $loop_idx_offset     =  8*1 + $pg_offset;
-my $reserved1_offset    =  8*1 + $loop_idx_offset;
-my $exp_offset          =  8*1 + $reserved1_offset;
-my $red_result_addr_offset=  8*9 + $exp_offset;
-my $reserved2_offset    =  8*1 + $red_result_addr_offset;
-my $Reduce_Data_offset  =  8*5 + $reserved2_offset;
-my $GT_offset           =  $Red_Data_Size + $Reduce_Data_offset;
-my $tmp_offset          =  8*8 + $GT_offset;
-my $tmp16_offset        =  8*8 + $tmp_offset;
-my $garray_offset       =  8*16 + $tmp16_offset;
-my $mem_size            =  8*8*32 + $garray_offset;
-
-#
-# Offsets within Reduce Data
-#
-#
-#	struct MODF_2FOLD_MONT_512_C1_DATA {
-#	UINT64 t[8][8];
-#	UINT64 m[8];
-#	UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^768 % m */
-#	UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */
-#	UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */
-#	};
-
-my $T                   =  0;
-my $M                   =  512;			# = 8 * 8 * 8
-my $M1                  =  576;			# = 8 * 8 * 9 /* += 8 * 8 */
-my $M2                  =  640;			# = 8 * 8 * 10 /* += 8 * 8 */
-my $K1                  =  704;			# = 8 * 8 * 11 /* += 8 * 8 */
-
-#
-#   FUNCTIONS
-#
-
-{{{
-#
-# MULADD_128x512 : Function to multiply 128-bits (2 qwords) by 512-bits (8 qwords)
-#                       and add 512-bits (8 qwords)
-#                       to get 640 bits (10 qwords)
-# Input: 128-bit mul source: [rdi+8*1], rbp
-#        512-bit mul source: [rsi+8*n]
-#        512-bit add source: r15, r14, ..., r9, r8
-# Output: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10, [rcx+8*1], [rcx+8*0]
-# Clobbers all regs except: rcx, rsi, rdi
-$code.=<<___;
-.type	MULADD_128x512,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align	16
-MULADD_128x512:
-___
-	&MULSTEP_512([map("%r$_",(8..15))], "(+8*0)(%rcx)", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx");
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rdi), %rbp
-___
-	&MULSTEP_512([map("%r$_",(9..15,8))], "(+8*1)(%rcx)", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx");
-$code.=<<___;
-	 ret
-.size	MULADD_128x512,.-MULADD_128x512
-___
-}}}
-
-{{{
-#MULADD_256x512	MACRO	pDst, pA, pB, OP, TMP, X7, X6, X5, X4, X3, X2, X1, X0
-#
-# Inputs: pDst: Destination  (768 bits, 12 qwords)
-#         pA:   Multiplicand (1024 bits, 16 qwords)
-#         pB:   Multiplicand (512 bits, 8 qwords)
-# Dst = Ah * B + Al
-# where Ah is (in qwords) A[15:12] (256 bits) and Al is A[7:0] (512 bits)
-# Results in X3 X2 X1 X0 X7 X6 X5 X4 Dst[3:0]
-# Uses registers: arguments, RAX, RDX
-sub MULADD_256x512
-{
- my ($pDst, $pA, $pB, $OP, $TMP, $X)=@_;
-$code.=<<___;
-	mov	(+8*12)($pA), $OP
-___
-	&MULSTEP_512_ADD($X, "(+8*0)($pDst)", $pB, $pA, $OP, $TMP);
-	push(@$X,shift(@$X));
-
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*13)($pA), $OP
-___
-	&MULSTEP_512($X, "(+8*1)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP);
-	push(@$X,shift(@$X));
-
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*14)($pA), $OP
-___
-	&MULSTEP_512($X, "(+8*2)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP);
-	push(@$X,shift(@$X));
-
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*15)($pA), $OP
-___
-	&MULSTEP_512($X, "(+8*3)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP);
-	push(@$X,shift(@$X));
-}
-
-#
-# mont_reduce(UINT64 *x,  /* 1024 bits, 16 qwords */
-#	       UINT64 *m,  /*  512 bits,  8 qwords */
-#	       MODF_2FOLD_MONT_512_C1_DATA *data,
-#             UINT64 *r)  /*  512 bits,  8 qwords */
-# Input:  x (number to be reduced): tmp16 (Implicit)
-#         m (modulus):              [pM]  (Implicit)
-#         data (reduce data):       [pData] (Implicit)
-# Output: r (result):		     Address in [red_res_addr]
-#         result also in: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10
-
-my @X=map("%r$_",(8..15));
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.type	mont_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align	16
-mont_reduce:
-___
-
-my $STACK_DEPTH         =  8;
-	#
-	# X1 = Xh * M1 + Xl
-$code.=<<___;
-	 lea	(+$Reduce_Data_offset+$X1_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rdi			# pX1 (Dst) 769 bits, 13 qwords
-	 mov	(+$pData_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rsi			# pM1 (Bsrc) 512 bits, 8 qwords
-	 add	\$$M1, %rsi
-	 lea	(+$tmp16_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rcx			# X (Asrc) 1024 bits, 16 qwords
-
-___
-
-	&MULADD_256x512("%rdi", "%rcx", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx", \@X);	# rotates @X 4 times
-	# results in r11, r10, r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, X1[3:0]
-
-$code.=<<___;
-	 xor	%rax, %rax
-	# X1 += xl
-	 add	(+8*8)(%rcx), $X[4]
-	 adc	(+8*9)(%rcx), $X[5]
-	 adc	(+8*10)(%rcx), $X[6]
-	 adc	(+8*11)(%rcx), $X[7]
-	 adc	\$0, %rax
-	# X1 is now rax, r11-r8, r15-r12, tmp16[3:0]
-
-	#
-	# check for carry ;; carry stored in rax
-	 mov	$X[4], (+8*8)(%rdi)			# rdi points to X1
-	 mov	$X[5], (+8*9)(%rdi)
-	 mov	$X[6], %rbp
-	 mov	$X[7], (+8*11)(%rdi)
-
-	 mov	%rax, (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp)
-
-	 mov	(+8*0)(%rdi), $X[4]
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rdi), $X[5]
-	 mov	(+8*2)(%rdi), $X[6]
-	 mov	(+8*3)(%rdi), $X[7]
-
-	# X1 is now stored in: X1[11], rbp, X1[9:8], r15-r8
-	# rdi -> X1
-	# rsi -> M1
-
-	#
-	# X2 = Xh * M2 + Xl
-	# do first part (X2 = Xh * M2)
-	 add	\$8*10, %rdi			# rdi -> pXh ; 128 bits, 2 qwords
-				#        Xh is actually { [rdi+8*1], rbp }
-	 add	\$`$M2-$M1`, %rsi			# rsi -> M2
-	 lea	(+$Reduce_Data_offset+$X2_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rcx			# rcx -> pX2 ; 641 bits, 11 qwords
-___
-	unshift(@X,pop(@X));	unshift(@X,pop(@X));
-$code.=<<___;
-
-	 call	MULADD_128x512			# args in rcx, rdi / rbp, rsi, r15-r8
-	# result in r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10, X2[1:0]
-	 mov	(+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rax
-
-	# X2 += Xl
-	 add	(+8*8-8*10)(%rdi), $X[6]		# (-8*10) is to adjust rdi -> Xh to Xl
-	 adc	(+8*9-8*10)(%rdi), $X[7]
-	 mov	$X[6], (+8*8)(%rcx)
-	 mov	$X[7], (+8*9)(%rcx)
-
-	 adc	%rax, %rax
-	 mov	%rax, (+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp)
-
-	 lea	(+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Q_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rdi			# rdi -> pQ ; 128 bits, 2 qwords
-	 add	\$`$K1-$M2`, %rsi			# rsi -> pK1 ; 128 bits, 2 qwords
-
-	# MUL_128x128t128	rdi, rcx, rsi	; Q = X2 * K1 (bottom half)
-	# B1:B0 = rsi[1:0] = K1[1:0]
-	# A1:A0 = rcx[1:0] = X2[1:0]
-	# Result = rdi[1],rbp = Q[1],rbp
-	 mov	(%rsi), %r8			# B0
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rsi), %rbx			# B1
-
-	 mov	(%rcx), %rax			# A0
-	 mul	%r8			# B0
-	 mov	%rax, %rbp
-	 mov	%rdx, %r9
-
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rcx), %rax			# A1
-	 mul	%r8			# B0
-	 add	%rax, %r9
-
-	 mov	(%rcx), %rax			# A0
-	 mul	%rbx			# B1
-	 add	%rax, %r9
-
-	 mov	%r9, (+8*1)(%rdi)
-	# end MUL_128x128t128
-
-	 sub	\$`$K1-$M`, %rsi
-
-	 mov	(%rcx), $X[6]
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rcx), $X[7]			# r9:r8 = X2[1:0]
-
-	 call	MULADD_128x512			# args in rcx, rdi / rbp, rsi, r15-r8
-	# result in r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10, X2[1:0]
-
-	# load first half of m to rdx, rdi, rbx, rax
-	# moved this here for efficiency
-	 mov	(+8*0)(%rsi), %rax
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rsi), %rbx
-	 mov	(+8*2)(%rsi), %rdi
-	 mov	(+8*3)(%rsi), %rdx
-
-	# continue with reduction
-	 mov	(+$Reduce_Data_offset+$Carries_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rbp
-
-	 add	(+8*8)(%rcx), $X[6]
-	 adc	(+8*9)(%rcx), $X[7]
-
-	#accumulate the final carry to rbp
-	 adc	%rbp, %rbp
-
-	# Add in overflow corrections: R = (X2>>128) += T[overflow]
-	# R = {r9, r8, r15, r14, ..., r10}
-	 shl	\$3, %rbp
-	 mov	(+$pData_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rcx			# rsi -> Data (and points to T)
-	 add	%rcx, %rbp			# pT ; 512 bits, 8 qwords, spread out
-
-	# rsi will be used to generate a mask after the addition
-	 xor	%rsi, %rsi
-
-	 add	(+8*8*0)(%rbp), $X[0]
-	 adc	(+8*8*1)(%rbp), $X[1]
-	 adc	(+8*8*2)(%rbp), $X[2]
-	 adc	(+8*8*3)(%rbp), $X[3]
-	 adc	(+8*8*4)(%rbp), $X[4]
-	 adc	(+8*8*5)(%rbp), $X[5]
-	 adc	(+8*8*6)(%rbp), $X[6]
-	 adc	(+8*8*7)(%rbp), $X[7]
-
-	# if there is a carry:	rsi = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
-	# if carry is clear:	rsi = 0x0000000000000000
-	 sbb	\$0, %rsi
-
-	# if carry is clear, subtract 0. Otherwise, subtract 256 bits of m
-	 and	%rsi, %rax
-	 and	%rsi, %rbx
-	 and	%rsi, %rdi
-	 and	%rsi, %rdx
-
-	 mov	\$1, %rbp
-	 sub	%rax, $X[0]
-	 sbb	%rbx, $X[1]
-	 sbb	%rdi, $X[2]
-	 sbb	%rdx, $X[3]
-
-	# if there is a borrow:		rbp = 0
-	# if there is no borrow:	rbp = 1
-	# this is used to save the borrows in between the first half and the 2nd half of the subtraction of m
-	 sbb	\$0, %rbp
-
-	#load second half of m to rdx, rdi, rbx, rax
-
-	 add	\$$M, %rcx
-	 mov	(+8*4)(%rcx), %rax
-	 mov	(+8*5)(%rcx), %rbx
-	 mov	(+8*6)(%rcx), %rdi
-	 mov	(+8*7)(%rcx), %rdx
-
-	# use the rsi mask as before
-	# if carry is clear, subtract 0. Otherwise, subtract 256 bits of m
-	 and	%rsi, %rax
-	 and	%rsi, %rbx
-	 and	%rsi, %rdi
-	 and	%rsi, %rdx
-
-	# if rbp = 0, there was a borrow before, it is moved to the carry flag
-	# if rbp = 1, there was not a borrow before, carry flag is cleared
-	 sub	\$1, %rbp
-
-	 sbb	%rax, $X[4]
-	 sbb	%rbx, $X[5]
-	 sbb	%rdi, $X[6]
-	 sbb	%rdx, $X[7]
-
-	# write R back to memory
-
-	 mov	(+$red_result_addr_offset+$STACK_DEPTH)(%rsp), %rsi
-	 mov	$X[0], (+8*0)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[1], (+8*1)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[2], (+8*2)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[3], (+8*3)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[4], (+8*4)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[5], (+8*5)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[6], (+8*6)(%rsi)
-	 mov	$X[7], (+8*7)(%rsi)
-
-	 ret
-.size	mont_reduce,.-mont_reduce
-___
-}}}
-
-{{{
-#MUL_512x512	MACRO	pDst, pA, pB, x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, tmp*2
-#
-# Inputs: pDst: Destination  (1024 bits, 16 qwords)
-#         pA:   Multiplicand (512 bits, 8 qwords)
-#         pB:   Multiplicand (512 bits, 8 qwords)
-# Uses registers rax, rdx, args
-#   B operand in [pB] and also in x7...x0
-sub MUL_512x512
-{
- my ($pDst, $pA, $pB, $x, $OP, $TMP, $pDst_o)=@_;
- my ($pDst,  $pDst_o) = ($pDst =~ m/([^+]*)\+?(.*)?/);
- my @X=@$x;	# make a copy
-
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*0)($pA), $OP
-
-	 mov	$X[0], %rax
-	 mul	$OP			# rdx:rax = %OP * [0]
-	 mov	%rax, (+$pDst_o+8*0)($pDst)
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-___
-for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	$X[$i], %rax
-	 mul	$OP			# rdx:rax = %OP * [$i]
-	 add	%rax, $X[$i-1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[$i]
-___
-}
-
-for(my $i=1;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+8*$i)($pA), $OP
-___
-
-	&MULSTEP_512(\@X, "(+$pDst_o+8*$i)($pDst)", $pB, $OP, $TMP);
-	push(@X,shift(@X));
-}
-
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	$X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[6], (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[7], (+$pDst_o+8*15)($pDst)
-___
-}
-
-#
-# mont_mul_a3b : subroutine to compute (Src1 * Src2) % M (all 512-bits)
-# Input:  src1: Address of source 1: rdi
-#         src2: Address of source 2: rsi
-# Output: dst:  Address of destination: [red_res_addr]
-#    src2 and result also in: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10
-# Temp:   Clobbers [tmp16], all registers
-$code.=<<___;
-.type	mont_mul_a3b,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align	16
-mont_mul_a3b:
-	#
-	# multiply tmp = src1 * src2
-	# For multiply: dst = rcx, src1 = rdi, src2 = rsi
-	# stack depth is extra 8 from call
-___
-	&MUL_512x512("%rsp+$tmp16_offset+8", "%rdi", "%rsi", [map("%r$_",(10..15,8..9))], "%rbp", "%rbx");
-$code.=<<___;
-	#
-	# Dst = tmp % m
-	# Call reduce(tmp, m, data, dst)
-
-	# tail recursion optimization: jmp to mont_reduce and return from there
-	 jmp	mont_reduce
-	# call	mont_reduce
-	# ret
-.size	mont_mul_a3b,.-mont_mul_a3b
-___
-}}}
-
-{{{
-#SQR_512 MACRO pDest, pA, x7, x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, tmp*4
-#
-# Input in memory [pA] and also in x7...x0
-# Uses all argument registers plus rax and rdx
-#
-# This version computes all of the off-diagonal terms into memory,
-# and then it adds in the diagonal terms
-
-sub SQR_512
-{
- my ($pDst, $pA, $x, $A, $tmp, $x7, $x6, $pDst_o)=@_;
- my ($pDst,  $pDst_o) = ($pDst =~ m/([^+]*)\+?(.*)?/);
- my @X=@$x;	# make a copy
-$code.=<<___;
-	# ------------------
-	# first pass 01...07
-	# ------------------
-	 mov	$X[0], $A
-
-	 mov	$X[1],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 mov	%rax, (+$pDst_o+8*1)($pDst)
-___
-for(my $i=2;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[$i-2]
-	 mov	$X[$i],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[$i-2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	%rdx, $x7
-
-	 mov	$X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*2)($pDst)
-
-	# ------------------
-	# second pass 12...17
-	# ------------------
-
-	 mov	(+8*1)($pA), $A
-
-	 mov	(+8*2)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*3)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	(+8*3)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*4)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	(+8*4)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[3]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[3]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	(+8*5)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[4]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[4]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[6],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[7],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $x7
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $x7
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[1]
-
-	# ------------------
-	# third pass 23...27
-	# ------------------
-	 mov	(+8*2)($pA), $A
-
-	 mov	(+8*3)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[3]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*5)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	(+8*4)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[4]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[4]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*6)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	(+8*5)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[6],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $x7
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $x7
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[7],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[2]
-
-	# ------------------
-	# fourth pass 34...37
-	# ------------------
-
-	 mov	(+8*3)($pA), $A
-
-	 mov	(+8*4)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*7)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	(+8*5)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $x7
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $x7
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$x7, (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[6],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[7],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[5]
-
-	# ------------------
-	# fifth pass 45...47
-	# ------------------
-	 mov	(+8*4)($pA), $A
-
-	 mov	(+8*5)($pA),%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[6],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[7],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[1]
-
-	# ------------------
-	# sixth pass 56...57
-	# ------------------
-	 mov	(+8*5)($pA), $A
-
-	 mov	$X[6],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[0]
-	 mov	$X[7],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 add	$X[0], $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[2]
-
-	# ------------------
-	# seventh pass 67
-	# ------------------
-	 mov	$X[6], $A
-
-	 mov	$X[7],%rax
-	 mul	$A
-	 add	%rax, $X[2]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-	 mov	$X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	%rdx, (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst)
-
-	# start finalize (add	in squares, and double off-terms)
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*1)($pDst), $X[0]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*2)($pDst), $X[1]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*3)($pDst), $X[2]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*4)($pDst), $X[3]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*5)($pDst), $X[4]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*6)($pDst), $X[5]
