[X2Go-Commits] [vcxsrv] 01/01: Update to openssl-1.0.2c
git-admin at x2go.org
git-admin at x2go.org
Mon Jun 22 07:59:53 CEST 2015
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x2go pushed a commit to branch release/external-1.17.0.0-x
in repository vcxsrv.
commit 36da4a2e0e43928a29ac2ee5c55bf681e90e2f42
Author: marha <marha at users.sourceforge.net>
Date: Mon Jun 15 20:18:50 2015 +0200
Update to openssl-1.0.2c
---
openssl/CHANGES | 90 ++
openssl/Configure | 45 +-
openssl/Makefile | 28 +-
openssl/Makefile.org | 26 +-
openssl/NEWS | 12 +
openssl/README | 2 +-
openssl/apps/Makefile | 19 +-
openssl/apps/apps.c | 6 +-
openssl/apps/asn1pars.c | 2 +-
openssl/apps/ca.c | 10 +-
openssl/apps/cms.c | 4 +-
openssl/apps/enc.c | 13 +-
openssl/apps/ocsp.c | 2 +
openssl/apps/s_cb.c | 5 +-
openssl/apps/s_client.c | 15 +-
openssl/apps/s_server.c | 79 +-
openssl/apps/s_time.c | 2 +-
openssl/apps/smime.c | 2 +
openssl/apps/speed.c | 11 +-
openssl/apps/srp.c | 4 +-
openssl/apps/verify.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/Makefile | 11 +-
openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl | 319 ++++++-
openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl | 945 +++++++++++++++-----
openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl | 209 +++--
openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c | 18 +
openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c | 40 +-
openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c | 3 +-
openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c | 3 -
openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c | 45 +-
openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c | 8 +-
openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c | 23 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl | 10 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl | 13 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h | 5 +
openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c | 18 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c | 7 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c | 10 +-
openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c | 10 +
openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c | 2 +
openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c | 4 +
openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c | 7 +-
openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c | 2 -
openssl/crypto/des/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/des/des.c | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c | 7 +-
openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c | 3 +-
openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 8 +-
openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ebcdic.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl | 28 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h | 11 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c | 20 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c | 15 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h | 8 -
openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 7 +
openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c | 135 +--
openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c | 24 +-
openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/err/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c | 3 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c | 7 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c | 11 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c | 9 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c | 3 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c | 10 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h | 17 +-
openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c | 5 +-
openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c | 19 +-
openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c | 179 +++-
openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/mem.c | 3 +
openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl | 276 ++++--
openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h | 38 +-
openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 5 +
openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README | 8 +-
openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c | 4 +-
openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 21 +-
openssl/crypto/opensslv.h | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c | 2 +
openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 3 +-
openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 16 +-
openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c | 2 +-
openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 8 +-
openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl | 74 +-
openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl | 6 +-
openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c | 9 +-
openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/store/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c | 12 +-
openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c | 2 +
openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 236 +++--
openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h | 6 +
openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c | 11 +-
openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c | 3 -
openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile | 34 +-
openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c | 18 +-
openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c | 8 +-
openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c | 11 +-
openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c | 6 +-
openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c | 3 +-
openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod | 2 -
openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod | 5 +-
openssl/doc/apps/config.pod | 53 ++
openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod | 13 +-
openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod | 11 +
openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod | 7 +-
openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod | 9 +
openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod | 4 +-
openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod | 13 +
openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod | 3 +-
openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod | 8 +-
openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod | 4 +-
openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 8 +-
openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod | 27 +-
.../doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod | 12 +-
openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod | 106 +--
openssl/e_os2.h | 8 +-
openssl/engines/Makefile | 13 +-
openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile | 18 +-
openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c | 3 +-
openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h | 1 +
openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c | 229 +++--
openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c | 6 +-
openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c | 36 +-
openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c | 2 +-
openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c | 87 +-
openssl/engines/e_sureware.c | 27 +-
openssl/openssl.spec | 2 +-
openssl/ssl/Makefile | 54 +-
openssl/ssl/d1_both.c | 46 +-
openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c | 10 +
openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c | 2 +-
openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c | 33 +-
openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c | 14 +
openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c | 104 ++-
openssl/ssl/s3_both.c | 2 +-
openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c | 16 +-
openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 327 +++++--
openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c | 4 +-
openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c | 15 +-
openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c | 232 +++--
openssl/ssl/ssl.h | 5 +
openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c | 6 +-
openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c | 16 +-
openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h | 2 +-
openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c | 131 ++-
openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c | 6 +
openssl/ssl/ssltest.c | 58 +-
openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c | 17 +-
openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 268 +++---
openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c | 3 +-
openssl/test/Makefile | 17 +-
openssl/test/cms-test.pl | 10 +-
openssl/test/testssl | 62 +-
openssl/test/tocsp | 2 +-
openssl/tools/Makefile | 2 +
openssl/tools/c_rehash | 6 +-
openssl/tools/c_rehash.in | 6 +-
openssl/util/libeay.num | 1 +
openssl/util/mk1mf.pl | 2 +-
openssl/util/mkerr.pl | 21 +-
openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl | 2 +-
openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl | 2 +-
packages.txt | 2 +-
237 files changed, 4329 insertions(+), 1543 deletions(-)
diff --git a/openssl/CHANGES b/openssl/CHANGES
index 3044aa7..4cbf61d 100644
--- a/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,96 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+ *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+ incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+ restored.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
+
+ *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
+
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ (CVE-2015-1788)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
+
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno B�ck.