-
-	 mov	(+8*3)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-	 mov	%rax, $x6
-	 mov	%rdx, $X[6]
-
-	 add	$X[0], $X[0]
-	 adc	$X[1], $X[1]
-	 adc	$X[2], $X[2]
-	 adc	$X[3], $X[3]
-	 adc	$X[4], $X[4]
-	 adc	$X[5], $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, $X[6]
-
-	 mov	(+8*0)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-	 mov	%rax, (+$pDst_o+8*0)($pDst)
-	 mov	%rdx, $A
-
-	 mov	(+8*1)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-
-	 add	$A, $X[0]
-	 adc	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $A
-	 mov	$X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*1)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*2)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	(+8*2)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-
-	 add	$A, $X[2]
-	 adc	%rax, $X[3]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $A
-
-	 mov	$X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*3)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*4)($pDst)
-
-	 xor	$tmp, $tmp
-	 add	$A, $X[4]
-	 adc	$x6, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, $tmp
-
-	 mov	$X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*5)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*6)($pDst)
-
-	# %%tmp has 0/1 in column 7
-	# %%A6 has a full value in column 7
-
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*7)($pDst), $X[0]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst), $X[1]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst), $X[2]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst), $X[3]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst), $X[4]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst), $X[5]
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst), $x6
-	 mov	(+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst), $x7
-
-	 mov	$X[7], %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-	 mov	%rax, $X[7]
-	 mov	%rdx, $A
-
-	 add	$X[0], $X[0]
-	 adc	$X[1], $X[1]
-	 adc	$X[2], $X[2]
-	 adc	$X[3], $X[3]
-	 adc	$X[4], $X[4]
-	 adc	$X[5], $X[5]
-	 adc	$x6, $x6
-	 adc	$x7, $x7
-	 adc	\$0, $A
-
-	 add	$tmp, $X[0]
-
-	 mov	(+8*4)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-
-	 add	$X[6], $X[0]
-	 adc	%rax, $X[1]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $tmp
-
-	 mov	$X[0], (+$pDst_o+8*7)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[1], (+$pDst_o+8*8)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	(+8*5)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-
-	 add	$tmp, $X[2]
-	 adc	%rax, $X[3]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	%rdx, $tmp
-
-	 mov	$X[2], (+$pDst_o+8*9)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[3], (+$pDst_o+8*10)($pDst)
-
-	 mov	(+8*6)($pA), %rax
-	 mul	%rax
-
-	 add	$tmp, $X[4]
-	 adc	%rax, $X[5]
-	 adc	\$0, %rdx
-
-	 mov	$X[4], (+$pDst_o+8*11)($pDst)
-	 mov	$X[5], (+$pDst_o+8*12)($pDst)
-
-	 add	%rdx, $x6
-	 adc	$X[7], $x7
-	 adc	\$0, $A
-
-	 mov	$x6, (+$pDst_o+8*13)($pDst)
-	 mov	$x7, (+$pDst_o+8*14)($pDst)
-	 mov	$A, (+$pDst_o+8*15)($pDst)
-___
-}
-
-#
-# sqr_reduce: subroutine to compute Result = reduce(Result * Result)
-#
-# input and result also in: r9, r8, r15, r14, r13, r12, r11, r10
-#
-$code.=<<___;
-.type	sqr_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align	16
-sqr_reduce:
-	 mov	(+$pResult_offset+8)(%rsp), %rcx
-___
-	&SQR_512("%rsp+$tmp16_offset+8", "%rcx", [map("%r$_",(10..15,8..9))], "%rbx", "%rbp", "%rsi", "%rdi");
-$code.=<<___;
-	# tail recursion optimization: jmp to mont_reduce and return from there
-	 jmp	mont_reduce
-	# call	mont_reduce
-	# ret
-.size	sqr_reduce,.-sqr_reduce
-___
-}}}
-
-#
-# MAIN FUNCTION
-#
-
-#mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
-#           UINT64 *g,   /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
-#           UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
-#           struct mod_ctx_512 *data)
-
-# window size = 5
-# table size = 2^5 = 32
-#table_entries	equ	32
-#table_size	equ	table_entries * 8
-$code.=<<___;
-.globl	mod_exp_512
-.type	mod_exp_512,\@function,4
-mod_exp_512:
-	 push	%rbp
-	 push	%rbx
-	 push	%r12
-	 push	%r13
-	 push	%r14
-	 push	%r15
-
-	# adjust stack down and then align it with cache boundary
-	 mov	%rsp, %r8
-	 sub	\$$mem_size, %rsp
-	 and	\$-64, %rsp
-
-	# store previous stack pointer and arguments
-	 mov	%r8, (+$rsp_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	%rdi, (+$pResult_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	%rsi, (+$pG_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	%rcx, (+$pData_offset)(%rsp)
-.Lbody:
-	# transform g into montgomery space
-	# GT = reduce(g * C2) = reduce(g * (2^256))
-	# reduce expects to have the input in [tmp16]
-	 pxor	%xmm4, %xmm4
-	 movdqu	(+16*0)(%rsi), %xmm0
-	 movdqu	(+16*1)(%rsi), %xmm1
-	 movdqu	(+16*2)(%rsi), %xmm2
-	 movdqu	(+16*3)(%rsi), %xmm3
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*0)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*1)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*6)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*7)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm0, (+$tmp16_offset+16*2)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm1, (+$tmp16_offset+16*3)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm2, (+$tmp16_offset+16*4)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm3, (+$tmp16_offset+16*5)(%rsp)
-
-	# load pExp before rdx gets blown away
-	 movdqu	(+16*0)(%rdx), %xmm0
-	 movdqu	(+16*1)(%rdx), %xmm1
-	 movdqu	(+16*2)(%rdx), %xmm2
-	 movdqu	(+16*3)(%rdx), %xmm3
-
-	 lea	(+$GT_offset)(%rsp), %rbx
-	 mov	%rbx, (+$red_result_addr_offset)(%rsp)
-	 call	mont_reduce
-
-	# Initialize tmp = C
-	 lea	(+$tmp_offset)(%rsp), %rcx
-	 xor	%rax, %rax
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*0)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*1)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*3)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*4)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*5)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*6)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+8*7)(%rcx)
-	 mov	%rax, (+$exp_offset+8*8)(%rsp)
-	 movq	\$1, (+8*2)(%rcx)
-
-	 lea	(+$garray_offset)(%rsp), %rbp
-	 mov	%rcx, %rsi			# pTmp
-	 mov	%rbp, %rdi			# Garray[][0]
-___
-
-	&swizzle("%rdi", "%rcx", "%rax", "%rbx");
-
-	# for (rax = 31; rax != 0; rax--) {
-	#     tmp = reduce(tmp * G)
-	#     swizzle(pg, tmp);
-	#     pg += 2; }
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	\$31, %rax
-	 mov	%rax, (+$i_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	%rbp, (+$pg_offset)(%rsp)
-	# rsi -> pTmp
-	 mov	%rsi, (+$red_result_addr_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	(+8*0)(%rsi), %r10
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rsi), %r11
-	 mov	(+8*2)(%rsi), %r12
-	 mov	(+8*3)(%rsi), %r13
-	 mov	(+8*4)(%rsi), %r14
-	 mov	(+8*5)(%rsi), %r15
-	 mov	(+8*6)(%rsi), %r8
-	 mov	(+8*7)(%rsi), %r9
-init_loop:
-	 lea	(+$GT_offset)(%rsp), %rdi
-	 call	mont_mul_a3b
-	 lea	(+$tmp_offset)(%rsp), %rsi
-	 mov	(+$pg_offset)(%rsp), %rbp
-	 add	\$2, %rbp
-	 mov	%rbp, (+$pg_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	%rsi, %rcx			# rcx = rsi = addr of tmp
-___
-
-	&swizzle("%rbp", "%rcx", "%rax", "%rbx");
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+$i_offset)(%rsp), %rax
-	 sub	\$1, %rax
-	 mov	%rax, (+$i_offset)(%rsp)
-	 jne	init_loop
-
-	#
-	# Copy exponent onto stack
-	 movdqa	%xmm0, (+$exp_offset+16*0)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm1, (+$exp_offset+16*1)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm2, (+$exp_offset+16*2)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm3, (+$exp_offset+16*3)(%rsp)
-
-
-	#
-	# Do exponentiation
-	# Initialize result to G[exp{511:507}]
-	 mov	(+$exp_offset+62)(%rsp), %eax
-	 mov	%rax, %rdx
-	 shr	\$11, %rax
-	 and	\$0x07FF, %edx
-	 mov	%edx, (+$exp_offset+62)(%rsp)
-	 lea	(+$garray_offset)(%rsp,%rax,2), %rsi
-	 mov	(+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rdx
-___
-
-	&unswizzle("%rdx", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx", "%rax");
-
-	#
-	# Loop variables
-	# rcx = [loop_idx] = index: 510-5 to 0 by 5
-$code.=<<___;
-	 movq	\$505, (+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp)
-
-	 mov	(+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rcx
-	 mov	%rcx, (+$red_result_addr_offset)(%rsp)
-	 mov	(+8*0)(%rcx), %r10
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rcx), %r11
-	 mov	(+8*2)(%rcx), %r12
-	 mov	(+8*3)(%rcx), %r13
-	 mov	(+8*4)(%rcx), %r14
-	 mov	(+8*5)(%rcx), %r15
-	 mov	(+8*6)(%rcx), %r8
-	 mov	(+8*7)(%rcx), %r9
-	 jmp	sqr_2
-
-main_loop_a3b:
-	 call	sqr_reduce
-	 call	sqr_reduce
-	 call	sqr_reduce
-sqr_2:
-	 call	sqr_reduce
-	 call	sqr_reduce
-
-	#
-	# Do multiply, first look up proper value in Garray
-	 mov	(+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp), %rcx			# bit index
-	 mov	%rcx, %rax
-	 shr	\$4, %rax			# rax is word pointer
-	 mov	(+$exp_offset)(%rsp,%rax,2), %edx
-	 and	\$15, %rcx
-	 shrq	%cl, %rdx
-	 and	\$0x1F, %rdx
-
-	 lea	(+$garray_offset)(%rsp,%rdx,2), %rsi
-	 lea	(+$tmp_offset)(%rsp), %rdx
-	 mov	%rdx, %rdi
-___
-
-	&unswizzle("%rdx", "%rsi", "%rbp", "%rbx", "%rax");
-	# rdi = tmp = pG
-
-	#
-	# Call mod_mul_a1(pDst,  pSrc1, pSrc2, pM, pData)
-	#                 result result pG     M   Data
-$code.=<<___;
-	 mov	(+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rsi
-	 call	mont_mul_a3b
-
-	#
-	# finish loop
-	 mov	(+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp), %rcx
-	 sub	\$5, %rcx
-	 mov	%rcx, (+$loop_idx_offset)(%rsp)
-	 jge	main_loop_a3b
-
-	#
-
-end_main_loop_a3b:
-	# transform result out of Montgomery space
-	# result = reduce(result)
-	 mov	(+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rdx
-	 pxor	%xmm4, %xmm4
-	 movdqu	(+16*0)(%rdx), %xmm0
-	 movdqu	(+16*1)(%rdx), %xmm1
-	 movdqu	(+16*2)(%rdx), %xmm2
-	 movdqu	(+16*3)(%rdx), %xmm3
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*4)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*5)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*6)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm4, (+$tmp16_offset+16*7)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm0, (+$tmp16_offset+16*0)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm1, (+$tmp16_offset+16*1)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm2, (+$tmp16_offset+16*2)(%rsp)
-	 movdqa	%xmm3, (+$tmp16_offset+16*3)(%rsp)
-	 call	mont_reduce
-
-	# If result > m, subract m
-	# load result into r15:r8
-	 mov	(+$pResult_offset)(%rsp), %rax
-	 mov	(+8*0)(%rax), %r8
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rax), %r9
-	 mov	(+8*2)(%rax), %r10
-	 mov	(+8*3)(%rax), %r11
-	 mov	(+8*4)(%rax), %r12
-	 mov	(+8*5)(%rax), %r13
-	 mov	(+8*6)(%rax), %r14
-	 mov	(+8*7)(%rax), %r15
-
-	# subtract m
-	 mov	(+$pData_offset)(%rsp), %rbx
-	 add	\$$M, %rbx
-
-	 sub	(+8*0)(%rbx), %r8
-	 sbb	(+8*1)(%rbx), %r9
-	 sbb	(+8*2)(%rbx), %r10
-	 sbb	(+8*3)(%rbx), %r11
-	 sbb	(+8*4)(%rbx), %r12
-	 sbb	(+8*5)(%rbx), %r13
-	 sbb	(+8*6)(%rbx), %r14
-	 sbb	(+8*7)(%rbx), %r15
-
-	# if Carry is clear, replace result with difference
-	 mov	(+8*0)(%rax), %rsi
-	 mov	(+8*1)(%rax), %rdi
-	 mov	(+8*2)(%rax), %rcx
-	 mov	(+8*3)(%rax), %rdx
-	 cmovnc	%r8, %rsi
-	 cmovnc	%r9, %rdi
-	 cmovnc	%r10, %rcx
-	 cmovnc	%r11, %rdx
-	 mov	%rsi, (+8*0)(%rax)
-	 mov	%rdi, (+8*1)(%rax)
-	 mov	%rcx, (+8*2)(%rax)
-	 mov	%rdx, (+8*3)(%rax)
-
-	 mov	(+8*4)(%rax), %rsi
-	 mov	(+8*5)(%rax), %rdi
-	 mov	(+8*6)(%rax), %rcx
-	 mov	(+8*7)(%rax), %rdx
-	 cmovnc	%r12, %rsi
-	 cmovnc	%r13, %rdi
-	 cmovnc	%r14, %rcx
-	 cmovnc	%r15, %rdx
-	 mov	%rsi, (+8*4)(%rax)
-	 mov	%rdi, (+8*5)(%rax)
-	 mov	%rcx, (+8*6)(%rax)
-	 mov	%rdx, (+8*7)(%rax)
-
-	 mov	(+$rsp_offset)(%rsp), %rsi
-	 mov	0(%rsi),%r15
-	 mov	8(%rsi),%r14
-	 mov	16(%rsi),%r13
-	 mov	24(%rsi),%r12
-	 mov	32(%rsi),%rbx
-	 mov	40(%rsi),%rbp
-	 lea	48(%rsi),%rsp
-.Lepilogue:
-	 ret
-.size mod_exp_512, . - mod_exp_512
-___
-
-if ($win64) {
-# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
-#		CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
-my $rec="%rcx";
-my $frame="%rdx";
-my $context="%r8";
-my $disp="%r9";
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.extern	__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
-.type	mod_exp_512_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align	16
-mod_exp_512_se_handler:
-	push	%rsi
-	push	%rdi
-	push	%rbx
-	push	%rbp
-	push	%r12
-	push	%r13
-	push	%r14
-	push	%r15
-	pushfq
-	sub	\$64,%rsp
-
-	mov	120($context),%rax	# pull context->Rax
-	mov	248($context),%rbx	# pull context->Rip
-
-	lea	.Lbody(%rip),%r10
-	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
-	jb	.Lin_prologue
-
-	mov	152($context),%rax	# pull context->Rsp
-
-	lea	.Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
-	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip>=epilogue label
-	jae	.Lin_prologue
-
-	mov	$rsp_offset(%rax),%rax	# pull saved Rsp
-
-	mov	32(%rax),%rbx
-	mov	40(%rax),%rbp
-	mov	24(%rax),%r12
-	mov	16(%rax),%r13
-	mov	8(%rax),%r14
-	mov	0(%rax),%r15
-	lea	48(%rax),%rax
-	mov	%rbx,144($context)	# restore context->Rbx
-	mov	%rbp,160($context)	# restore context->Rbp
-	mov	%r12,216($context)	# restore context->R12
-	mov	%r13,224($context)	# restore context->R13
-	mov	%r14,232($context)	# restore context->R14
-	mov	%r15,240($context)	# restore context->R15
-
-.Lin_prologue:
-	mov	8(%rax),%rdi
-	mov	16(%rax),%rsi
-	mov	%rax,152($context)	# restore context->Rsp
-	mov	%rsi,168($context)	# restore context->Rsi
-	mov	%rdi,176($context)	# restore context->Rdi
-
-	mov	40($disp),%rdi		# disp->ContextRecord
-	mov	$context,%rsi		# context
-	mov	\$154,%ecx		# sizeof(CONTEXT)
-	.long	0xa548f3fc		# cld; rep movsq
-
-	mov	$disp,%rsi
-	xor	%rcx,%rcx		# arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
-	mov	8(%rsi),%rdx		# arg2, disp->ImageBase
-	mov	0(%rsi),%r8		# arg3, disp->ControlPc
-	mov	16(%rsi),%r9		# arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
-	mov	40(%rsi),%r10		# disp->ContextRecord
-	lea	56(%rsi),%r11		# &disp->HandlerData
-	lea	24(%rsi),%r12		# &disp->EstablisherFrame
-	mov	%r10,32(%rsp)		# arg5
-	mov	%r11,40(%rsp)		# arg6
-	mov	%r12,48(%rsp)		# arg7
-	mov	%rcx,56(%rsp)		# arg8, (NULL)
-	call	*__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
-
-	mov	\$1,%eax		# ExceptionContinueSearch
-	add	\$64,%rsp
-	popfq
-	pop	%r15
-	pop	%r14
-	pop	%r13
-	pop	%r12
-	pop	%rbp
-	pop	%rbx
-	pop	%rdi
-	pop	%rsi
-	ret
-.size	mod_exp_512_se_handler,.-mod_exp_512_se_handler
-
-.section	.pdata
-.align	4
-	.rva	.LSEH_begin_mod_exp_512
-	.rva	.LSEH_end_mod_exp_512
-	.rva	.LSEH_info_mod_exp_512
-
-.section	.xdata
-.align	8
-.LSEH_info_mod_exp_512:
-	.byte	9,0,0,0
-	.rva	mod_exp_512_se_handler
-___
-}
-
-sub reg_part {
-my ($reg,$conv)=@_;
-    if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/)	{ $reg .= $conv; }
-    elsif ($conv eq "b")	{ $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/;	}
-    elsif ($conv eq "w")	{ $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/;		}
-    elsif ($conv eq "d")	{ $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/;		}
-    return $reg;
-}
-
-$code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem;
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/(\(\+[^)]+\))/eval $1/gem;
-print $code;
-close STDOUT;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 28a9fd5..8c46e50 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -185,10 +185,10 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
                 goto err;
         }
     }
-    ret = 1;
- err:
     if (r != rr)
         BN_copy(r, rr);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
     bn_check_top(r);
     return (ret);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile
index 88535f9..60e8960 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ cmll-x86.s:	asm/cmll-x86.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/cmll-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@
 cmll-x86_64.s:  asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/cmll-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
-cmllt4-sparcv9.s: asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl
+cmllt4-sparcv9.s: asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl ../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
 	$(PERL) asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
 