+ (CVE-2015-1789)
+ [Emilia K�sper]
+
+ *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-1790)
+ [Emilia K�sper]
+
+ *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ (CVE-2015-1792)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ (CVE-2015-1791)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites
+ EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites
+ were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to
+ 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were
+ introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export
+ ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
+ 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
+ curves, prefer P-256 (both).
+ [Emilia Kasper]
+
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
+
Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
*) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
diff --git a/openssl/Configure b/openssl/Configure
index f776e23..d99eed7 100644
--- a/openssl/Configure
+++ b/openssl/Configure
@@ -105,7 +105,24 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimenta
my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED";
-my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wno-padded -Wno-shorten-64-to-32 -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wno-missing-noreturn -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-sign-conversion -Wno-unreachable-code -Wno-conversion -Wno-documentation -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-cast-align -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-unused-macros -Wno-disabled-macro-expansion -Wno-condi [...]
+# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the following
+# warnings can also be enabled:
+# -Wconditional-uninitialized, -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros,
+# -Wmissing-field-initializers, -Wmissing-variable-declarations,
+# -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
+# -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
+# -Wextended-offsetof
+my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof";
+
+# These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
+# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
+# following warnings can also be enabled: -Wconditional-uninitialized,
+# -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros, -Wmissing-field-initializers,
+# -Wmissing-variable-declarations,
+# -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
+# -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
+# -Wextended-offsetof
+my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
my $strict_warnings = 0;
@@ -233,12 +250,12 @@ my %table=(
#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
"solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc
"solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
####
-"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mv8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups
@@ -255,7 +272,7 @@ my %table=(
#### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one.
#"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::",
-"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
+"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
#### IRIX 5.x configs
# -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate.
@@ -398,7 +415,7 @@ my %table=(
"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
@@ -419,7 +436,7 @@ my %table=(
#### SPARC Linux setups
# Ray Miller <ray.miller at computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
# assisted with debugging of following two configs.
-"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
# -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -454,7 +471,7 @@ my %table=(
"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
@@ -462,7 +479,7 @@ my %table=(
# triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86_64", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -1195,6 +1212,7 @@ my $cc = $fields[$idx_cc];
if($ENV{CC}) {
$cc = $ENV{CC};
}
+
my $cflags = $fields[$idx_cflags];
my $unistd = $fields[$idx_unistd];
my $thread_cflag = $fields[$idx_thread_cflag];
@@ -1630,12 +1648,21 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
if ($strict_warnings)
{
+ my $ecc = $cc;
+ $ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
my $wopt;
- die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($cc =~ /gcc$/ or $cc =~ /clang$/);
+ die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
}
+ if ($ecc eq "clang")
+ {
+ foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
+ {
+ $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
+ }
+ }
}
open(IN,'<Makefile.org') || die "unable to read Makefile.org:$!\n";
diff --git a/openssl/Makefile b/openssl/Makefile
index c6b9e9d..56b43c6 100644
--- a/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2a
+VERSION=1.0.2c
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
-all: Makefile build_all openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
+all: Makefile build_all
# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
@@ -273,7 +273,10 @@ reflect:
sub_all: build_all
build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
-build_libs: build_crypto build_ssl build_engines
+build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
+
+build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
+build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
build_crypto:
@dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
@@ -459,6 +462,9 @@ tests: rehash
report:
@$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
+update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
+ @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
depend:
@set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
@@ -483,26 +489,10 @@ util/libeay.num::
util/ssleay.num::
$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
-crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
- $(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
-crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
- $(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
-crypto/objects/obj_xref.h: crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
- $(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt >crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
-
-apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf
- $(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf
-
-crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
- $(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
-
-
TABLE: Configure
(echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
$(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
-update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_xref.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend
-
# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
diff --git a/openssl/Makefile.org b/openssl/Makefile.org
index b7a3f96..9f4faae 100644
--- a/openssl/Makefile.org
+++ b/openssl/Makefile.org
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
-all: Makefile build_all openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
+all: Makefile build_all
# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
@@ -271,7 +271,10 @@ reflect:
sub_all: build_all
build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
-build_libs: build_crypto build_ssl build_engines
+build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
+
+build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
+build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
build_crypto:
@dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
@@ -457,6 +460,9 @@ tests: rehash
report:
@$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
+update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
+ @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
depend:
@set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
@@ -481,26 +487,10 @@ util/libeay.num::
util/ssleay.num::
$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
-crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
- $(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
-crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
- $(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
-crypto/objects/obj_xref.h: crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
- $(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt >crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
-
-apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf
- $(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf
-
-crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
- $(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
-
-
TABLE: Configure
(echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
$(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
-update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_xref.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend
-
# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
diff --git a/openssl/NEWS b/openssl/NEWS
index 682c583..f3574cf 100644
--- a/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,18 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+ o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
+
+ o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
+ o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