 files:
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index d93b14f..076b545 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -231,6 +231,8 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
         return 0;
     }
     tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
+    if(!tmp)
+        return 0;
     /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
     EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
                       in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
index e3ffeb2..faca9ae 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
@@ -585,7 +585,11 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
                 CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE);
                 goto err;
             }
-            BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)));
+            if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
+                        (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)))) {
+                CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
             while (*p)
                 buf->data[to++] = *(p++);
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
index d03de24..544fe97 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
@@ -86,23 +86,10 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
     /* Need to load ENGINEs */
     ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
 #endif
-    /* Add others here? */
-
     ERR_clear_error();
-    if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
+    CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
                                CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
-                               CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) {
-        BIO *bio_err;
-        ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-        if ((bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE)) != NULL) {
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Auto configuration failed\n");
-            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-            BIO_free(bio_err);
-        }
-        exit(1);
-    }
-
-    return;
+                               CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
 }
 
 void OPENSSL_no_config()
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h b/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h
index 4d94639..e85d310 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/des/spr.h
@@ -58,180 +58,155 @@
 
 OPENSSL_GLOBAL const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64] = {
     {
-/* nibble 0 */
-     0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
-     0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
-     0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
-     0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
-     0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
-     0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
-     0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
-     0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
-     0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
-     0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
-     0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
-     0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
-     0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
-     0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
-     0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
-     0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
-     }, {
-/* nibble 1 */
-         0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
-         0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
-         0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
-         0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
-         0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
-         0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
-         0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
-         0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
-         0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
-         0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
-         0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
-         0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
-         0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
-         0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
-         0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
-         0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
-         }, {
-/* nibble 2 */
-             0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
-             0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
-             0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
-             0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
-             0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
-             0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
-             0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
-             0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
-             0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
-             0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
-             0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
-             0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
-             0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
-             0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
-             0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
-             0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
-             }, {
-/* nibble 3 */
-                 0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
-                 0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
-                 0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
-                 0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
-                 0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
-                 0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
-                 0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
-                 0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
-                 0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
-                 0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
-                 0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
-                 0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
-                 0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
-                 0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
-                 0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
-                 0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
-                 }, {
-/* nibble 4 */
-                     0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
-                     0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
-                     0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
-                     0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
-                     0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
-                     0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
-                     0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
-                     0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
-                     0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
-                     0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
-                     0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
-                     0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
-                     0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
-                     0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
-                     0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
-                     0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
-                     }, {
-/* nibble 5 */
-                         0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
-                         0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
-                         0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
-                         0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
-                         0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
-                         0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
-                         0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
-                         0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
-                         0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
-                         0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
-                         0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
-                         0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
-                         0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
-                         0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
-                         0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
-                         0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
-                         }, {
-/* nibble 6 */
-                             0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L,
-                             0x01000004L,
-                             0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L,
-                             0x00000000L,
-                             0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L,
-                             0x01004000L,
-                             0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L,
-                             0x00000204L,
-                             0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L,
-                             0x01004204L,
-                             0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
-                             0x00004200L,
-                             0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L,
-                             0x00000004L,
-                             0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L,
-                             0x01000000L,
-                             0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L,
-                             0x00000204L,
-                             0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
-                             0x01004004L,
-                             0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L,
-                             0x00000000L,
-                             0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L,
-                             0x01000200L,
-                             0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L,
-                             0x00004200L,
-                             0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L,
-                             0x01000000L,
-                             0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L,
-                             0x01004204L,
-                             0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L,
-                             0x00004004L,
-                             }, {
-/* nibble 7 */
-                                 0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L,
-                                 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x20820080L,
-                                 0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L,
-                                 0x00020080L,
-                                 0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L,
-                                 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L,
-                                 0x20020000L,
-                                 0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x00820000L,
-                                 0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L,
-                                 0x20800080L,
-                                 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L,
-                                 0x00000080L,
-                                 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L,
-                                 0x20820080L,
-                                 0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x00820000L,
-                                 0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L,
-                                 0x00800080L,
-                                 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L,
-                                 0x20020000L,
-                                 0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x20000080L,
-                                 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L,
-                                 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L,
-                                 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L,
-                                 0x00820080L,
-                                 }
+        /* nibble 0 */
+        0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
+        0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
+        0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
+        0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
+        0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
+        0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
+        0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
+        0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
+        0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
+        0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
+        0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
+        0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
+        0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
+        0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 1 */
+        0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
+        0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
+        0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
+        0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
+        0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
+        0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
+        0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
+        0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
+        0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
+        0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
+        0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
+        0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
+        0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
+        0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
+        0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 2 */
+        0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
+        0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
+        0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
+        0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
+        0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
+        0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
+        0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
+        0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
+        0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
+        0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
+        0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
+        0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
+        0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
+        0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 3 */
+        0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
+        0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
+        0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
+        0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
+        0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
+        0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
+        0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
+        0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
+        0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
+        0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
+        0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
+        0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
+        0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
+        0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 4 */
+        0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
+        0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
+        0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
+        0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
+        0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
+        0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
+        0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
+        0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
+        0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
+        0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
+        0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
+        0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
+        0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
+        0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 5 */
+        0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
+        0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
+        0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
+        0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
+        0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
+        0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
+        0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
+        0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
+        0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
+        0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
+        0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
+        0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
+        0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
+        0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 6 */
+        0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
+        0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L,
+        0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L,
+        0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L,
+        0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L,
+        0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
+        0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L,
+        0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L,
+        0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L,
+        0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L,
+        0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
+        0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 7 */
+        0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L,
+        0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L,
+        0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L,
+        0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
+        0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
+        0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L,
+        0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L,
+        0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L,
+        0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
+        0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L,
+        0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
+        0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L,
+        0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L,
+        0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L,
+    }
 };
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
index a8349e7..c6bfc2d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
 static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 {
     DH *dh;
-    void *pval = NULL;
     int ptype;
     unsigned char *penc = NULL;
     int penclen;
@@ -161,12 +160,15 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
 
     str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+    if(!str) {
+        DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
     str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data);
     if (str->length <= 0) {
         DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;
     }
-    pval = str;
     ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
 
     pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL);
@@ -183,14 +185,14 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     }
 
     if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id),
-                               ptype, pval, penc, penclen))
+                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
         return 1;
 
  err:
     if (penc)
         OPENSSL_free(penc);
-    if (pval)
-        ASN1_STRING_free(pval);
+    if (str)
+        ASN1_STRING_free(str);
 
     return 0;
 }
@@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
 
     EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
 
-    ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
 
     return 1;
 
@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
     DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
  dherr:
     DH_free(dh);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -282,7 +285,8 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
-    ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
@@ -296,7 +300,7 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     if (params != NULL)
         ASN1_STRING_free(params);
     if (prkey != NULL)
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
     return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index 494a887..b3a3147 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
         ret = 0;
         Zlen = DH_size(dh);
         Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen);
+        if(!Z) {
+            goto err;
+        }
         if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0)
             goto err;
         if (!DH_KDF_X9_42(key, *keylen, Z, Zlen, dctx->kdf_oid,
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index c142ce7..2a5cd71 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -129,21 +129,23 @@ static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
 static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 {
     DSA *dsa;
-    void *pval = NULL;
     int ptype;
     unsigned char *penc = NULL;
     int penclen;
+    ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
 
     dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
     if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
-        ASN1_STRING *str;
         str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+        if (!str) {
+            DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
         str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
         if (str->length <= 0) {
             DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto err;
         }
-        pval = str;
         ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
     } else
         ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
@@ -158,14 +160,14 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     }
 
     if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
-                               ptype, pval, penc, penclen))
+                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
         return 1;
 
  err:
     if (penc)
         OPENSSL_free(penc);
-    if (pval)
-        ASN1_STRING_free(pval);
+    if (str)
+        ASN1_STRING_free(str);
 
     return 0;
 }
@@ -226,7 +228,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
             goto decerr;
         if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
             p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
-            ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+            ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
             if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
                 goto decerr;
         }
@@ -264,7 +266,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
     if (ndsa)
         sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
     else
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
 
     return 1;
 
@@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
  dsaerr:
     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     if (privkey)
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
     sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
     DSA_free(dsa);
     return 0;
@@ -315,7 +317,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
-    ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
@@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     if (params != NULL)
         ASN1_STRING_free(params);
     if (prkey != NULL)
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
     return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
index c0fcbb1..f629f03 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
             return (NULL);
         }
         strcpy(merged, filespec2);
-    } else
+    } else {
         /*
          * This part isn't as trivial as it looks.  It assumes that the
          * second file specification really is a directory, and makes no
@@ -322,13 +322,12 @@ static char *dlfcn_merger(DSO *dso, const char *filespec1,
          * concatenation of filespec2 followed by a slash followed by
          * filespec1.
          */
-    {
         int spec2len, len;
 
         spec2len = strlen(filespec2);
-        len = spec2len + (filespec1 ? strlen(filespec1) : 0);
+        len = spec2len + strlen(filespec1);
 
-        if (filespec2 && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') {
+        if (spec2len && filespec2[spec2len - 1] == '/') {
             spec2len--;
             len--;
         }
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
index 14d885d..0eff96e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso)
 # endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
 
     const char *sp1, *sp2;      /* Search result */
+    const char *ext = NULL;	/* possible extension to add */
 
     if (filename == NULL) {
         DSOerr(DSO_F_VMS_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
@@ -214,11 +215,19 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso)
     /* Now, let's see if there's a type, and save the position in sp2 */
     sp2 = strchr(sp1, '.');
     /*
+     * If there is a period and the next character is a semi-colon,
+     * we need to add an extension
+     */
+    if (sp2 != NULL && sp2[1] == ';')
+        ext = ".EXE";
+    /*
      * If we found it, that's where we'll cut.  Otherwise, look for a version
      * number and save the position in sp2
      */
-    if (sp2 == NULL)
+    if (sp2 == NULL) {
         sp2 = strchr(sp1, ';');
+        ext = ".EXE";
+    }
     /*
      * If there was still nothing to find, set sp2 to point at the end of the
      * string
@@ -244,6 +253,11 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso)
 
     strncpy(p->imagename, filename, sp1 - filename);
     p->imagename[sp1 - filename] = '\0';
+    if (ext) {
+        strcat(p->imagename, ext);
+        if (*sp2 == '.')
+            sp2++;
+    }
     strcat(p->imagename, sp2);
 
     p->filename_dsc.dsc$w_length = strlen(p->filename);
@@ -525,7 +539,8 @@ static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
 {
     int len = strlen(filename);
     char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
-    strcpy(not_translated, filename);
+    if(not_translated)
+        strcpy(not_translated, filename);
     return (not_translated);
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index 2924374..b4b0e9f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -1017,14 +1017,8 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
     EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
     EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
 
-    if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-
-    if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(&priv_key, in, len)) == NULL) {
+    if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
         ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
         return NULL;
     }
 
@@ -1033,8 +1027,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
             ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto err;
         }
-        if (a)
-            *a = ret;
     } else
         ret = *a;
 
@@ -1102,10 +1094,12 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
         ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
     }
 
+    if (a)
+        *a = ret;
     ok = 1;
  err:
     if (!ok) {
-        if (ret)
+        if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
             EC_KEY_free(ret);
         ret = NULL;
     }
@@ -1232,16 +1226,19 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
             ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             return NULL;
         }
-        if (a)
-            *a = ret;
     } else
         ret = *a;
 
     if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+             EC_KEY_free(ret);
         return NULL;
     }
 
+    if (a)
+        *a = ret;
+
     return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
index 023bd0e..6dbe9d8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
@@ -69,16 +69,16 @@
  *
  */
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-
 #include <string.h>
 #include "ec_lcl.h"
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
 typedef struct {
     int field_type,             /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
                                  * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c
index 73cc123..5a832ba 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c
@@ -69,13 +69,13 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
 
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "ec_lcl.h"
-
 EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index 9a59ef0..ed09f97 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static void bin28_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[28])
     out[0] = *((const uint64_t *)(in)) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
     out[1] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 7))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
     out[2] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 14))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
-    out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 21))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
+    out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in+20))) >> 8;
 }
 
 static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
index bcb4c44..4279dd9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags)
 static int int_def_cb(const char *alg, int len, void *arg)
 {
     unsigned int *pflags = arg;
+    if (alg == NULL)
+        return 0;
     if (!strncmp(alg, "ALL", len))
         *pflags |= ENGINE_METHOD_ALL;
     else if (!strncmp(alg, "RSA", len))
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c b/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8362754..0000000
--- a/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,701 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */
-/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp.
- *   Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com
- *           Jim Guilford
- *           Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com
- *           Maxim.Perminov@intel.com
- *           Ying.Huang@intel.com
- *
- * More information about algorithm used can be found at:
- *   http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */
-#undef COMPILE_RSAX
-
-#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
-     defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
-# define COMPILE_RSAX
-static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void);
-#endif
-
-void ENGINE_load_rsax(void)
-{
-/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
-#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
-    ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax();
-    if (!toadd)
-        return;
-    ENGINE_add(toadd);
-    ENGINE_free(toadd);
-    ERR_clear_error();
-#endif
-}
-
-#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
-# define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine"
-
-static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e);
-static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e);
-static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* RSA stuff */
-static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
-                              BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r);
-# endif
-
-static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = {
-    {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-};
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa = {
-    "Intel RSA-X method",
-    NULL,
-    NULL,
-    NULL,
-    NULL,
-    e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp,
-    NULL,
-    NULL,
-    e_rsax_rsa_finish,
-    RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE,
-    NULL,
-    NULL,
-    NULL
-};
-# endif
-
-/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax";
-static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support";
-
-/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */
-static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
-{
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
-# endif
-    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) ||
-        !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) ||
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-        !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) ||
-# endif
-        !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) ||
-        !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) ||
-        !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) ||
-        !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) ||
-        !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns))
-        return 0;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
-    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
-    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
-    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
-    e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp;
-# endif
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void)
-{
-    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-    if (!ret)
-        return NULL;
-    if (!bind_helper(ret)) {
-        ENGINE_free(ret);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */
-static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1;
-# endif
-
-static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* (de)initialisation functions. */
-static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e)
-{
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
-        rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-# endif
-    if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
-        return 0;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
-{
-    int to_return = 1;
-
-    switch (cmd) {
-        /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
-    default:
-        to_return = 0;
-        break;
-    }
-
-    return to_return;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-
-#  ifdef _WIN32
-typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64;
-#  else
-typedef unsigned long long UINT64;
-#  endif
-typedef unsigned short UINT16;
-
-/*
- * Table t is interleaved in the following manner: The order in memory is
- * t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ... A particular 512-bit value is
- * stored in t[][index] rather than the more normal t[index][]; i.e. the
- * qwords of a particular entry in t are not adjacent in memory
- */
-
-/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */
-static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array);
-
-/*
- * Extract array elements from BIGNUM b To set the whole array from b, call
- * with n=8
- */
-static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n,
-                                   UINT64 *array);
-
-struct mod_ctx_512 {
-    UINT64 t[8][8];
-    UINT64 m[8];
-    UINT64 m1[8];               /* 2^278 % m */
-    UINT64 m2[8];               /* 2^640 % m */
-    UINT64 k1[2];               /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */
-};
-
-static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data);
-
-void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
-                 UINT64 *g,     /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
-                 UINT64 *exp,   /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
-                 struct mod_ctx_512 *data);
-
-typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx {
-    UINT64 type;
-    union {
-        struct mod_ctx_512 b512;
-    } ctx;
-
-} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX;
-
-static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM *m)
-{
-    E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr;
-
-    if (idx < 0 || idx > 2)
-        return NULL;
-
-    hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
-    if (!hptr) {
-        hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3 * sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX));
-        if (!hptr)
-            return NULL;
-        hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type = hptr[0].type = 0;
-        RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr);
-    }
-
-    if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m))
-        return hptr + idx;
-
-    if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
-        UINT64 _m[8];
-        bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m);
-        memset(&hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512));
-        mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512);
-    }
-
-    hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m);
-    return hptr + idx;
-}
-
-static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
-{
-    E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
-    if (hptr) {
-        OPENSSL_free(hptr);
-        RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL);
-    }
-    if (rsa->_method_mod_n)
-        BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-    if (rsa->_method_mod_p)
-        BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-    if (rsa->_method_mod_q)
-        BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e,
-                             const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-                             BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont,
-                             E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *rsax_mod_ctx)
-{
-    if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
-        if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
-            UINT64 _r[8];
-            UINT64 _g[8];
-            UINT64 _e[8];
-
-            /* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */
-            bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g);
-            bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e);
-
-            mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512);
-            /* Return the result in the BIGNUM */
-            interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r);
-            return 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont);
-}
-
-/*
- * Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular
- * exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the
- * necessary values.  These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in the
- * target openssl.
- */
-
-/*
- * Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into
- * an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM
- */
-static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n,
-                                   UINT64 *array)
-{
-    int i;
-    UINT64 tmp;
-    unsigned char bn_buff[64];
-    memset(bn_buff, 0, 64);
-    if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) {
-        printf("Can't support this byte size\n");
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (BN_num_bytes(b) != 0) {
-        if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff + (64 - BN_num_bytes(b)))) {
-            printf("Error's in bn2bin\n");
-            /* We have to error, here */
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    while (n-- > 0) {
-        array[n] = 0;
-        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
-            tmp = bn_buff[63 - (n * 8 + i)];
-            array[n] |= tmp << (8 * i);
-        }
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */
-static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array)
-{
-    unsigned char tmp[64];
-    int n = 8;
-    int i;
-    while (n-- > 0) {
-        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
-            tmp[63 - (n * 8 + i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n] >> (8 * i));
-    }}
-    BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b);
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* The main 512bit precompute call */
-static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data)
-{
-    BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2;
-
-    /* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */
-    BN_CTX *ctx;
-    /* Some tmps */
-    UINT64 _t[8];
-    int i, j, ret = 0;
-
-    /* Init _m with m */
-    BN_init(&_m);
-    interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m);
-    memset(_t, 0, 64);
-
-    /* Inits */
-    BN_init(&two_768);
-    BN_init(&two_640);
-    BN_init(&two_128);
-    BN_init(&two_512);
-    BN_init(&tmp);
-    BN_init(&tmp2);
-
-    /* Create our context */
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-    /*
-     * For production, if you care, these only need to be set once,
-     * and may be made constants.
-     */
-    BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768);
-    BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640);
-    BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128);
-    BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512);
-
-    if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) {
-        exit(1);
-    }
-    if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) {    /* Odd modulus required for Mont */
-        exit(1);
-    }
-
-    /* Precompute m1 */
-    BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx);
-    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Precompute m2 */
-    BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx);
-    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should
-     * be non-negative.
-     */
-    BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx);
-    if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) {
-        BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp);
-    }
-    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Precompute t */
-    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-        BN_zero(&tmp);
-        if (i & 1) {
-            BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp);
-        }
-        if (i & 2) {
-            BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp);
-        }
-        if (i & 4) {
-            BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp);
-        }
-
-        BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx);
-        if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) {
-            goto err;
-        }
-        for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
-            data->t[j][i] = _t[j];
-    }
-
-    /* Precompute m */
-    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-        data->m[i] = m[i];
-    }
-
-    ret = 1;
-
- err:
-    /* Cleanup */
-    if (ctx != NULL) {
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    }
-    BN_free(&two_768);
-    BN_free(&two_640);
-    BN_free(&two_128);
-    BN_free(&two_512);
-    BN_free(&tmp);
-    BN_free(&tmp2);
-    BN_free(&_m);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
-                              BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
-    BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
-    BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
-    {
-        BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
-        BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-        int error = 0;
-
-        /*
-         * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
-         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
-         */
-        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-            BN_init(&local_p);
-            p = &local_p;
-            BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-            BN_init(&local_q);
-            q = &local_q;
-            BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        } else {
-            p = rsa->p;
-            q = rsa->q;
-        }
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
-                error = 1;
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
-                error = 1;
-        }
-
-        /* clean up */
-        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-            BN_free(&local_p);
-            BN_free(&local_q);
-        }
-        if (error)
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    /* compute I mod q */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        c = &local_c;
-        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
-        BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    } else
-        dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
-
-    if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
-                           rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0,
-                                                              rsa->q)))
-        goto err;
-
-    /* compute I mod p */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        c = &local_c;
-        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
-        BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    } else
-        dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
-
-    if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
-                           rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1,
-                                                              rsa->p)))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
-        goto err;
-    /*
-     * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
-     * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
-     */
-    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
-        goto err;
-
-    /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        pr1 = &local_r1;
-        BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    } else
-        pr1 = r1;
-    if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
-     * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
-     * break the private key operations: the following second correction
-     * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
-     * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
-     */
-    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
-            goto err;
-    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
-        goto err;
-    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
-        if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp
-            (vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n,
-             e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n)))
-            goto err;
-
-        /*
-         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
-         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
-         * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
-         * absolute equality, just congruency.
-         */
-        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
-            goto err;
-        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
-            if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
-                goto err;
-        if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
-            /*
-             * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
-             * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
-             * return that instead.
-             */
-
-            BIGNUM local_d;
-            BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
-            if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-                d = &local_d;
-                BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-            } else
-                d = rsa->d;
-            if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2,
-                                                                      rsa->n)))
-                goto err;
-        }
-    }
-    ret = 1;
-
- err:
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-# endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-#endif                          /* !COMPILE_RSAX */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
index 30590d5..c9afca7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ AR=		ar r
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile
-TEST=evp_test.c
+TEST=evp_test.c evp_extra_test.c
 TESTDATA=evptests.txt
 APPS=
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c
index bd7760d..f2643f3 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -203,9 +203,12 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
             ctx->engine = impl;
         } else
             ctx->engine = NULL;
-    } else if (!ctx->digest) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET);
-        return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (!ctx->digest) {
+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        type = ctx->digest;
     }
 #endif
     if (ctx->digest != type) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 41844bc..8161b26 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -790,6 +790,8 @@ static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         default:
             return 0;
         }
+#  else
+        cctx->str = NULL;
 #  endif
         cctx->key_set = 1;
     }
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f7b011
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/*
+ * kExampleRSAKeyDER is an RSA private key in ASN.1, DER format. Of course, you
+ * should never use this key anywhere but in an example.
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xf8,
+    0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0x59,
+    0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xd3, 0x37,
+    0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34, 0x75, 0x71,
+    0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x97, 0x8a,
+    0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8, 0x50, 0xe4,
+    0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0xec,
+    0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83, 0x58, 0x76,
+    0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xd8,
+    0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a, 0x5c, 0xd7,
+    0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x2c,
+    0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
+    0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a, 0x6d, 0xc7,
+    0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5, 0x32, 0x85,
+    0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x5f, 0xee,
+    0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8, 0x66, 0x85,
+    0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa4, 0x0a,
+    0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x15,
+    0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0x83,
+    0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78, 0x80, 0x1b,
+    0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x99, 0x73,
+    0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60, 0x1f, 0x99,
+    0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x02,
+    0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3, 0x40, 0x41,
+    0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x3d, 0x59,
+    0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18, 0xc6, 0xd9,
+    0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0xef,
+    0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x46, 0x87,
+    0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x2c, 0xdf,
+    0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63, 0x55, 0xf5,
+    0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05, 0xcd, 0xb5,
+    0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16, 0xb3, 0x62,
+    0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3, 0x9b, 0x64,
+    0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85, 0xfa, 0xb8,
+    0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xe8, 0xba,
+    0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7, 0xe7, 0xfe,
+    0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99, 0x75, 0xe7,
+    0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4, 0x9d, 0xfe,
+    0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d, 0xf1, 0xdb,
+    0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40, 0x5a, 0x34,
+    0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x84, 0x27,
+    0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0xe9, 0xc0,
+    0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c, 0xb9, 0xba,
+    0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06,
+    0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea, 0x52, 0x2c,
+    0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x1e,
+    0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e, 0x49, 0xaf,
+    0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9, 0xd1, 0x8a,
+    0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae, 0x17, 0x17,
+    0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d, 0x08, 0xf1,
+    0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf,
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kMsg[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4 };
+
+static const unsigned char kSignature[] = {
+    0xa5, 0xf0, 0x8a, 0x47, 0x5d, 0x3c, 0xb3, 0xcc, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xaf, 0x4d,
+    0x8c, 0xae, 0x4c, 0x14, 0xef, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0x34, 0x36, 0xde, 0xf4, 0x3e,
+    0x3d, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x60, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x91, 0x28, 0xda, 0xfb, 0x7e, 0x04,
+    0x96, 0x7e, 0x63, 0x13, 0x90, 0xce, 0xb9, 0xb4, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xfd, 0x09,
+    0x3d, 0xc7, 0x67, 0x78, 0x54, 0x04, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x62, 0x6e, 0x24, 0x67,
+    0xb4, 0x40, 0xfc, 0x57, 0x62, 0xc6, 0xf1, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x97, 0x8f, 0x6a,
+    0xa8, 0xae, 0x44, 0x46, 0x5e, 0xab, 0x67, 0x17, 0x53, 0x19, 0x3a, 0xda,
+    0x5a, 0xc8, 0x16, 0x3e, 0x86, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x71, 0x2f, 0xfc, 0x23, 0x48,
+    0xd9, 0x0b, 0x13, 0xdd, 0x7b, 0x5a, 0x25, 0x79, 0xef, 0xa5, 0x7b, 0x04,
+    0xed, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x18, 0x55, 0xe4, 0x0a, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x79, 0x5d, 0xd7,
+    0x55, 0xa7, 0xab, 0x45, 0x02, 0x97, 0x60, 0x42,
+};
+
+/*
+ * kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8 is kExampleRSAKeyDER encoded in a PKCS #8
+ * PrivateKeyInfo.
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8[] = {
+    0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x76, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a,
+    0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x82,
+    0x02, 0x60, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81,
+    0x00, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0x6c, 0x83, 0xb4, 0xbc, 0xd9, 0xa8, 0x57, 0xc0, 0xa5,
+    0xb4, 0x59, 0x76, 0x8c, 0x54, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xeb, 0x22, 0x52, 0x04, 0x7e,
+    0xd3, 0x37, 0xeb, 0x41, 0xfd, 0x83, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x15, 0x34,
+    0x75, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x84, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0xef, 0x5a, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xde,
+    0x97, 0x8a, 0xdd, 0xff, 0xbb, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x92, 0xbe, 0xb8,
+    0x50, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x33, 0x30, 0x76, 0x13, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x7b,
+    0xdc, 0xec, 0x5a, 0xca, 0x63, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x25, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x8a, 0x83,
+    0x58, 0x76, 0x20, 0xfa, 0x16, 0x77, 0xd7, 0x79, 0x92, 0x63, 0x01, 0x48,
+    0x1a, 0xd8, 0x7b, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x52, 0x55, 0x49, 0x4e, 0xd6, 0x6e, 0x4a,
+    0x5c, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x36, 0x0c, 0xde, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x44, 0xe8, 0xc2,
+    0xa7, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0xb5, 0xaf, 0x64, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x07, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01,
+    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x74, 0x88, 0x64, 0x3f, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3a,
+    0x6d, 0xc7, 0x7f, 0xb9, 0xa3, 0xc0, 0x6e, 0xec, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0xb5,
+    0x32, 0x85, 0x5f, 0x19, 0xd4, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x3c, 0xfa, 0xc2, 0xf6,
+    0x5f, 0xee, 0xe6, 0xba, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2e, 0xc7, 0x0c, 0xd4, 0x42, 0xb8,
+    0x66, 0x85, 0x9c, 0x7b, 0x24, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x16, 0x11, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xb6,
+    0xa4, 0x0a, 0xc9, 0x55, 0x2e, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x61, 0xcb, 0x25, 0x8f,
+    0xc2, 0x15, 0x7b, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0x1c,
+    0x5b, 0x83, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0xcc, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x2c, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x78,
+    0x80, 0x1b, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x57, 0x91, 0x3d, 0x71,
+    0x99, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x8c, 0x07, 0x4f, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0x60,
+    0x1f, 0x99, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0xef, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7d,
+    0xb1, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x65, 0x70, 0xf8, 0xce, 0xd3,
+    0x40, 0x41, 0x80, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x01, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x3d,
+    0x3d, 0x59, 0x09, 0x33, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x96, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x18,
+    0xc6, 0xd9, 0x78, 0xf1, 0xf4, 0x35, 0x46, 0xe9, 0x7c, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x5d,
+    0x9f, 0xef, 0x54, 0xb8, 0xf7, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x32,
+    0x46, 0x87, 0x67, 0x30, 0x7b, 0xa7, 0xac, 0xe3, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xfc,
+    0x2c, 0xdf, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x88, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x93, 0x47, 0x63,
+    0x55, 0xf5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x43, 0xba, 0x1c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0xb6, 0x95, 0x05,
+    0xcd, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xdf, 0xeb, 0x04, 0x53, 0x9d, 0xbd, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x16,
+    0xb3, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0x46, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0x97, 0x93, 0x9f, 0x8a, 0xc3,
+    0x9b, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x32, 0x57, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x85,
+    0xfa, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xbc, 0x3d, 0xde, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0x97,
+    0xe8, 0xba, 0x9e, 0x81, 0x37, 0x17, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x64, 0xc9, 0x00, 0xb7,
+    0xe7, 0xfe, 0xf4, 0x29, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x20, 0xbd, 0x99,
+    0x75, 0xe7, 0x76, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0xae, 0xaf, 0x7e, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x81, 0xf4,
+    0x9d, 0xfe, 0x07, 0x2b, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x0b, 0x5a, 0x55, 0x90, 0x71, 0x7d,
+    0xf1, 0xdb, 0xd9, 0xb1, 0x41, 0x41, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x4e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x40,
+    0x5a, 0x34, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf5, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x26,
+    0x84, 0x27, 0x14, 0x93, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xc6, 0x0f, 0x5e, 0x27, 0xe6, 0xe1,
+    0xe9, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0x34, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xa2, 0x4b, 0x73, 0xbc, 0x8c,
+    0xb9, 0xba, 0x13, 0x6c, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x51, 0x84, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0x30,
+    0x10, 0x06, 0x7e, 0xed, 0x17, 0x5a, 0x14, 0x00, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x85, 0xea,
+    0x52, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x02, 0x40, 0x51, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x83, 0x19, 0x9b,
+    0xc4, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x50, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x5a, 0xa2, 0x18, 0xca, 0x5f, 0x2e,
+    0x49, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xcc, 0xfa, 0x65, 0x77, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xa1, 0x0a, 0xa9,
+    0xd1, 0x8a, 0x39, 0x37, 0xf4, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x27, 0x5e, 0xae,
+    0x17, 0x17, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x54, 0x34, 0xbf, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x5d,
+    0x08, 0xf1, 0x2d, 0x86, 0x9d, 0xa5, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0xdf,
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * kExampleECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey
+ * structure.
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleECKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x08, 0x72, 0x7a,
+    0xd4, 0xa0, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0xdd, 0x59, 0xc9, 0x4d, 0x89, 0x68, 0x77, 0x08,
+    0xb5, 0x6f, 0xc9, 0x5d, 0x30, 0x77, 0x0e, 0xe8, 0xd1, 0xc9, 0xce, 0x0a,
+    0x8b, 0xb4, 0x6a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d,
+    0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xe6, 0x2b, 0x69,
+    0xe2, 0xbf, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x97, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x94, 0x8a, 0x4c,
+    0xd5, 0x97, 0x6b, 0xb7, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x0d, 0x46, 0xfb, 0xdd, 0xa9, 0xa9,
+    0x1e, 0x9d, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x5a, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xa8, 0x0a, 0x18,
+    0xf9, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x1e, 0x56, 0xe2, 0x7c, 0x83, 0x48, 0xdb, 0x16,
+    0x1a, 0x1c, 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0xf1, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x72, 0x22,
+    0xc1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * kExampleBadECKeyDER is a sample EC private key encoded as an ECPrivateKey
+ * structure. The private key is equal to the order and will fail to import
+ */
+static const unsigned char kExampleBadECKeyDER[] = {
+    0x30, 0x66, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48,
+    0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03,
+    0x01, 0x07, 0x04, 0x4C, 0x30, 0x4A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3,
+    0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00,
+    0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+    0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
+    0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
+};
+#endif
+
+static EVP_PKEY *load_example_rsa_key(void)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *derp = kExampleRSAKeyDER;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+    if (!d2i_RSAPrivateKey(&rsa, &derp, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER))) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+    if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    ret = pkey;
+    pkey = NULL;
+
+ out:
+    if (pkey) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+    if (rsa) {
+        RSA_free(rsa);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_EVP_DigestSignInit(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    unsigned char *sig = NULL;
+    size_t sig_len = 0;
+    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx, md_ctx_verify;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx_verify);
+
+    pkey = load_example_rsa_key();
+    if (pkey == NULL ||
+        !EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
+        !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg))) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+    /* Determine the size of the signature. */
+    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+    /* Sanity check for testing. */
+    if (sig_len != (size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "sig_len mismatch\n");
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
+    if (sig == NULL || !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, sig, &sig_len)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure that the signature round-trips. */
+    if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx_verify, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey)
+        || !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx_verify, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg))
+        || !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx_verify, sig, sig_len)) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ out:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx_verify);
+    if (pkey) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+    if (sig) {
+        OPENSSL_free(sig);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+    pkey = load_example_rsa_key();
+    if (pkey == NULL ||
+        !EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
+        !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, kMsg, sizeof(kMsg)) ||
+        !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, kSignature, sizeof(kSignature))) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+
+ out:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    if (pkey) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(const unsigned char *input,
+                                   size_t input_len, int expected_id)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    p = input;
+    pkey = d2i_AutoPrivateKey(NULL, &p, input_len);
+    if (pkey == NULL || p != input + input_len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey failed\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != expected_id) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Did not decode expected type\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+    if (!ret) {
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    }
+
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* Tests loading a bad key in PKCS8 format */
+static int test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    const unsigned char *derp = kExampleBadECKeyDER;
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+    p8inf = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &derp, sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER));
+
+    if (!p8inf || derp != kExampleBadECKeyDER + sizeof(kExampleBadECKeyDER)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse key\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+    if (pkey) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Imported invalid EC key\n");
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    ret = 1;
+
+ done:
+    if (p8inf != NULL) {
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+    }
+
+    if (pkey != NULL) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    /* Load up the software EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD definitions */
+    OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
+    OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+
+    if (!test_EVP_DigestSignInit()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestSignInit failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_EVP_DigestVerifyInit()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "EVP_DigestVerifyInit failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyDER),
+                                 EVP_PKEY_RSA)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyDER) failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey
+        (kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8, sizeof(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8), EVP_PKEY_RSA)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleRSAKeyPKCS8) failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (!test_d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER, sizeof(kExampleECKeyDER),
+                                 EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "d2i_AutoPrivateKey(kExampleECKeyDER) failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (!test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "test_EVP_PKCS82PKEY failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c b/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
index 5a3546a..f96a517 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c
@@ -500,6 +500,8 @@ static void int_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
     EX_CLASS_ITEM *item;
     void *ptr;
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS **storage = NULL;
+    if (ex_data == NULL)
+        return;
     if ((item = def_get_class(class_index)) == NULL)
         return;
     CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 4debf53..24a84a7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -852,7 +852,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block)
     {
         gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
         ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit;
+#  if defined(GHASH)
         ctx->ghash = gcm_ghash_4bit;
+#  else
+        ctx->ghash = NULL;
+#  endif
     }
 # elif  defined(GHASH_ASM_SPARC)
     if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] & SPARCV9_VIS3) {
@@ -872,7 +876,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *key, block128_f block)
     } else {
         gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
         ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit;
+#  if defined(GHASH)
         ctx->ghash = gcm_ghash_4bit;
+#  else
+        ctx->ghash = NULL;
+#  endif
     }
 # else
     gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable, ctx->H.u);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c
index e1e13a6..c6774f4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c
@@ -312,15 +312,18 @@ void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type,
     d.type = type;
     d.names =
         OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof *d.names);
-    d.n = 0;
-    OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d);
+    /* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */
+    if(d.names) {
+        d.n = 0;
+        OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d);
 