+ o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
+ o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
+ o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291)
diff --git a/openssl/README b/openssl/README
index 8ce093d..ae04431 100644
--- a/openssl/README
+++ b/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2c 12 Jun 2015
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/openssl/apps/Makefile b/openssl/apps/Makefile
index 72657ea..cafe554 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/apps/Makefile
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
sreq.o: req.c
$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c
+openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf
+
files:
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
@@ -127,12 +130,12 @@ links:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-depend:
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
- else \
- $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
- fi
+update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
@@ -144,10 +147,10 @@ clean:
rm -f req
$(DLIBSSL):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=ssl all)
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
$(DLIBCRYPTO):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto all)
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
$(EXE): progs.h $(E_OBJ) $(PROGRAM).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(DLIBSSL)
$(RM) $(EXE)
diff --git a/openssl/apps/apps.c b/openssl/apps/apps.c
index b0acbc7..7478fc3 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/apps.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/apps.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
char *prompt = NULL;
prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
- if(!prompt) {
+ if (!prompt) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
return 0;
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
- if(!buff) {
+ if (!buff) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
OPENSSL_free(prompt);
@@ -2371,6 +2371,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
else
return 0;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c b/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c
index 7a0f169..11b0787 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
{
CONF *cnf = NULL;
int len;
- long errline;
+ long errline = 0;
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/ca.c b/openssl/apps/ca.c
index d64ec4f..3b7336c 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/ca.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/ca.c
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
- if(!tmp) {
+ if (!tmp) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2843,7 +2843,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
if (prevtm) {
*prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
- if(!*prevtm) {
+ if (!*prevtm) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2887,7 +2887,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
goto err;
}
comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
- if(!comp_time) {
+ if (!comp_time) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/apps/cms.c b/openssl/apps/cms.c
index 2c92253..6047937 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/cms.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/cms.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) {
cms_key_param *nparam;
nparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(cms_key_param));
- if(!nparam) {
+ if (!nparam) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto argerr;
}
@@ -646,6 +646,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/enc.c b/openssl/apps/enc.c
index 5c2cf7a..7b7c70b 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/enc.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/enc.c
@@ -548,9 +548,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else
OPENSSL_cleanse(str, strlen(str));
}
- if ((hiv != NULL) && !set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
- goto end;
+ if (hiv != NULL) {
+ int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
+ if (siz == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n");
+ } else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
}
if ((hiv == NULL) && (str == NULL)
&& EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) != 0) {
@@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "iv undefined\n");
goto end;
}
- if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, sizeof key)) {
+ if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex key value\n");
goto end;
}
diff --git a/openssl/apps/ocsp.c b/openssl/apps/ocsp.c
index ebb3732..b858b8d 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -536,6 +536,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
index f6e6bcd..dd3aa74 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */
#define USE_SOCKETS
#define NON_MAIN
#include "apps.h"
@@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
if (ncurves <= 0)
return 1;
curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int));
- if(!curves) {
+ if (!curves) {
BIO_puts(out, "Malloc error getting supported curves\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -1012,7 +1013,7 @@ int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized) {
- if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/openssl/apps/s_client.c
index 8fa2b73..e55f2c5 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_client.c
@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
@@ -560,7 +562,7 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
int l;
- if(!pass) {
+ if (!pass) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
return NULL;
}
@@ -1336,13 +1338,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback);
- if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) {
- /*
- * BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting default verify locations\n");
- */
+ if ((CAfile || CApath)
+ && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- /* goto end; */
}
ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download);
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/openssl/apps/s_server.c
index a8491ac..acef382 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_server.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx);
static void free_sessions(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
-static DH *get_dh512(void);
+static DH *get_dh2048(void);
#endif
#ifdef MONOLITH
@@ -230,30 +230,48 @@ static void s_server_init(void);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
- 0xDA, 0x58, 0x3C, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x85, 0x22, 0x89, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xAF, 0x75,
- 0x6F, 0x4C, 0xCA, 0x92, 0xDD, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x04, 0xFB, 0x0F,
- 0xED, 0x94, 0xEF, 0x9C, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x03, 0xED, 0x57, 0x46, 0x50, 0xD3,
- 0x69, 0x99, 0xDB, 0x29, 0xD7, 0x76, 0x27, 0x6B, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0x12,
- 0xE2, 0x18, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1E, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7C,
- 0x47, 0x74, 0xE8, 0x33,
+static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
+ 0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6,
+ 0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1,
+ 0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9,
+ 0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD,
+ 0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17,
+ 0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F,
+ 0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD,
+ 0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30,
+ 0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E,
+ 0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4,
+ 0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58,
+ 0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B,
+ 0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C,
+ 0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B,
+ 0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD,
+ 0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C,
+ 0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C,
+ 0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29,
+ 0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B,
+ 0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C,
+ 0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55,
+ 0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B,
};
-static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
0x02,
};
-static DH *get_dh512(void)
+DH *get_dh2048()
{
- DH *dh = NULL;
+ DH *dh;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
- dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
- if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
- return (NULL);
- return (dh);
+ return NULL;
+ dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
+ dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
+ if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return dh;
}
#endif
@@ -554,6 +572,8 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
@@ -754,7 +774,7 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = inl;
wbuf =
(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
- if(!wbuf)