-    qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof *d.names, do_all_sorted_cmp);
+        qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof *d.names, do_all_sorted_cmp);
 
-    for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n)
-        fn(d.names[n], arg);
+        for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n)
+            fn(d.names[n], arg);
 
-    OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names);
+        OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names);
+    }
 }
 
 static int free_type;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
index 15c00bb..d0ed459 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ open (OUT,">$ARGV[2]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[2]";
 print OUT <<'EOF';
 /* crypto/objects/obj_mac.h */
 
-/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the
- * following command:
- * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
+/*
+ * THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the following
+ * command: perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
  */
 
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
@@ -132,21 +132,21 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -176,28 +176,36 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-#define SN_undef			"UNDEF"
-#define LN_undef			"undefined"
-#define NID_undef			0
-#define OBJ_undef			0L
-
+#define SN_undef                        "UNDEF"
+#define LN_undef                        "undefined"
+#define NID_undef                       0
+#define OBJ_undef                       0L
 EOF
 
+sub expand
+	{
+	my $string = shift;
+
+	1 while $string =~ s/\t+/' ' x (length($&) * 8 - length($`) % 8)/e;
+
+	return $string;
+	}
+
 foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %ordern)
 	{
 	$Cname=$ordern{$_};
-	print OUT "#define SN_",$Cname,"\t\t\"",$sn{$Cname},"\"\n" if $sn{$Cname} ne "";
-	print OUT "#define LN_",$Cname,"\t\t\"",$ln{$Cname},"\"\n" if $ln{$Cname} ne "";
-	print OUT "#define NID_",$Cname,"\t\t",$nid{$Cname},"\n" if $nid{$Cname} ne "";
-	print OUT "#define OBJ_",$Cname,"\t\t",$obj{$Cname},"\n" if $obj{$Cname} ne "";
 	print OUT "\n";
+	print OUT expand("#define SN_$Cname\t\t\"$sn{$Cname}\"\n") if $sn{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define LN_$Cname\t\t\"$ln{$Cname}\"\n") if $ln{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define NID_$Cname\t\t$nid{$Cname}\n") if $nid{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define OBJ_$Cname\t\t$obj{$Cname}\n") if $obj{$Cname} ne "";
 	}
 
 close OUT;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl b/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
index 833f4ab..1913b9d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objxref.pl
@@ -63,30 +63,36 @@ $pname =~ s|^.[^/]/||;
 print <<EOF;
 /* AUTOGENERATED BY $pname, DO NOT EDIT */
 
-typedef struct
-	{
-	int sign_id;
-	int hash_id;
-	int pkey_id;
-	} nid_triple;
+typedef struct {
+    int sign_id;
+    int hash_id;
+    int pkey_id;
+} nid_triple;
 
-static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] =
-	{
+static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = {
 EOF
 
 foreach (@srt1)
 	{
 	my $xr = $_;
 	my ($p1, $p2) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}};
-	print "\t{NID_$xr, NID_$p1, NID_$p2},\n";
-	}
+	my $o1 = "    {NID_$xr, NID_$p1,";
+	my $o2 = "NID_$p2},";
+        if (length("$o1 $o2") < 78)
+		{
+		print "$o1 $o2\n";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		print "$o1\n     $o2\n";
+		}
+        }
 
-print "\t};";
+print "};";
 print <<EOF;
 
 
-static const nid_triple * const sigoid_srt_xref[] =
-	{
+static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = {
 EOF
 
 foreach (@srt2)
@@ -95,10 +101,10 @@ foreach (@srt2)
 	# If digest or signature algorithm is "undef" then the algorithm
 	# needs special handling and is excluded from the cross reference table.
 	next if $p1 eq "undef" || $p2 eq "undef";
-	print "\t\&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
+	print "    \&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
 	}
 
-print "\t};\n\n";
+print "};\n";
 
 sub check_oid
 	{
@@ -108,4 +114,3 @@ sub check_oid
 		die "Not Found \"$chk\"\n";
 		}
 	}
-
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index e277cae..4f20b97 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000200fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000201fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2-fips 22 Jan 2015"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2a-fips 19 Mar 2015"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2 22 Jan 2015"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl b/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
index dc55b34..eb267a5 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
@@ -1249,6 +1249,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	fxor		%f8,  %f4, %f4
 	fxor		%f10, %f6, %f6
 
+	subcc		$len, 2, $len
 	stda		%f0, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
 	add		$out, 8, $out
 	stda		%f2, [$out]0xe2		! ASI_BLK_INIT, T4-specific
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index dd6f675..31a1b98 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -261,6 +261,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
     PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /*
+     * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
+     * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
+     *
+     * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
+     * error.
+     *
+     * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
+     * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
+     */
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
 
@@ -411,6 +430,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
     unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
     int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
 
@@ -707,6 +736,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
     STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -746,6 +785,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
         if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
             M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+            os = NULL;
             p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
         }
         break;
@@ -755,6 +795,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
         if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) {
             M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+            os = NULL;
             p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
         }
         break;
@@ -820,22 +861,30 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
     }
 
-    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
-        char *cont;
-        long contlen;
-        btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
-        if (btmp == NULL) {
-            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
         /*
-         * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
-         * instead of making an extra copy.
+         * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
+         * digested data support is broken.
          */
-        BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
-        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
-        ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+        if (os == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+            char *cont;
+            long contlen;
+            btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+            if (btmp == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+            /*
+             * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+             * instead of making an extra copy.
+             */
+            BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+            ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+        }
     }
     ret = 1;
  err:
@@ -910,6 +959,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio,
     STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
     X509 *x509;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
         cert = p7->d.sign->cert;
     } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
index c773812..0c5fcaa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
     nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
 
     switch (cmd) {
+    /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
     case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
         if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
             ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
@@ -444,6 +445,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md)
 
 STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
 {
+    if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+        return NULL;
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
         return (p7->d.sign->signer_info);
     } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
index 1b6e501..737aebf 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
 #else
 # include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 # include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# include <stddef.h>
 # include <sys/types.h>
 # include <sys/socket.h>
 # ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
index 9c4a137..02148d5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
     if (DosQuerySysState) {
         char *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(256 * 1024);
 
+        if(!buffer)
+            return 0;
+
         if (DosQuerySysState(0x1F, 0, 0, 0, buffer, 256 * 1024) == 0) {
             /*
              * First 4 bytes in buffer is a pointer to the thread count there
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index c7106a3..ca3922e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -698,9 +698,10 @@ static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
         return -1;
     }
-    if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey))
+    if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) {
         /* Carry on */
         return 2;
+    }
     return -1;
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index bc91da2..19461c6 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -261,19 +261,8 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
                 OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
 #endif
         if (sigtype != dtype) {
-            if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
-                 (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
-                ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
-                 (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) {
-                /* ok, we will let it through */
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
-                fprintf(stderr,
-                        "signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
-#endif
-            } else {
-                RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
-                goto err;
-            }
+            RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+            goto err;
         }
         if (rm) {
             const EVP_MD *md;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
index 8377299..4895eb3 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ sub sha1msg2	{ sha1op38(0xca,@_); }
 	&sub	("esp",32);
 
 	&movdqu	($ABCD,&QWP(0,$ctx));
-	&movd	($E,&QWP(16,$ctx));
+	&movd	($E,&DWP(16,$ctx));
 	&and	("esp",-32);
 	&movdqa	($BSWAP,&QWP(0x50,$tmp1));	# byte-n-word swap
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c b/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c
index 47457c7..de437ac 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/stack/stack.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ void sk_zero(_STACK *st)
         return;
     if (st->num <= 0)
         return;
-    memset((char *)st->data, 0, sizeof(st->data) * st->num);
+    memset((char *)st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num);
     st->num = 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
index 1b57659..28884c2 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
     int i;
 
     lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE));
+    if(!lock_cs) {
+        /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
+        return;
+    }
     for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
         lock_cs[i] = CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL);
     }
@@ -168,6 +172,10 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
 # else
     lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(rwlock_t));
 # endif
+    if(!lock_cs) {
+        /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
+        return;
+    }
     lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
     for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
         lock_count[i] = 0;
@@ -251,6 +259,12 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
     int i;
     char filename[20];
 
+    lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *));
+    if(!lock_cs) {
+        /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
+        return;
+    }
+
     strcpy(filename, "/tmp/mttest.XXXXXX");
     mktemp(filename);
 
@@ -261,7 +275,6 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
     arena = usinit(filename);
     unlink(filename);
 
-    lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *));
     for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
         lock_cs[i] = usnewsema(arena, 1);
     }
@@ -315,6 +328,14 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
 
     lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t));
     lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
+    if(!lock_cs || !lock_count) {
+        /* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
+        if(lock_cs)
+            OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+        if(lock_count)
+            OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
+        return;
+    }
     for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
         lock_count[i] = 0;
         pthread_mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]), NULL);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 8bda83c..5d66276 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -185,43 +185,37 @@
 
 /*
  * There are 5 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS,
- * MSDOS and SGTTY
+ * MSDOS and SGTTY.
+ *
+ * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will
+ * remain respected.  Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few
+ * systems that require something different.
+ *
+ * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration.  We
+ * may eventually opt to remove it's use entirely.
  */
 
-#if defined(__sgi) && !defined(TERMIOS)
-# define TERMIOS
-# undef  TERMIO
-# undef  SGTTY
-#endif
-
-#if defined(linux) && !defined(TERMIO)
-# undef  TERMIOS
-# define TERMIO
-# undef  SGTTY
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _LIBC
-# undef  TERMIOS
-# define TERMIO
-# undef  SGTTY
-#endif
+#if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY)
 
-#if !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) && !defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE)
-# undef  TERMIOS
-# undef  TERMIO
-# define SGTTY
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# undef TERMIOS
-# undef TERMIO
-# undef SGTTY
-#endif
+# if defined(_LIBC)
+#  undef  TERMIOS
+#  define TERMIO
+#  undef  SGTTY
+/*
+ * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, NETWARE use entirely other mechanisms.
+ * MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE should probably go away, but that needs to be confirmed.
+ */
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \
+	&& !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \
+	&& !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) \
+	&& !defined(MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE)	\
+	&& !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
+	&& !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+#  define TERMIOS
+#  undef  TERMIO
+#  undef  SGTTY
+# endif
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# undef TERMIOS
-# undef TERMIO
-# undef SGTTY
 #endif
 
 #ifdef TERMIOS
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
index bc6e566..01795f4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_req.c
@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md)
         goto err;
 
     pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+    if (pktmp == NULL)
+        goto err;
     i = X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp);
     EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
     if (!i)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
index 476d51c..dca6ab2 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -230,8 +230,12 @@ static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
                 goto merr;
             if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
                 goto merr;
-            qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps);
-            qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new();
+            if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
+                X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if(!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
+                goto merr;
             if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value,
                                  strlen(cnf->value)))
                 goto merr;
@@ -290,14 +294,18 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
     POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
     if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
         goto merr;
-    qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice);
+    if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
+        X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
     if (!(not = USERNOTICE_new()))
         goto merr;
     qual->d.usernotice = not;
     for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) {
         cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i);
         if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) {
-            not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new();
+            if(!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
+                goto merr;
             if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value,
                                  strlen(cnf->value)))
                 goto merr;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
index f65323b..ed6099e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -901,8 +901,13 @@ static int do_check_string(ASN1_STRING *a, int cmp_type, equal_fn equal,
         int astrlen;
         unsigned char *astr;
         astrlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&astr, a);
-        if (astrlen < 0)
+        if (astrlen < 0) {
+            /*
+             * -1 could be an internal malloc failure or a decoding error from
+             * malformed input; we can't distinguish.
+             */
             return -1;
+        }
         rv = equal(astr, astrlen, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags);
         if (rv > 0 && peername)
             *peername = BUF_strndup((char *)astr, astrlen);
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
index 4eeb55b..e9280bc 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.
 
 =item B<DEFAULT>
 
-the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and, as of OpenSSL
-1.0.0, is normally B<ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL>. This must be the first cipher string
+the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and
+is normally B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>. This must be the firstcipher string
 specified.
 
 =item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
index 25c5381..d5cce54 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
@@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ section containing configuration module specific information. E.g.
 
  ... engine stuff here ...
 
-Currently there are two configuration modules. One for ASN1 objects another
-for ENGINE configuration.
+The features of each configuration module are described below.
 