+ if (!wbuf)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
@@ -1865,7 +1885,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
- dh = get_dh512();
+ dh = get_dh2048();
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
}
(void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
@@ -2453,8 +2477,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
- l += k;
- i -= k;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ l += k;
+ i -= k;
+ }
if (i <= 0)
break;
}
@@ -3281,7 +3307,8 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
{
unsigned int count = 0;
do {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
+ return 0;
/*
* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
* is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
@@ -3323,7 +3350,7 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
unsigned char *p;
sess = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(simple_ssl_session));
- if(!sess) {
+ if (!sess) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -3334,12 +3361,12 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
sess->id = BUF_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen);
sess->der = OPENSSL_malloc(sess->derlen);
- if(!sess->id || !sess->der) {
+ if (!sess->id || !sess->der) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
- if(sess->id)
+ if (sess->id)
OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
- if(sess->der)
+ if (sess->der)
OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
OPENSSL_free(sess);
return 0;
diff --git a/openssl/apps/s_time.c b/openssl/apps/s_time.c
index a40997a..38788f7 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/s_time.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/s_time.c
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
maxTime = atoi(*(++argv));
- if(maxTime <= 0) {
+ if (maxTime <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n");
badop = 1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/apps/smime.c b/openssl/apps/smime.c
index 764509f..6044ccf 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/smime.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/smime.c
@@ -442,6 +442,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
diff --git a/openssl/apps/speed.c b/openssl/apps/speed.c
index 7b1acc1..3697b71 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/speed.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/speed.c
@@ -2775,7 +2775,7 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
inp = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1]);
out = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024);
- if(!inp || !out) {
+ if (!inp || !out) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Out of memory\n");
goto end;
}
@@ -2791,7 +2791,7 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
print_message(alg_name, 0, mblengths[j]);
Time_F(START);
for (count = 0, run = 1; run && count < 0x7fffffff; count++) {
- unsigned char aad[13];
+ unsigned char aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
size_t len = mblengths[j];
int packlen;
@@ -2826,7 +2826,8 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
aad[11] = len >> 8;
aad[12] = len;
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, aad);
+ EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+ EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad);
EVP_Cipher(&ctx, out, inp, len + pad);
}
}
@@ -2865,9 +2866,9 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
}
end:
- if(inp)
+ if (inp)
OPENSSL_free(inp);
- if(out)
+ if (out)
OPENSSL_free(out);
}
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/apps/srp.c b/openssl/apps/srp.c
index c679448..c0ff417 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/srp.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/srp.c
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/apps/verify.c b/openssl/apps/verify.c
index b3ba53d..78e729f 100644
--- a/openssl/apps/verify.c
+++ b/openssl/apps/verify.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (ret == 1) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-attime timestamp]");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-engine e]");
#endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/Makefile
index 9a39e93..7869996 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/Makefile
@@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ install:
lint:
@target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
-depend:
+update: local_depend
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h
- @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
clean:
rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile
index b94ca72..e825c14 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/Makefile
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
index c1fce89..19b0433 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
@@ -1499,13 +1499,13 @@ ___
# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
-if ($win64) {
+if ($win64 && $avx) {
$rec="%rcx";
$frame="%rdx";
$context="%r8";
$disp="%r9";
-$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+$code.=<<___;
.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
.type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
@@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
.rva .LSEH_end_${func}_shaext
.rva .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext
___
-$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
+$code.=<<___;
.section .xdata
.align 8
.LSEH_info_${func}_xop:
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
index 3deb86a..f67df8c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
# Westmere 3.77/1.37 1.37 1.52 1.27
# * Bridge 5.07/0.98 0.99 1.09 0.91
# Haswell 4.44/0.80 0.97 1.03 0.72
-# Atom 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
+# Silvermont 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
# Bulldozer 5.80/0.98 1.05 1.24 0.93
$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ require "x86asm.pl";
&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+&static_label("key_const");
+
if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=\&movups; }
else { $movekey=\&movups; }
@@ -181,7 +184,10 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+ &pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
@@ -197,7 +203,10 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+ &pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
@@ -349,17 +358,15 @@ sub aesni_generate6
&neg ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,16);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
- &jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"));
+ &jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner"));
&set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner");
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
@@ -615,6 +622,14 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&set_label("ecb_ret");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
+ &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
######################################################################
@@ -704,6 +719,15 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&mov ($out,&wparam(5));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
+ &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
@@ -804,6 +828,15 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&mov ($out,&wparam(5));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
+ &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
}
@@ -1053,6 +1086,17 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&set_label("ctr32_ret");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(80,"esp"));
&function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
@@ -1394,6 +1438,20 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0); # write output
&set_label("xts_enc_ret");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
&function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt");
@@ -1756,6 +1814,20 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
&set_label("xts_dec_ret");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
&function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt");
}
@@ -1808,6 +1880,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&add ($len,16);
&jnz (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
&movaps ($ivec,$inout0);
+ &pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
@@ -1871,7 +1944,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movaps ($inout0,$inout5);
&movaps ($ivec,$rndkey0);
&add ($len,0x50);
- &jle (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+ &jle (&label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected"));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
@@ -1910,10 +1983,14 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x40,$out));
&movaps ($inout0,$inout4);
+ &pxor ($inout4,$inout4);
&sub ($len,0x50);
&jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
@@ -1933,6 +2010,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout1,$in0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movaps ($inout0,$inout1);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
&movaps ($ivec,$in1);
&sub ($len,0x20);
@@ -1945,7 +2023,9 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout2,$in1);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movaps ($inout0,$inout2);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
&movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
&sub ($len,0x30);
@@ -1961,29 +2041,44 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
&movaps ($inout0,$inout3);
+ &pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&sub ($len,0x40);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+&set_label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected",16);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
+ &pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
+ &pxor ($inout4,$inout4);
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
&and ($len,15);
&jnz (&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16);
&movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
+ &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&mov ("ecx",16);
&mov ($inp,"esp");
&sub ("ecx",$len);
&data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
&set_label("cbc_ret");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"esp")); # pull original %esp
&mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
+ &pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
+ &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec); # output IV
+ &pxor ($ivec,$ivec);
&set_label("cbc_abort");
&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
@@ -2000,14 +2095,24 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
# $round rounds
&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+ &push ("ebp");
+ &push ("ebx");
&test ("eax","eax");
&jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
&test ($key,$key);
&jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop("ebx");
+ &lea ("ebx",&DWP(&label("key_const")."-".&label("pic"),"ebx"));
+
+ &picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("key_const"));
&movups ("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax")); # pull first 128 bits of *userKey
&xorps ("xmm4","xmm4"); # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
+ &mov ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &and ("ebp",1<<28|1<<11); # AVX and XOP bits
&cmp ($rounds,256);
&je (&label("14rounds"));
&cmp ($rounds,192);
@@ -2016,6 +2121,9 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jne (&label("bad_keybits"));
&set_label("10rounds",16);
+ &cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
+ &je (&label("10rounds_alt"));
+
&mov ($rounds,9);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 1
@@ -2040,8 +2148,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&call (&label("key_128"));
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &ret();
+
+ &jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_128",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
@@ -2055,8 +2163,76 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
&ret();
+&set_label("10rounds_alt",16);
+ &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
+ &mov ($rounds,8);
+ &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+ &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+&set_label("loop_key128");
+ &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
+ &aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &pslld ("xmm4",1);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+ &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
+
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &jnz (&label("loop_key128"));
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x30,"ebx"));
+
+ &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
+ &aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &pslld ("xmm4",1);
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
+ &pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
+ &aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &pslldq ("xmm2",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+ &mov ($rounds,9);
+ &mov (&DWP(96,$key),$rounds);
+
+ &jmp (&label("good_key"));
+
&set_label("12rounds",16);
&movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
+ &cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
+ &je (&label("12rounds_alt"));
+
&mov ($rounds,11);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2
@@ -2077,8 +2253,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&call (&label("key_192b"));
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &ret();
+
+ &jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_192a",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
@@ -2108,10 +2284,52 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&jmp (&label("key_192b_warm"));
+&set_label("12rounds_alt",16);
+ &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x10,"ebx"));
+ &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+ &mov ($rounds,8);
+ &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+&set_label("loop_key192");
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
+ &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
+ &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5");
+ &aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4");
+ &pslld ("xmm4",1);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(24,$key));
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &pslldq ("xmm0",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &pslldq ("xmm0",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &pslldq ("xmm0",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm3");
+
+ &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0xff);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
+ &pslldq ("xmm1",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
+
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &jnz (&label("loop_key192"));
+
+ &mov ($rounds,11);
+ &mov (&DWP(32,$key),$rounds);
+
+ &jmp (&label("good_key"));
+
&set_label("14rounds",16);
&movups ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining half of *userKey
- &mov ($rounds,13);
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
+ &je (&label("14rounds_alt"));
+
+ &mov ($rounds,13);
&$movekey (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); # round 1
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 2
@@ -2143,7 +2361,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
- &ret();
+
+ &jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_256a",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
@@ -2169,11 +2388,77 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ("xmm2","xmm1");
&ret();
+&set_label("14rounds_alt",16);
+ &movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
+ &movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
+ &mov ($rounds,7);
+ &movdqu (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0");
+ &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2");
+
+&set_label("loop_key256");
+ &pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5");
+ &aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4");
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &pslldq ("xmm0",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &pslldq ("xmm0",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &pslldq ("xmm0",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm3");
+ &pslld ("xmm4",1);
+
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &jz (&label("done_key256"));
+
+ &pshufd ("xmm2","xmm0",0xff);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm3");
+
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm1")
+ &pslldq ("xmm1",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
+ &pslldq ("xmm1",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
+ &pslldq ("xmm1",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm3");
+
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm1");
+ &movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm2");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
+ &jmp (&label("loop_key256"));
+
+&set_label("done_key256");
+ &mov ($rounds,13);
+ &mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
+
+&set_label("good_key");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
+ &pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
+ &pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
+ &pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &pop ("ebx");
+ &pop ("ebp");
+ &ret ();
+
&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
&mov ("eax",-1);
+ &pop ("ebx");
+ &pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&mov ("eax",-2);
+ &pop ("ebx");
+ &pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
@@ -2223,10 +2508,18 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
+ &pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
&set_label("dec_key_ret");
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+
+&set_label("key_const",64);
+&data_word(0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d);
+&data_word(0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605);
+&data_word(1,1,1,1);
+&data_word(0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b);
&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
&asm_finish();
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
index 5f61746..25ca574 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@
# Westmere 3.77/1.25 1.25 1.25 1.26
# * Bridge 5.07/0.74 0.75 0.90 0.85
# Haswell 4.44/0.63 0.63 0.73 0.63
-# Atom 5.75/3.54 3.56 4.12 3.87(*)
+# Silvermont 5.75/3.54 3.56 4.12 3.87(*)