 =head2 ASN1 OBJECT CONFIGURATION MODULE
 
@@ -191,6 +190,25 @@ For example:
  # Supply all default algorithms
  default_algorithms = ALL
 
+=head2 EVP CONFIGURATION MODULE
+
+This modules has the name B<alg_section> which points to a section containing
+algorithm commands.
+
+Currently the only algorithm command supported is B<fips_mode> whose
+value should be a boolean string such as B<on> or B<off>. If the value is
+B<on> this attempt to enter FIPS mode. If the call fails or the library is
+not FIPS capable then an error occurs.
+
+For example:
+
+ alg_section = evp_settings
+
+ [evp_settings]
+
+ fips_mode = on
+
+
 =head1 NOTES
 
 If a configuration file attempts to expand a variable that doesn't exist
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
index 38f026a..2372b37 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
 [B<-no_cert_verify>]
 [B<-no_chain>]
 [B<-no_cert_checks>]
+[B<-no_explicit>]
 [B<-port num>]
 [B<-index file>]
 [B<-CA file>]
@@ -189,6 +190,10 @@ testing purposes.
 do not use certificates in the response as additional untrusted CA
 certificates.
 
+=item B<-no_explicit>
+
+do not explicitly trust the root CA if it is set to be trusted for OCSP signing.
+
 =item B<-no_cert_checks>
 
 don't perform any additional checks on the OCSP response signers certificate.
@@ -301,8 +306,9 @@ CA certificate in the request. If there is a match and the OCSPSigning
 extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder certificate then the
 OCSP verify succeeds.
 
-Otherwise the root CA of the OCSP responders CA is checked to see if it
-is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP verify succeeds.
+Otherwise, if B<-no_explicit> is B<not> set the root CA of the OCSP responders
+CA is checked to see if it is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP
+verify succeeds.
 
 If none of these checks is successful then the OCSP verify fails.
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae2b53d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_TIME_set.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_TIME_set, ASN1_TIME_adj, ASN1_TIME_check, ASN1_TIME_set_string,
+ASN1_TIME_print, ASN1_TIME_diff - ASN.1 Time functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t);
+ ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t t,
+                          int offset_day, long offset_sec);
+ int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str);
+ int ASN1_TIME_check(const ASN1_TIME *t);
+ int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *b, const ASN1_TIME *s);
+
+ int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                    const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function ASN1_TIME_set() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the
+time represented by the time_t value B<t>. If B<s> is NULL a new ASN1_TIME
+structure is allocated and returned.
+
+ASN1_TIME_adj() sets the ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the time represented
+by the time B<offset_day> and B<offset_sec> after the time_t value B<t>.
+The values of B<offset_day> or B<offset_sec> can be negative to set a
+time before B<t>. The B<offset_sec> value can also exceed the number of
+seconds in a day. If B<s> is NULL a new ASN1_TIME structure is allocated
+and returned.
+
+ASN1_TIME_set_string() sets ASN1_TIME structure B<s> to the time
+represented by string B<str> which must be in appropriate ASN.1 time
+format (for example YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ).
+
+ASN1_TIME_check() checks the syntax of ASN1_TIME structure B<s>.
+
+ASN1_TIME_print() prints out the time B<s> to BIO B<b> in human readable
+format. It will be of the format MMM DD HH:MM:SS YYYY [GMT], for example
+"Feb  3 00:55:52 2015 GMT" it does not include a newline. If the time
+structure has invalid format it prints out "Bad time value" and returns
+an error.
+
+ASN1_TIME_diff() sets B<*pday> and B<*psec> to the time difference between
+B<from> and B<to>. If B<to> represents a time later than B<from> then
+one or both (depending on the time difference) of B<*pday> and B<*psec>
+will be positive. If B<to> represents a time earlier than B<from> then
+one or both of B<*pday> and B<*psec> will be negative. If B<to> and B<from>
+represent the same time then B<*pday> and B<*psec> will both be zero.
+If both B<*pday> and B<*psec> are non-zero they will always have the same
+sign. The value of B<*psec> will always be less than the number of seconds
+in a day. If B<from> or B<to> is NULL the current time is used.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The ASN1_TIME structure corresponds to the ASN.1 structure B<Time>
+defined in RFC5280 et al. The time setting functions obey the rules outlined
+in RFC5280: if the date can be represented by UTCTime it is used, else
+GeneralizedTime is used.
+
+The ASN1_TIME structure is represented as an ASN1_STRING internally and can
+be freed up using ASN1_STRING_free().
+
+The ASN1_TIME structure can represent years from 0000 to 9999 but no attempt
+is made to correct ancient calendar changes (for example from Julian to
+Gregorian calendars).
+
+Some applications add offset times directly to a time_t value and pass the
+results to ASN1_TIME_set() (or equivalent). This can cause problems as the
+time_t value can overflow on some systems resulting in unexpected results.
+New applications should use ASN1_TIME_adj() instead and pass the offset value
+in the B<offset_sec> and B<offset_day> parameters instead of directly
+manipulating a time_t value.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+ASN1_TIME_print() currently does not print out the time zone: it either prints
+out "GMT" or nothing. But all certificates complying with RFC5280 et al use GMT
+anyway.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Set a time structure to one hour after the current time and print it out:
+
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+ ASN1_TIME *tm;
+ time_t t;
+ BIO *b;
+ t = time(NULL);
+ tm = ASN1_TIME_adj(NULL, t, 0, 60 * 60);
+ b = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ASN1_TIME_print(b, tm);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(tm);
+ BIO_free(b);
+
+Determine if one time is later or sooner than the current time:
+
+ int day, sec;
+
+ if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, NULL, to))
+	/* Invalid time format */
+
+ if (day > 0 || sec > 0)
+   printf("Later\n");
+ else if (day < 0 || sec < 0)
+   printf("Sooner\n");
+ else
+   printf("Same\n");
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_TIME_set() and ASN1_TIME_adj() return a pointer to an ASN1_TIME structure
+or NULL if an error occurred.
+
+ASN1_TIME_set_string() returns 1 if the time value is successfully set and
+0 otherwise.
+
+ASN1_TIME_check() returns 1 if the structure is syntactically correct and 0
+otherwise.
+
+ASN1_TIME_print() returns 1 if the time is successfully printed out and 0 if
+an error occurred (I/O error or invalid time format).
+
+ASN1_TIME_diff() returns 1 for sucess and 0 for failure. It can fail if the
+pass ASN1_TIME structure has invalid syntax for example.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod
index 8ff1c31..3ed92bd 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_get0_type.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 =head1 NAME
 
- CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType - get and set CMS content types
+ CMS_get0_type, CMS_set1_eContentType, CMS_get0_eContentType, CMS_get0_content - get and set CMS content types and content
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
  int CMS_set1_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
  const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **CMS_get0_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
@@ -26,11 +27,15 @@ undefined.
 ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_eContentType() returns a pointer to the embedded
 content type.
 
+CMS_get0_content() returns a pointer to the B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> pointer
+containing the embedded content.
+
 =head1 NOTES
 
-As the B<0> implies CMS_get0_type() and CMS_get0_eContentType() return internal
-pointers which should B<not> be freed up. CMS_set1_eContentType() copies the
-supplied OID and it B<should> be freed up after use.
+As the B<0> implies CMS_get0_type(), CMS_get0_eContentType() and
+CMS_get0_content() return internal pointers which should B<not> be freed up.
+CMS_set1_eContentType() copies the supplied OID and it B<should> be freed up
+after use.
 
 The B<ASN1_OBJECT> values returned can be converted to an integer B<NID> value
 using OBJ_obj2nid(). For the currently supported content types the following
@@ -43,6 +48,15 @@ values are returned:
  NID_pkcs7_encrypted
  NID_pkcs7_enveloped
 
+The return value of CMS_get0_content() is a pointer to the B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING>
+content pointer. That means that for example:
+
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pconf = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+
+B<*pconf> could be NULL if there is no embedded content. Applications can
+access, modify or create the embedded content in a B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure
+using this function. Applications usually will not need to modify the
+embedded content as it is normally set by higher level functions.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
index 0c4d926..cc0b537 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@
  #include <openssl/conf.h>
 
  int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname,
-			   unsigned long flags);
+			                unsigned long flags);
  int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname,
-		      unsigned long flags);
+		               unsigned long flags);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ NULL the standard OpenSSL application name B<openssl_conf> is used.
 The behaviour can be cutomized using B<flags>.
 
 CONF_modules_load() is idential to CONF_modules_load_file() except it
-read configuration information from B<cnf>. 
+reads configuration information from B<cnf>.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ The following B<flags> are currently recognized:
 
 B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS> if set errors returned by individual
 configuration modules are ignored. If not set the first module error is
-considered fatal and no further modules are loads.
+considered fatal and no further modules are loaded.
 
 Normally any modules errors will add error information to the error queue. If
 B<CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT> is set no error information is added.
@@ -42,7 +42,84 @@ B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> if set will make CONF_load_modules_file()
 ignore missing configuration files. Normally a missing configuration file
 return an error.
 
-=head1 RETURN VALUE
+B<CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION> if set and B<appname> is not NULL will use the
+default section pointed to by B<openssl_conf> if B<appname> does not exist.
+
+Applications should call these functions after loading builtin modules using
+OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(), any ENGINEs for example using
+ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), any algorithms for example
+OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms() and (if the application uses libssl)
+SSL_library_init().
+
+By using CONF_modules_load_file() with appropriate flags an application can
+customise application configuration to best suit its needs. In some cases the
+use of a configuration file is optional and its absence is not an error: in
+this case B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> would be set.
+
+Errors during configuration may also be handled differently by different
+applications. For example in some cases an error may simply print out a warning
+message and the application continue. In other cases an application might
+consider a configuration file error as fatal and exit immediately.
+
+Applications can use the CONF_modules_load() function if they wish to load a
+configuration file themselves and have finer control over how errors are
+treated.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Load a configuration file and print out any errors and exit (missing file
+considered fatal):
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n");
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    exit(1);
+ }
+
+Load default configuration file using the section indicated by "myapp",
+tolerate missing files, but exit on other errors:
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, "myapp",
+                            CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: error loading configuration file\n");
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    exit(1);
+ }
+
+Load custom configuration file and section, only print warnings on error,
+missing configuration file ignored:
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load_file("/something/app.cnf", "myapp",
+                            CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: error loading configuration file\n");
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+
+Load and parse configuration file manually, custom error handling:
+
+ FILE *fp;
+ CONF *cnf = NULL;
+ long eline;
+ fp = fopen("/somepath/app.cnf", "r");
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "Error opening configuration file\n");
+    /* Other missing configuration file behaviour */
+ } else {
+    cnf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+    if (NCONF_load_fp(cnf, fp, &eline) == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Error on line %ld of configuration file\n", eline);
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+        /* Other malformed configuration file behaviour */
+    } else if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, "appname", 0) <= 0) {
+      fprintf(stderr, "Error configuring application\n");
+      ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+      /* Other configuration error behaviour */
+    }
+    fclose(fp);
+    NCONF_free(cnf);
+  }
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
 
 These functions return 1 for success and a zero or negative value for
 failure. If module errors are not ignored the return code will reflect the
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
index 2027569..e859689 100755
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ EC_KEY_new, EC_KEY_get_flags, EC_KEY_set_flags, EC_KEY_clear_flags, EC_KEY_new_b
  int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv);
  const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key);
  int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub);
- unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
- void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
  point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
  void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
  void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, 
@@ -69,16 +67,6 @@ on the key to confirm that it is valid.
 
 The functions EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key, EC_KEY_set_private_key, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, and EC_KEY_set_public_key get and set the EC_GROUP object, the private key and the EC_POINT public key for the B<key> respectively.
 
-The functions EC_KEY_get_enc_flags and EC_KEY_set_enc_flags get and set the value of the encoding flags for the B<key>. There are two encoding
-flags currently defined - EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS and EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY.  These flags define the behaviour of how the  B<key> is
-converted into ASN1 in a call to i2d_ECPrivateKey. If EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS is set then the public parameters for the curve are not encoded
-along with the private key. If EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY is set then the public key is not encoded along with the private key.
-
-When reading a private key encoded with EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY,
-d2i_ECPrivateKey generates the missing public key
-automatically. Private keys encoded with EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS cannot
-be loaded using d2i_ECPrivateKey.
-
 The functions EC_KEY_get_conv_form and EC_KEY_set_conv_form get and set the point_conversion_form for the B<key>. For a description
 of point_conversion_forms please refer to L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>.
 
@@ -106,15 +94,15 @@ EC_KEY_get0_group returns the EC_GROUP associated with the EC_KEY.
 
 EC_KEY_get0_private_key returns the private key associated with the EC_KEY.
 
-EC_KEY_get_enc_flags returns the value of the current encoding flags for the EC_KEY.
-
 EC_KEY_get_conv_form return the point_conversion_form for the EC_KEY.
 
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ec(3)|ec(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)|EC_GROUP_new(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>,
-L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)|EC_POINT_add(3)>,
-L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)|EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)|d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ec(3)|ec(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)|EC_GROUP_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_add(3)|EC_POINT_add(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)|EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)|d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
 
 =cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod
index 69eb0d1..858baf4 100755
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EC_POINT_new.pod
@@ -81,8 +81,13 @@ on the curve there will only ever be two possible values for y. Therefore a poin
 and EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m functions where B<x> is the x co-ordinate and B<y_bit> is a value 0 or 1 to identify which of
 the two possible values for y should be used.
 
-In addition EC_POINTs can be converted to and from various external representations. Supported representations are octet strings, BIGNUMs and hexadecimal. The format of the external representation is described by the point_conversion_form. See L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)> for
-a description of point_conversion_form. Octet strings are stored in a buffer along with an associated buffer length. A point held in a BIGNUM is calculated by converting the point to an octet string and then converting that octet string into a BIGNUM integer. Points in hexadecimal format are stored in a NULL terminated character string where each character is one of the printable values 0-9 or A-F (or a-f).
+In addition EC_POINTs can be converted to and from various external
+representations. Supported representations are octet strings, BIGNUMs and
+hexadecimal. Octet strings are stored in a buffer along with an associated
+buffer length. A point held in a BIGNUM is calculated by converting the point to
+an octet string and then converting that octet string into a BIGNUM integer.
+Points in hexadecimal format are stored in a NULL terminated character string
+where each character is one of the printable values 0-9 or A-F (or a-f).
 
 The functions EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point, EC_POINT_point2bn, EC_POINT_bn2point, EC_POINT_point2hex and EC_POINT_hex2point convert
 from and to EC_POINTs for the formats: octet string, BIGNUM and hexadecimal respectively.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod
index 888de88..2d25b26 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod
@@ -15,31 +15,24 @@ OPENSSL_config, OPENSSL_no_config - simple OpenSSL configuration functions
 
 OPENSSL_config() configures OpenSSL using the standard B<openssl.cnf>
 configuration file name using B<config_name>. If B<config_name> is NULL then
-the default name B<openssl_conf> will be used. Any errors are ignored. Further
-calls to OPENSSL_config() will have no effect. The configuration file format
-is documented in the L<conf(5)|conf(5)> manual page.
+the file specified in the environment variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> will be used,
+and if that is not set then a system default location is used.
+Errors are silently ignored.
+Multiple calls have no effect.
 
 OPENSSL_no_config() disables configuration. If called before OPENSSL_config()
 no configuration takes place.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
-It is B<strongly> recommended that B<all> new applications call OPENSSL_config()
-or the more sophisticated functions such as CONF_modules_load() during
-initialization (that is before starting any threads). By doing this
-an application does not need to keep track of all configuration options
-and some new functionality can be supported automatically.
-
-It is also possible to automatically call OPENSSL_config() when an application
-calls OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms() by compiling an application with the
-preprocessor symbol B<OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF> #define'd. In this way configuration
-can be added without source changes.
-
-The environment variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> can be set to specify the location
-of the configuration file.
- 
-Currently ASN1 OBJECTs and ENGINE configuration can be performed future
-versions of OpenSSL will add new configuration options.
+The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and
+forget it" function.
+It is however B<much> better than nothing. Applications which need finer
+control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration
+functions such as CONF_modules_load() directly. This function is deprecated
+and its use should be avoided.
+Applications should instead call CONF_modules_load() during
+initialization (that is before starting any threads).
 
 There are several reasons why calling the OpenSSL configuration routines is
 advisable. For example new ENGINE functionality was added to OpenSSL 0.9.7.
@@ -55,17 +48,6 @@ configuration file.
 Applications should free up configuration at application closedown by calling
 CONF_modules_free().
 
-=head1 RESTRICTIONS
-
-The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and
-forget it" function. As a result its behaviour is somewhat limited. It ignores
-all errors silently and it can only load from the standard configuration file
-location for example.
-
-It is however B<much> better than nothing. Applications which need finer
-control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration
-functions such as CONF_load_modules() directly.
-
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
 Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
index f8b530d..0def17a 100755
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
@@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ but would not match a peer certificate with a DNS name of
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
 The functions return 1 for a successful match, 0 for a failed match
-and -1 for an internal error: typically a memory allocation failure.
+and -1 for an internal error: typically a memory allocation failure
+or an ASN.1 decoding error.
 