# Bulldozer 5.77/0.70 0.72 0.90 0.70
#
-# (*) Atom ECB result is suboptimal because of penalties incurred
-# by operations on %xmm8-15. As ECB is not considered
+# (*) Atom Silvermont ECB result is suboptimal because of penalties
+# incurred by operations on %xmm8-15. As ECB is not considered
# critical, nothing was done to mitigate the problem.
$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
@@ -263,7 +263,10 @@ ${PREFIX}_encrypt:
___
&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
$code.=<<___;
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
movups $inout0,($out) # output
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
ret
.size ${PREFIX}_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_encrypt
@@ -276,7 +279,10 @@ ${PREFIX}_decrypt:
___
&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
$code.=<<___;
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
movups $inout0,($out) # output
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
ret
.size ${PREFIX}_decrypt, .-${PREFIX}_decrypt
___
@@ -445,21 +451,18 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt6:
pxor $rndkey0,$inout4
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2
pxor $rndkey0,$inout5
+ $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey0
add \$16,%rax
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5
- $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
jmp .L${dir}_loop6_enter
.align 16
.L${dir}_loop6:
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2
+.L${dir}_loop6_enter:
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5
-.L${dir}_loop6_enter:
$movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey1
add \$32,%rax
aes${dir} $rndkey0,$inout0
@@ -506,23 +509,18 @@ _aesni_${dir}rypt8:
lea 32($key,$rounds),$key
neg %rax # $rounds
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0
- add \$16,%rax
pxor $rndkey0,$inout5
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1
pxor $rndkey0,$inout6
+ aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1
pxor $rndkey0,$inout7
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout5
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout6
- aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout7
- $movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
- jmp .L${dir}_loop8_enter
+ $movkey ($key,%rax),$rndkey0
+ add \$16,%rax
+ jmp .L${dir}_loop8_inner
.align 16
.L${dir}_loop8:
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout0
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout1
+.L${dir}_loop8_inner:
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout2
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout3
aes${dir} $rndkey1,$inout4
@@ -587,15 +585,15 @@ aesni_ecb_encrypt:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) # offload $inout4..7
movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
.Lecb_enc_body:
___
$code.=<<___;
- and \$-16,$len
- jz .Lecb_ret
+ and \$-16,$len # if ($len<16)
+ jz .Lecb_ret # return
mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
@@ -604,10 +602,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
test %r8d,%r8d # 5th argument
jz .Lecb_decrypt
#--------------------------- ECB ENCRYPT ------------------------------#
- cmp \$0x80,$len
- jb .Lecb_enc_tail
+ cmp \$0x80,$len # if ($len<8*16)
+ jb .Lecb_enc_tail # short input
- movdqu ($inp),$inout0
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks
movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1
movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2
movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3
@@ -615,14 +613,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5
movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6
movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7
- lea 0x80($inp),$inp
- sub \$0x80,$len
+ lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16
+ sub \$0x80,$len # $len-=8*16 (can be zero)
jmp .Lecb_enc_loop8_enter
.align 16
.Lecb_enc_loop8:
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks
mov $key_,$key # restore $key
- movdqu ($inp),$inout0
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks
mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1
@@ -637,17 +635,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6
movups $inout7,0x70($out)
- lea 0x80($out),$out
+ lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16
movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7
- lea 0x80($inp),$inp
+ lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16
.Lecb_enc_loop8_enter:
call _aesni_encrypt8
sub \$0x80,$len
- jnc .Lecb_enc_loop8
+ jnc .Lecb_enc_loop8 # loop if $len-=8*16 didn't borrow
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks
mov $key_,$key # restore $key
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds
@@ -657,11 +655,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout5,0x50($out)
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
movups $inout7,0x70($out)
- lea 0x80($out),$out
- add \$0x80,$len
- jz .Lecb_ret
+ lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16
+ add \$0x80,$len # restore real remaining $len
+ jz .Lecb_ret # done if ($len==0)
-.Lecb_enc_tail:
+.Lecb_enc_tail: # $len is less than 8*16
movups ($inp),$inout0
cmp \$0x20,$len
jb .Lecb_enc_one
@@ -678,8 +676,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups 0x50($inp),$inout5
je .Lecb_enc_six
movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6
+ xorps $inout7,$inout7
call _aesni_encrypt8
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 7 output blocks
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
@@ -692,25 +691,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
$code.=<<___;
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_enc_two:
call _aesni_encrypt2
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_enc_three:
call _aesni_encrypt3
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_enc_four:
call _aesni_encrypt4
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
@@ -719,7 +718,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lecb_enc_five:
xorps $inout5,$inout5
call _aesni_encrypt6
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
@@ -728,7 +727,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Lecb_enc_six:
call _aesni_encrypt6
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 6 output blocks