-X509_check_ip_asc() can also return -2 if the IP address string is malformed.
+All functions can also return -2 if the input is malformed. For example,
+X509_check_host() returns -2 if the provided B<name> contains embedded
+NULs.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_CMS_ContentInfo.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_CMS_ContentInfo.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ddb2f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_CMS_ContentInfo.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_CMS_ContentInfo, i2d_CMS_ContentInfo - CMS ContentInfo functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo *d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(CMS_ContentInfo **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_CMS_ContentInfo(CMS_ContentInfo *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an CMS ContentInfo structure.
+
+Otherwise they behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+These functions were first added to OpenSSL 0.9.8
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod
index 3768c41..704b4ab 100755
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPKParameters.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 =head1 NAME
 
-d2i_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECPKParameters, d2i_ECPKParameters_bio, i2d_ECPKParameters_bio, d2i_ECPKParameters_fp, i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x), ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities
+d2i_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECPKParameters, d2i_ECPKParameters_bio, i2d_ECPKParameters_bio, d2i_ECPKParameters_fp, i2d_ECPKParameters_fp, ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPrivateKey.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPrivateKey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adeffe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_ECPrivateKey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+i2d_ECPrivateKey, d2i_ECPrivate_key - Encode and decode functions for saving and
+reading EC_KEY structures
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+ unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+ void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The ECPrivateKey encode and decode routines encode and parse an
+B<EC_KEY> structure into a binary format (ASN.1 DER) and back again.
+
+These functions are similar to the d2i_X509() functions, and you should refer to
+that page for a detailed description (see L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>).
+
+The format of the external representation of the public key written by
+i2d_ECPrivateKey (such as whether it is stored in a compressed form or not) is
+described by the point_conversion_form. See L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>
+for a description of point_conversion_form.
+
+When reading a private key encoded without an associated public key (e.g. if
+EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY has been used - see below), then d2i_ECPrivateKey generates
+the missing public key automatically. Private keys encoded without parameters
+(e.g. if EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS has been used - see below) cannot be loaded using
+d2i_ECPrivateKey.
+
+The functions EC_KEY_get_enc_flags and EC_KEY_set_enc_flags get and set the
+value of the encoding flags for the B<key>. There are two encoding flags
+currently defined - EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS and EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY.  These flags
+define the behaviour of how the  B<key> is converted into ASN1 in a call to
+i2d_ECPrivateKey. If EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS is set then the public parameters for
+the curve are not encoded along with the private key. If EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY is
+set then the public key is not encoded along with the private key.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+d2i_ECPrivateKey() returns a valid B<EC_KEY> structure or B<NULL> if an error
+occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+i2d_ECPrivateKey() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a
+negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+EC_KEY_get_enc_flags returns the value of the current encoding flags for the
+EC_KEY.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ec(3)|ec(3)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)|EC_GROUP_new(3)>,
+L<EC_GROUP_copy(3)|EC_GROUP_copy(3)>, L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>,
+L<EC_POINT_add(3)|EC_POINT_add(3)>,
+L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)|EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)|d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>,
+L<d2i_ECPrivateKey(3)|d2i_ECPrivateKey(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
index fea6e86..5b7c16f 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
@@ -30,8 +30,11 @@ successful a pointer to the B<X509> structure is returned. If an error
 occurred then B<NULL> is returned. If B<px> is not B<NULL> then the
 returned structure is written to B<*px>. If B<*px> is not B<NULL>
 then it is assumed that B<*px> contains a valid B<X509>
-structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. If the call is
-successful B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the
+structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. This "reuse" capability is present
+for historical compatibility but its use is B<strongly discouraged> (see BUGS
+below, and the discussion in the RETURN VALUES section).
+
+If the call is successful B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the
 parsed data.
 
 i2d_X509() encodes the structure pointed to by B<x> into DER format.
@@ -233,7 +236,10 @@ i2d_re_X509_tbs().
 
 d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure
 or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used
+with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not
+freed in the event of error but may be in a potentially invalid or inconsistent
+state.
 
 i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
 value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod
index 94ab7bc..0c9dbf2 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/sha.pod
@@ -2,29 +2,58 @@
 
 =head1 NAME
 
-SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm
+SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final, SHA224, SHA224_Init, SHA224_Update,
+SHA224_Final, SHA256, SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final, SHA384,
+SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final, SHA512, SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update,
+SHA512_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
  #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
- unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
-                  unsigned char *md);
-
  int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c);
- int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data,
-                  unsigned long len);
+ int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
  int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA224_Init(SHA256_CTX *c);
+ int SHA224_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA224_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA224(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *c);
+ int SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA256_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA256(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *c);
+ int SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA384_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA384(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
+
+ int SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *c);
+ int SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *data, size_t len);
+ int SHA512_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA512_CTX *c);
+ unsigned char *SHA512(const unsigned char *d, size_t n,
+      unsigned char *md);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
+Applications should use the higher level functions
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the hash
+functions directly.
+
 SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function with a
 160 bit output.
 
 SHA1() computes the SHA-1 message digest of the B<n>
 bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for
 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest
-is placed in a static array.
+is placed in a static array. Note: setting B<md> to NULL is B<not thread safe>.
 
 The following functions may be used if the message is not completely
 stored in memory:
@@ -37,24 +66,29 @@ be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>).
 SHA1_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space
 for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the B<SHA_CTX>.
 
-Applications should use the higher level functions
-L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>
-etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly.
+The SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 families of functions operate in the
+same way as for the SHA1 functions. Note that SHA224 and SHA256 use a
+B<SHA256_CTX> object instead of B<SHA_CTX>. SHA384 and SHA512 use B<SHA512_CTX>.
+The buffer B<md> must have space for the output from the SHA variant being used
+(defined by SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH and
+SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH). Also note that, as for the SHA1() function above, the
+SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() functions are not thread safe if
+B<md> is NULL.
 
 The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be
 used only when backward compatibility is required.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
-SHA1() returns a pointer to the hash value. 
+SHA1(), SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() return a pointer to the hash
+value. 
 
-SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise.
+SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() and equivalent SHA224, SHA256,
+SHA384 and SHA512 functions return 1 for success, 0 otherwise.
 
 =head1 CONFORMING TO
 
-SHA: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180 (Secure Hash
-Standard),
-SHA-1: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-1 (Secure Hash
+US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-4 (Secure Hash
 Standard),
 ANSI X9.30
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
index ab87efc..4e34280 100755
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags.pod
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ least one of these flags must be set.
 recognise options intended for use in SSL/TLS clients or servers. One or
 both of these flags must be set.
 
-=item SSL_CONF_CERTIFICATE
+=item SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE
 
 recognise certificate and private key options.
 
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
index 6d073cb..2bf1a60 100755
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ context. This option is only supported if certificate operations
 are permitted. Note: if no B<-key> option is set then a private key is
 not loaded: it does not currently use the B<Certificate> file.
 
+=item B<ServerInfoFile>
+
+Attempts to use the file B<value> in the "serverinfo" extension using the
+function SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file.
+
 =item B<DHParameters>
 
 Attempts to use the file B<value> as the set of temporary DH parameters for
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527164b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead, SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead,
+SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead, SSL_set_read_ahead, SSL_get_read_ahead
+- manage whether to read as many input bytes as possible
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
+ void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
+
+ #define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx)
+ #define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m)
+ #define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx)
+ #define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m)
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() and SSL_set_read_ahead() set whether we should read as
+many input bytes as possible (for non-blocking reads) or not. For example if
+B<x> bytes are currently required by OpenSSL, but B<y> bytes are available from
+the underlying BIO (where B<y> > B<x>), then OpenSSL will read all B<y> bytes
+into its buffer (providing that the buffer is large enough) if reading ahead is
+on, or B<x> bytes otherwise. The parameter B<yes> or B<m> should be 0 to ensure
+reading ahead is off, or non zero otherwise.
+
+SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead is a synonym for SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead, and
+SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead is a synonym for SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead.
+
+SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead() and SSL_get_read_ahead() indicate whether reading
+ahead has been set or not.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions have no impact when used with DTLS. The return values for
+SSL_CTX_get_read_head() and SSL_get_read_ahead() are undefined for DTLS.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_read_ahead and SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead return 0 if reading ahead is off,
+and non zero otherwise.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod
index 43f2874..9dd071b 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ The number of bytes pending is returned.
 
 SSL_pending() takes into account only bytes from the TLS/SSL record
 that is currently being processed (if any).  If the B<SSL> object's
-I<read_ahead> flag is set, additional protocol bytes may have been
-read containing more TLS/SSL records; these are ignored by
+I<read_ahead> flag is set (see
+L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)|SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>), additional protocol
+bytes may have been read containing more TLS/SSL records; these are ignored by
 SSL_pending().
 
 Up to OpenSSL 0.9.6, SSL_pending() does not check if the record type
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ of pending data is application data.
 
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
-L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
+L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)|SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
 
 =cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
index 8d5b8c3..242087e 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod
@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure.
 
 =item int (*B<SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
 
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
 =item char *B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_data>(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx);
 
 =item int B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void))
@@ -237,6 +239,8 @@ protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure.
 
 =item int B<SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
 
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
 =item int B<SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx);
 
 =item long B<SSL_CTX_get_timeout>(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
@@ -325,6 +329,8 @@ protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure.
 
 =item void B<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
 
+=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m);
+
 =item void B<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
 
 =item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version>(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
@@ -707,6 +713,7 @@ L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>,
 L<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)>,
 L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>,
 L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)|SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)|SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>,
 L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>,
 L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>,
 L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)|SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)>,
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c
index 971a1ed..5924791 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ static int bind_gost(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
     int ret = 0;
     if (id && strcmp(id, engine_gost_id))
         return 0;
+    if (ameth_GostR3410_94) {
+        printf("GOST engine already loaded\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
 
     if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_gost_id)) {
         printf("ENGINE_set_id failed\n");
diff --git a/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c b/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c
index 2d6331d..6f09ffb 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/e_ubsec.c
@@ -967,11 +967,11 @@ static int ubsec_dh_generate_key(DH *dh)
 
     if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
         pub_key = BN_new();
+        if (pub_key == NULL)
+            goto err;
         pub_key_len = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
         if (bn_wexpand(pub_key, dh->p->top) == NULL)
             goto err;
-        if (pub_key == NULL)
-            goto err;
     } else {
         pub_key = dh->pub_key;
     }
diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec
index c90dc69..909f2bf 100644
--- a/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Release: 1
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2
+Version: 1.0.2a
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 2553c3d..2104800 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1108,8 +1108,10 @@ int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
     memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
 
     if (is_ccs) {
+        /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */
         OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
-                       DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+                       ((s->version==DTLS1_BAD_VER)?3:DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH)
+                       == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
     } else {
         OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
                        DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 2845757..ee78921 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 
     ssl3_clear(s);
     if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
-        s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+        s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
     else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
         s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
     else
@@ -543,6 +543,9 @@ int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
 {
     int ret;
 
+    /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
+    SSL_clear(s);
+
     SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
     s->d1->listen = 1;
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index c07be8f..940ca69 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
             pitem_free(item);
 
         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return (0);
+        return -1;
     }
 
     rdata->packet = s->packet;
@@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
         }
 
-        if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */
+        if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
             s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
             if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
                 }
             }
 #endif
-        } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */
+        } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
             char tmp[16];
 
             s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
index 4af7e4a..30bbcf2 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define DTLS1_VERSION                   0xFEFF
 # define DTLS1_2_VERSION                 0xFEFD
 # define DTLS_MAX_VERSION                DTLS1_2_VERSION
+# define DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR             0xFE
 
 # define DTLS1_BAD_VER                   0x0100
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index f8a9439..d55b93f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
 
         OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
                        && s->session->master_key_length
-                       < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+                       <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
         EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
                          s->session->master_key_length);
         EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &c, 1);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index daba6dd..19bb48c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -371,7 +371,8 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
 
 static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 {
-    int is_export, i, n, keya, ek;
+    int is_export, i, n, keya;
+    unsigned int ek;
     unsigned long len;
     unsigned char *p;
     const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
@@ -454,11 +455,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
         SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
         return (-1);
     }
-    i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
-                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
-                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
-                                (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
-                                RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
 
     is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
 
@@ -475,23 +471,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
     } else
         ek = 5;
 
+    /*
+     * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
+     * 1 byte message type
+     * 3 bytes cipher
+     * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
+     * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
+     * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
+     * clear key
+     * encrypted key
+     * key args
+     *
+     * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
+     * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
+     * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
+     * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
+     * must be zero).
+     */
+    if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
+        (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+        ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    /*
+     * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
+     * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
+     * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
+     */
+    if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
+        (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+        ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
+                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+                                &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+                                (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
+                                RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
     /* bad decrypt */
 # if 1
     /*
      * If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
      * secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
      */
-    if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-                    || (is_export && ((i != ek)
-                                      || (s->s2->tmp.clear +
-                                          (unsigned int)i != (unsigned int)
-                                          EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) {
+    if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
+                    || (is_export && i != (int)ek))) {
         ERR_clear_error();
         if (is_export)
             i = ek;
         else
             i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, i) <= 0)
+        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
             return 0;
     }
 # else
@@ -513,7 +547,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
 # endif
 
     if (is_export)
-        i += s->s2->tmp.clear;
+        i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
 
     if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
         ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index f186c3c..91053d5 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -717,8 +717,9 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
         } else
             i = 1;
 
-        if (i)
-            ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+        if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+                                       sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+            goto err;
 
         /* Do the message type and length last */
         d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index cdbf0f0..cda2d8c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
                         s, s->msg_callback_arg);
     }
 #endif
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof buf);
     return (ret);
 }
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index ec56c55..221ae03 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (!s->read_ahead)
+    /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
+    if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
         /* ignore max parameter */
         max = n;
     else {
@@ -707,6 +708,10 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
                 packlen *= 4;
 
             wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
+            if(!wb->buf) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
             wb->len = packlen;
         } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
             OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
@@ -780,7 +785,7 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 
             i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
             if (i <= 0) {
-                if (i < 0) {
+                if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
                     OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
                     wb->buf = NULL;
                 }
@@ -1425,7 +1430,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
         }
 
-        if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */
+        if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
             s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
             if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
@@ -1448,7 +1453,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
             else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
                 return (0);
 #endif
-        } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */
+        } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
             char tmp[16];
 
             s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 2c6fb28..c016139 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2251,10 +2251,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
         int idx = -1;
         EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
-        if (n)
+        if (n > 1) {
             n2s(p, i);
-        else
+        } else {
+            if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
             i = 0;
+        }
         if (n && n != i + 2) {
             if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
@@ -3260,14 +3267,16 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 {
+    unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+    HMAC_CTX hctx;
+
     if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
-        unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+        unsigned char *p, *macstart;
         const unsigned char *const_p;
         int len, slen_full, slen;
         SSL_SESSION *sess;
         unsigned int hlen;
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-        HMAC_CTX hctx;
         SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
         unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
         unsigned char key_name[16];
@@ -3278,32 +3287,38 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
          * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
          * long
          */
-        if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+        if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
             return -1;
         senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
         if (!senc)
             return -1;
+
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+        HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+
         p = senc;
-        i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+        if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+            goto err;
 
         /*
          * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
          */
         const_p = senc;
         sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
-        if (sess == NULL) {
-            OPENSSL_free(senc);
-            return -1;
-        }
+        if (sess == NULL)
+            goto err;
         sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
 
         slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
-        if (slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
-            OPENSSL_free(senc);
-            return -1;
+        if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
+            SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+            goto err;
         }
         p = senc;
-        i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+        if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+            SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+            goto err;
+        }
         SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
 
         /*-
@@ -3317,26 +3332,26 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
         if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
                           SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
                           EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
-            return -1;
+            goto err;
+
         p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-        HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
         /*
          * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
          * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
          */
         if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
             if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
-                                           &hctx, 1) < 0) {
-                OPENSSL_free(senc);
-                return -1;
-            }
+                                           &hctx, 1) < 0)
+                goto err;
         } else {
-            RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
-            EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-                               tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
-            HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-                         tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+            if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                                    tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+                goto err;
+            if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+                              tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
+                goto err;
             memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
         }
 
@@ -3357,14 +3372,19 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
         memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
         p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
         /* Encrypt session data */
-        EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+        if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+            goto err;
         p += len;
-        EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+        if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+            goto err;
         p += len;
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
-        HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
-        HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+        if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+            goto err;
+        if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
+            goto err;
+
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
         HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 
         p += hlen;
@@ -3381,6 +3401,12 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 
     /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
     return ssl_do_write(s);
+ err:
+    if (senc)
+        OPENSSL_free(senc);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+    return -1;
 }
 
 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index 2b0f662..a6d845d 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ extern "C" {
  * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when
  * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'.
  */
-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
+# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
 /*
  * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
  * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index f8c265c..39d48ea 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -421,7 +421,9 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
         id = 0x02000000L |
             ((unsigned long)os.data[0] << 16L) |
             ((unsigned long)os.data[1] << 8L) | (unsigned long)os.data[2];
-    } else if ((ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    } else if ((ssl_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
+        || (ssl_version >> 8) == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
+        || ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
         if (os.length != 2) {
             c.error = SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
             c.line = __LINE__;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index b038c55..2cc9a4a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
      * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
      * ALL!)
      */
-    {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0,
-     0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, ~SSL_SSLV2,
+     SSL_EXP_MASK, 0, 0, 0},
 
     /*
      * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
@@ -1027,6 +1027,10 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
             if (cipher_id && cipher_id != cp->id)
                 continue;
 #endif
+            if (algo_strength == SSL_EXP_MASK && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cp))
+                goto ok;
+            if (alg_ssl == ~SSL_SSLV2 && cp->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
+                goto ok;
             if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
                 continue;
             if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
@@ -1045,6 +1049,8 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
                 continue;
         }
 