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
@@ -738,10 +737,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
#--------------------------- ECB DECRYPT ------------------------------#
.align 16
.Lecb_decrypt:
- cmp \$0x80,$len
- jb .Lecb_dec_tail
+ cmp \$0x80,$len # if ($len<8*16)
+ jb .Lecb_dec_tail # short input
- movdqu ($inp),$inout0
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks
movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1
movdqu 0x20($inp),$inout2
movdqu 0x30($inp),$inout3
@@ -749,14 +748,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu 0x50($inp),$inout5
movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6
movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7
- lea 0x80($inp),$inp
- sub \$0x80,$len
+ lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16
+ sub \$0x80,$len # $len-=8*16 (can be zero)
jmp .Lecb_dec_loop8_enter
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_loop8:
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks
mov $key_,$key # restore $key
- movdqu ($inp),$inout0
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load 8 input blocks
mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout1
@@ -771,30 +770,38 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
movdqu 0x60($inp),$inout6
movups $inout7,0x70($out)
- lea 0x80($out),$out
+ lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16
movdqu 0x70($inp),$inout7
- lea 0x80($inp),$inp
+ lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16
.Lecb_dec_loop8_enter:
call _aesni_decrypt8
$movkey ($key_),$rndkey0
sub \$0x80,$len
- jnc .Lecb_dec_loop8
+ jnc .Lecb_dec_loop8 # loop if $len-=8*16 didn't borrow
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
mov $key_,$key # restore $key
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
mov $rnds_,$rounds # restore $rounds
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
movups $inout4,0x40($out)
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
movups $inout5,0x50($out)
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
+ pxor $inout6,$inout6
movups $inout7,0x70($out)
- lea 0x80($out),$out
- add \$0x80,$len
- jz .Lecb_ret
+ pxor $inout7,$inout7
+ lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16
+ add \$0x80,$len # restore real remaining $len
+ jz .Lecb_ret # done if ($len==0)
.Lecb_dec_tail:
movups ($inp),$inout0
@@ -814,70 +821,107 @@ $code.=<<___;
je .Lecb_dec_six
movups 0x60($inp),$inout6
$movkey ($key),$rndkey0
+ xorps $inout7,$inout7
call _aesni_decrypt8
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 7 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
movups $inout4,0x40($out)
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
movups $inout5,0x50($out)
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
+ pxor $inout6,$inout6
+ pxor $inout7,$inout7
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_one:
___
&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
$code.=<<___;
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_two:
call _aesni_decrypt2
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_three:
call _aesni_decrypt3
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_four:
call _aesni_decrypt4
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_five:
xorps $inout5,$inout5
call _aesni_decrypt6
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
movups $inout4,0x40($out)
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
jmp .Lecb_ret
.align 16
.Lecb_dec_six:
call _aesni_decrypt6
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 6 output blocks
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0 # clear register bank
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
movups $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
movups $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
movups $inout4,0x40($out)
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
movups $inout5,0x50($out)
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
.Lecb_ret:
+ xorps $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # %xmm0
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,(%rsp) # clear stack
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp
.Lecb_enc_ret:
___
@@ -911,10 +955,10 @@ aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) # $iv
+ movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) # $bswap_mask
+ movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) # $in0
+ movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) # $increment
.Lccm64_enc_body:
___
$code.=<<___;
@@ -956,7 +1000,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1
paddq $increment,$iv
- dec $len
+ dec $len # $len-- ($len is in blocks)
aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout0
aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout1
@@ -965,16 +1009,26 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa $iv,$inout0
movups $in0,($out) # save output
pshufb $bswap_mask,$inout0
- lea 16($out),$out
- jnz .Lccm64_enc_outer
+ lea 16($out),$out # $out+=16
+ jnz .Lccm64_enc_outer # loop if ($len!=0)
- movups $inout1,($cmac)
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
+ movups $inout1,($cmac) # store resulting mac
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
+ pxor $in0,$in0
+ pxor $iv,$iv
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,(%rsp) # clear stack
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp
.Lccm64_enc_ret:
___
@@ -991,10 +1045,10 @@ aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm6,(%rsp) # $iv
+ movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp) # $bswap_mask
+ movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp) # $in8
+ movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp) # $increment
.Lccm64_dec_body:
___
$code.=<<___;
@@ -1015,7 +1069,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov \$16,$rounds
movups ($inp),$in0 # load inp
paddq $increment,$iv
- lea 16($inp),$inp
+ lea 16($inp),$inp # $inp+=16
sub %r10,%rax # twisted $rounds
lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key # end of key schedule
mov %rax,%r10
@@ -1025,11 +1079,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
xorps $inout0,$in0 # inp ^= E(iv)
movdqa $iv,$inout0
movups $in0,($out) # save output
- lea 16($out),$out
+ lea 16($out),$out # $out+=16
pshufb $bswap_mask,$inout0
- sub \$1,$len
- jz .Lccm64_dec_break