+    ok:
+
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
         fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c
index 0ee6e46..5478840 100755
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ static int ssl_set_option_list(const char *elem, int len, void *usr)
      * len == -1 indicates not being called in list context, just for single
      * command line switches, so don't allow +, -.
      */
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
     if (len != -1) {
         if (*elem == '+') {
             elem++;
@@ -384,6 +386,18 @@ static int cmd_PrivateKey(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
     return rv > 0;
 }
 
+static int cmd_ServerInfoFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    int rv = 1;
+    if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE))
+        return -2;
+    if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER))
+        return -2;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        rv = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(cctx->ctx, value);
+    return rv > 0;
+}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 static int cmd_DHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
 {
@@ -442,6 +456,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = {
     SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Options, NULL),
     SSL_CONF_CMD(Certificate, "cert", SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
     SSL_CONF_CMD(PrivateKey, "key", SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ServerInfoFile, NULL, SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     SSL_CONF_CMD(DHParameters, "dhparam", SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE)
 #endif
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 46ea18a..79b85b9 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -370,10 +370,10 @@
 # define SSL_AEAD                0x00000040L
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */
-# define SSL_SSLV2               0x00000001L
-# define SSL_SSLV3               0x00000002L
+# define SSL_SSLV2               0x00000001UL
+# define SSL_SSLV3               0x00000002UL
 # define SSL_TLSV1               SSL_SSLV3/* for now */
-# define SSL_TLSV1_2             0x00000004L
+# define SSL_TLSV1_2             0x00000004UL
 
 /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
 
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index 0113b65..9f5d586 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
         if (!do_client && !do_server) {
             fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
             ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-            break;
+            goto err;
         }
         if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) {
             if (c_write) {
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 0f5baa6..577885f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -260,6 +260,11 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
         if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
             count++;
     }
+    if(!count) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+    }
     len = slen / count;
     if (count == 1)
         slen = 0;
@@ -550,16 +555,24 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 #endif                          /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
     if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-        EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
-    } else
-        EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+            || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err2;
+        }
+    }
     /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-    if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-                            *mac_secret_size, mac_secret);
-
+    if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
+        && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+                                *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err2;
+    }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
     if (s->msg_callback) {
         int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
@@ -650,6 +663,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
 
     if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(p1);
         goto err;
     }
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -967,6 +981,8 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
         err = 1;
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
     if (err)
         return 0;
     else
@@ -1130,6 +1146,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
              co, col,
              s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
              so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
     fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
     BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
@@ -1240,6 +1257,8 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                   NULL, 0,
                   s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
                   out, buff, olen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
     fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 72be01d..d85d26e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
             if (FIPS_mode()) {
                 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
-                *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
+                pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
             } else
 # endif
             {
@@ -651,6 +651,8 @@ static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
     size_t i;
     int nid;
     char etmp[20];
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
     if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
         return 0;
     if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
@@ -2965,6 +2967,7 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
         OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
         s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+        s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
     }
     /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
     for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
@@ -3618,6 +3621,7 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
         OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
         c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+        c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
     }
     /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
     if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
@@ -3640,12 +3644,14 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
         preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
     }
     nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
-    if (!nmatch)
-        return 1;
-    salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
-    if (!salgs)
-        return 0;
-    nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+    if (nmatch) {
+        salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+        if (!salgs)
+            return 0;
+        nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+    } else {
+        salgs = NULL;
+    }
     c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
     c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
     return 1;
@@ -3948,6 +3954,8 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
     size_t i;
     char etmp[20], *p;
     int sig_alg, hash_alg;
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return 0;
     if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
         return 0;
     if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
@@ -4122,10 +4130,10 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 # endif
     } else {
         if (!x || !pk)
-            goto end;
+            return 0;
         idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
         if (idx == -1)
-            goto end;
+            return 0;
         cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
         if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
             check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
diff --git a/openssl/test/Makefile b/openssl/test/Makefile
index bc4a920..3388679 100644
--- a/openssl/test/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/test/Makefile
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SSLTEST=	ssltest
 RSATEST=	rsa_test
 ENGINETEST=	enginetest
 EVPTEST=	evp_test
+EVPEXTRATEST=evp_extra_test
 IGETEST=	igetest
 JPAKETEST=	jpaketest
 SRPTEST=	srptest
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+	$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \
 	$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
-	$(EVPTEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
+	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
 	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(DESTEST).c $(SHATEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \
 	$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
-	$(EVPTEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
+	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
 	$(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c
 
 EXHEADER= 
@@ -144,13 +145,16 @@ alltests: \
 	test_rand test_bn test_ec test_ecdsa test_ecdh \
 	test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \
 	test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
-	test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
+	test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
 	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_ocsp test_v3name test_heartbeat \
 	test_constant_time
 
 test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
 
+test_evp_extra: $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPEXTRATEST)
+
 test_des: $(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DESTEST)
 
@@ -484,6 +488,9 @@ $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ENGINETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
 $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
 	@target=$(EVPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+	@target=$(EVPEXTRATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECDSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
 	@target=$(ECDSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
 
@@ -629,6 +636,19 @@ enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
 enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 enginetest.o: enginetest.c
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+evp_extra_test.o: evp_extra_test.c
 evp_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
 evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
diff --git a/openssl/test/cms-test.pl b/openssl/test/cms-test.pl
index f55fd69..51abeef 100644
--- a/openssl/test/cms-test.pl
+++ b/openssl/test/cms-test.pl
@@ -59,23 +59,31 @@ my $redir = " 2> cms.err > cms.out";
 if ( $^O eq "VMS" && -f "OSSLX:openssl.exe" ) {
     $ossl_path = "pipe mcr OSSLX:openssl";
     $null_path = "NL:";
+    # On VMS, the lowest 3 bits of the exit code indicates severity
+    # 1 is success (perl translates it to 0 for $?), 2 is error
+    # (perl doesn't translate it)
+    $failure_code = 512;	# 2 << 8 = 512
 }
 # Make MSYS work
 elsif ( $^O eq "MSWin32" && -f "../apps/openssl.exe" ) {
     $ossl_path = "cmd /c ..\\apps\\openssl";
-    $null_path = "/dev/null";
+    $null_path = "NUL";
+    $failure_code = 256;
 }
 elsif ( -f "../apps/openssl$ENV{EXE_EXT}" ) {
     $ossl_path = "../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl";
     $null_path = "/dev/null";
+    $failure_code = 256;
 }
 elsif ( -f "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe" ) {
     $ossl_path = "..\\out32dll\\openssl.exe";
-    $null_path = "/dev/null";
+    $null_path = "NUL";
+    $failure_code = 256;
 }
 elsif ( -f "..\\out32\\openssl.exe" ) {
     $ossl_path = "..\\out32\\openssl.exe";
-    $null_path = "/dev/null";
+    $null_path = "NUL";
+    $failure_code = 256;
 }
 else {
     die "Can't find OpenSSL executable";
@@ -97,7 +105,7 @@ if ($? == 0)
 	{
 	$no_ec = 1;
 	}
-elsif ($^O eq "VMS" ? $? == 512 : $? == 256)
+elsif ($? == $failure_code)
 	{
 	$no_ec = 0;
 	}
@@ -111,7 +119,7 @@ if ($? == 0)
 	{
 	$no_ec2m = 1;
 	}
-elsif ($? == 256)
+elsif ($? == $failure_code)
 	{
 	$no_ec2m = 0;
 	}
@@ -125,7 +133,7 @@ if ($? == 0)
 	{
 	$no_ecdh = 1;
 	}
-elsif ($? == 256)
+elsif ($? == $failure_code)
 	{
 	$no_ecdh = 0;
 	}
diff --git a/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f2a8f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl/util/libeay.num b/openssl/util/libeay.num
index 4a11d78..b977e4e 100644
--- a/openssl/util/libeay.num
+++ b/openssl/util/libeay.num
@@ -1806,6 +1806,7 @@ d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG          2341	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 ASN1_UTCTIME_get                        2350	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_REQ_digest                         2362	EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
 X509_CRL_digest                         2391	EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
+ASN1_STRING_clear_free                  2392	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7                   2397	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_ALGOR_cmp                          2398	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length           2399	EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
index 88388f5..7b6776d 100644
--- a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
@@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ foreach $lib (keys %csrc)
 	print OUT @out;
 	undef @out;
 	print OUT <<"EOF";
-/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
 EOF
@@ -473,7 +474,7 @@ EOF
 ${staticloader}void ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void);
 ${staticloader}void ERR_unload_${lib}_strings(void);
 ${staticloader}void ERR_${lib}_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
-#define ${lib}err(f,r) ERR_${lib}_error((f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
+# define ${lib}err(f,r) ERR_${lib}_error((f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
 
 EOF
 	}
@@ -484,7 +485,7 @@ EOF
 EOF
 
 	foreach $i (@function) {
-		$z=6-int(length($i)/8);
+		$z=48 - length($i);
 		if($fcodes{$i} eq "X") {
 			$fassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:([^:]*):/;
 			$findcode = $1;
@@ -498,13 +499,13 @@ EOF
 			$fassigned{$lib} .= "$findcode:";
 			print STDERR "New Function code $i\n" if $debug;
 		}
-		printf OUT "#define $i%s $fcodes{$i}\n","\t" x $z;
+		printf OUT "# define $i%s $fcodes{$i}\n"," " x $z;
 	}
 
 	print OUT "\n/* Reason codes. */\n";
 
 	foreach $i (@reasons) {
-		$z=6-int(length($i)/8);
+		$z=48 - length($i);
 		if($rcodes{$i} eq "X") {
 			$rassigned{$lib} =~ m/^:([^:]*):/;
 			$findcode = $1;
@@ -518,7 +519,7 @@ EOF
 			$rassigned{$lib} .= "$findcode:";
 			print STDERR "New Reason code   $i\n" if $debug;
 		}
-		printf OUT "#define $i%s $rcodes{$i}\n","\t" x $z;
+		printf OUT "# define $i%s $rcodes{$i}\n"," " x $z;
 	}
 	print OUT <<"EOF";
 
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ EOF
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ EOF
  *
  */
 
-/* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
  * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
  * only reason strings will be preserved.
  */
@@ -642,11 +644,10 @@ EOF
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
 
-#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,func,0)
-#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,0,reason)
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,0,reason)
 
-static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_functs[]=
-	{
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_functs[] = {
 EOF
 	# Add each function code: if a function name is found then use it.
 	foreach $i (@function) {
@@ -657,20 +658,22 @@ EOF
 			$fn = $ftrans{$fn};
 		}
 #		print OUT "{ERR_PACK($pack_errcode,$i,0),\t\"$fn\"},\n";
-		print OUT "{ERR_FUNC($i),\t\"$fn\"},\n";
+		if(length($i) + length($fn) > 58) {
+			print OUT "    {ERR_FUNC($i),\n     \"$fn\"},\n";
+		} else {
+			print OUT "    {ERR_FUNC($i), \"$fn\"},\n";
+		}
 	}
 	print OUT <<"EOF";
-{0,NULL}
-	};
+    {0, NULL}
+};
 
-static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_reasons[]=
-	{
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_str_reasons[] = {
 EOF
 	# Add each reason code.
 	foreach $i (@reasons) {
 		my $rn;
 		my $rstr = "ERR_REASON($i)";
-		my $nspc = 0;
 		if (exists $err_reason_strings{$i}) {
 			$rn = $err_reason_strings{$i};
 		} else {
@@ -678,90 +681,87 @@ EOF
 			$rn = $1;
 			$rn =~ tr/_[A-Z]/ [a-z]/;
 		}
-		$nspc = 40 - length($rstr) unless length($rstr) > 40;
-		$nspc = " " x $nspc;
-		print OUT "{${rstr}${nspc},\"$rn\"},\n";
+		if(length($i) + length($rn) > 56) {
+			print OUT "    {${rstr},\n     \"$rn\"},\n";
+		} else {
+			print OUT "    {${rstr}, \"$rn\"},\n";
+		}
 	}
 if($static) {
 	print OUT <<"EOF";
-{0,NULL}
-	};
+    {0, NULL}
+};
 
 #endif
 
 ${staticloader}void ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void)
-	{
+{
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
 
-	if (ERR_func_error_string(${lib}_str_functs[0].error) == NULL)
-		{
-		ERR_load_strings($load_errcode,${lib}_str_functs);
-		ERR_load_strings($load_errcode,${lib}_str_reasons);
-		}
+    if (ERR_func_error_string(${lib}_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+        ERR_load_strings($load_errcode, ${lib}_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings($load_errcode, ${lib}_str_reasons);
+    }
 #endif
-	}
+}
 EOF
 } else {
 	print OUT <<"EOF";
-{0,NULL}
-	};
+    {0, NULL}
+};
 
 #endif
 
 #ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME
-static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_lib_name[]=
-        {
-{0	,${lib}_LIB_NAME},
-{0,NULL}
-	};
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ${lib}_lib_name[] = {
+    {0, ${lib}_LIB_NAME},
+    {0, NULL}
+};
 #endif
 
-
-static int ${lib}_lib_error_code=0;
-static int ${lib}_error_init=1;
+static int ${lib}_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int ${lib}_error_init = 1;
 
 ${staticloader}void ERR_load_${lib}_strings(void)
-	{
-	if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0)
-		${lib}_lib_error_code=ERR_get_next_error_library();
+{
+    if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0)
+        ${lib}_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
 
-	if (${lib}_error_init)
-		{
-		${lib}_error_init=0;
+    if (${lib}_error_init) {
+        ${lib}_error_init = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-		ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_functs);
-		ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_reasons);
+        ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_functs);
+        ERR_load_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_reasons);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME
-		${lib}_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(${lib}_lib_error_code,0,0);
-		ERR_load_strings(0,${lib}_lib_name);
+        ${lib}_lib_name->error = ERR_PACK(${lib}_lib_error_code, 0, 0);
+        ERR_load_strings(0, ${lib}_lib_name);
 #endif
-		}
-	}
+    }
+}
 
 ${staticloader}void ERR_unload_${lib}_strings(void)
-	{
-	if (${lib}_error_init == 0)
-		{
+{
+    if (${lib}_error_init == 0) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-		ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_functs);
-		ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code,${lib}_str_reasons);
+        ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_functs);
+        ERR_unload_strings(${lib}_lib_error_code, ${lib}_str_reasons);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef ${lib}_LIB_NAME
-		ERR_unload_strings(0,${lib}_lib_name);
+        ERR_unload_strings(0, ${lib}_lib_name);
 #endif
-		${lib}_error_init=1;
-		}
-	}
+        ${lib}_error_init = 1;
+    }
+}
 
 ${staticloader}void ERR_${lib}_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
-	{
-	if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0)
-		${lib}_lib_error_code=ERR_get_next_error_library();
-	ERR_PUT_error(${lib}_lib_error_code,function,reason,file,line);
-	}
+{
+    if (${lib}_lib_error_code == 0)
+        ${lib}_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+    ERR_PUT_error(${lib}_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
 EOF
 
 }
diff --git a/openssl/util/openssl-format-source b/openssl/util/openssl-format-source
index 4e90147..8c3a7c0 100755
--- a/openssl/util/openssl-format-source
+++ b/openssl/util/openssl-format-source
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ do
 	      -e 's/^((DECLARE|IMPLEMENT)_(EXTERN_ASN1|ASN1|ADB|STACK_OF|PKCS12_STACK_OF).*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
 	      -e 's/^([ \t]*(make_dh|make_dh_bn|make_rfc5114_td)\(.*\)[ \t,]*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
 	      -e 's/^(ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE\(.*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
-	      -e 's/^((ASN1|ADB)_.*_END\(.*[\){=,;]+[ \t]*)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
+	      -e 's/^((ASN1|ADB)_.*_(end|END)\(.*[\){=,;]+[ \t]*)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
 	      -e '/ASN1_(ITEM_ref|ITEM_ptr|ITEM_rptr|PCTX)/ || s/^((ASN1|ADB)_[^\*]*[){=,]+[ \t]*)$/\/**INDENT-OFF**\/\n$1/;' \
 	      -e 's/^(} (ASN1|ADB)_[^\*]*[\){=,;]+)$/$1\n\/**INDENT-ON**\//;' \
 	      | \
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl b/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl
index 82f1aa7..1d4e9dc 100644
--- a/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/unix.pl
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ $bf_enc_src="";
 	  'x86_64-mont' => 'crypto/bn',
 	  'x86_64-mont5' => 'crypto/bn',
 	  'x86_64-gf2m' => 'crypto/bn',
-	  'modexp512-x86_64' => 'crypto/bn',
 	  'aes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes',
 	  'vpaes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes',
 	  'bsaes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes',
diff --git a/packages.txt b/packages.txt
index 2164cd0..26471d8 100644
--- a/packages.txt
+++ b/packages.txt
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ libxcb git version
 libxkbfile-1.0.8
 mesa git version
 mkfontscale git version
-openssl-1.0.2
+openssl-1.0.2a
 pixman git version
 presentproto-1.0
 pthreads-w32 cvs version

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[X2Go-Commits] [vcxsrv] 19/24: Upgraded to openssl 1.0.2a