+ sub \$1,$len # $len-- ($len is in blocks)
+ jz .Lccm64_dec_break # if ($len==0) break
$movkey ($key_),$rndkey0
mov %r10,%rax
@@ -1049,13 +1103,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1
$movkey -16($key,%rax),$rndkey0
jnz .Lccm64_dec2_loop
- movups ($inp),$in0 # load inp
+ movups ($inp),$in0 # load input
paddq $increment,$iv
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1
aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout0
aesenclast $rndkey0,$inout1
- lea 16($inp),$inp
+ lea 16($inp),$inp # $inp+=16
jmp .Lccm64_dec_outer
.align 16
@@ -1065,13 +1119,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
&aesni_generate1("enc",$key_,$rounds,$inout1,$in0);
$code.=<<___;
- movups $inout1,($cmac)
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
+ movups $inout1,($cmac) # store resulting mac
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
+ pxor $in0,$in0
+ pxor $iv,$iv
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,(%rsp) # clear stack
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp
.Lccm64_dec_ret:
___
@@ -1102,13 +1166,34 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks,\@function,5
.align 16
aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks:
+ cmp \$1,$len
+ jne .Lctr32_bulk
+
+ # handle single block without allocating stack frame,
+ # useful when handling edges
+ movups ($ivp),$inout0
+ movups ($inp),$inout1
+ mov 240($key),%edx # key->rounds
+___
+ &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,"%edx");
+$code.=<<___;
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
+ xorps $inout1,$inout0
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
+ movups $inout0,($out)
+ xorps $inout0,$inout0
+ jmp .Lctr32_epilogue
+
+.align 16
+.Lctr32_bulk:
lea (%rsp),%rax
push %rbp
sub \$$frame_size,%rsp
and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax)
+ movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax) # offload everything
movaps %xmm7,-0x98(%rax)
movaps %xmm8,-0x88(%rax)
movaps %xmm9,-0x78(%rax)
@@ -1123,8 +1208,8 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
lea -8(%rax),%rbp
- cmp \$1,$len
- je .Lctr32_one_shortcut
+ # 8 16-byte words on top of stack are counter values
+ # xor-ed with zero-round key
movdqu ($ivp),$inout0
movdqu ($key),$rndkey0
@@ -1139,7 +1224,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa $inout0,0x40(%rsp)
movdqa $inout0,0x50(%rsp)
movdqa $inout0,0x60(%rsp)
- mov %rdx,%r10 # borrow %rdx
+ mov %rdx,%r10 # about to borrow %rdx
movdqa $inout0,0x70(%rsp)
lea 1($ctr),%rax
@@ -1183,15 +1268,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa 0x40(%rsp),$inout4
movdqa 0x50(%rsp),$inout5
- cmp \$8,$len
- jb .Lctr32_tail
+ cmp \$8,$len # $len is in blocks
+ jb .Lctr32_tail # short input if ($len<8)
- sub \$6,$len
+ sub \$6,$len # $len is biased by -6
cmp \$`1<<22`,%r10d # check for MOVBE without XSAVE
- je .Lctr32_6x
+ je .Lctr32_6x # [which denotes Atom Silvermont]
lea 0x80($key),$key # size optimization
- sub \$2,$len
+ sub \$2,$len # $len is biased by -8
jmp .Lctr32_loop8
.align 16
@@ -1205,13 +1290,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Lctr32_loop6:
- add \$6,$ctr
+ add \$6,$ctr # next counter value
$movkey -48($key,$rnds_),$rndkey0
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
mov $ctr,%eax
xor $key0,%eax
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1
- movbe %eax,`0x00+12`(%rsp)
+ movbe %eax,`0x00+12`(%rsp) # store next counter value
lea 1($ctr),%eax
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2
xor $key0,%eax
@@ -1244,16 +1329,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
call .Lenc_loop6
- movdqu ($inp),$inout6
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout6 # load 6 input blocks
movdqu 0x10($inp),$inout7
movdqu 0x20($inp),$in0
movdqu 0x30($inp),$in1
movdqu 0x40($inp),$in2
movdqu 0x50($inp),$in3
- lea 0x60($inp),$inp
+ lea 0x60($inp),$inp # $inp+=6*16
$movkey -64($key,$rnds_),$rndkey1
- pxor $inout0,$inout6
- movaps 0x00(%rsp),$inout0
+ pxor $inout0,$inout6 # inp^=E(ctr)
+ movaps 0x00(%rsp),$inout0 # load next counter [xor-ed with 0 round]
pxor $inout1,$inout7
movaps 0x10(%rsp),$inout1
pxor $inout2,$in0
@@ -1264,19 +1349,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
movaps 0x40(%rsp),$inout4
pxor $inout5,$in3
movaps 0x50(%rsp),$inout5
- movdqu $inout6,($out)
+ movdqu $inout6,($out) # store 6 output blocks
movdqu $inout7,0x10($out)
movdqu $in0,0x20($out)
movdqu $in1,0x30($out)
movdqu $in2,0x40($out)
movdqu $in3,0x50($out)
- lea 0x60($out),$out
-
+ lea 0x60($out),$out # $out+=6*16
+
sub \$6,$len
- jnc .Lctr32_loop6
+ jnc .Lctr32_loop6 # loop if $len-=6 didn't borrow
- add \$6,$len
- jz .Lctr32_done
+ add \$6,$len # restore real remaining $len
+ jz .Lctr32_done # done if ($len==0)
lea -48($rnds_),$rounds
lea -80($key,$rnds_),$key # restore $key
@@ -1286,7 +1371,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 32
.Lctr32_loop8:
- add \$8,$ctr
+ add \$8,$ctr # next counter value
movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$inout6
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
mov $ctr,%r9d
@@ -1298,7 +1383,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor $key0,%r9d
nop
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3
- mov %r9d,0x00+12(%rsp)
+ mov %r9d,0x00+12(%rsp) # store next counter value
lea 1($ctr),%r9
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5
@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesenc $rndkey0,$inout1
aesenc $rndkey0,$inout2
xor $key0,%r9d
- movdqu 0x00($inp),$in0
+ movdqu 0x00($inp),$in0 # start loading input
aesenc $rndkey0,$inout3
mov %r9d,0x70+12(%rsp)
cmp \$11,$rounds
@@ -1388,7 +1473,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Lctr32_enc_done:
movdqu 0x10($inp),$in1
- pxor $rndkey0,$in0
+ pxor $rndkey0,$in0 # input^=round[last]
movdqu 0x20($inp),$in2
pxor $rndkey0,$in1
movdqu 0x30($inp),$in3
@@ -1406,11 +1491,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout7
- movdqu 0x60($inp),$rndkey1
- lea 0x80($inp),$inp
+ movdqu 0x60($inp),$rndkey1 # borrow $rndkey1 for inp[6]
+ lea 0x80($inp),$inp # $inp+=8*16
- aesenclast $in0,$inout0
- pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey1
+ aesenclast $in0,$inout0 # $inN is inp[N]^round[last]
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey1 # borrowed $rndkey
movdqu 0x70-0x80($inp),$in0
aesenclast $in1,$inout1
pxor $rndkey0,$in0
@@ -1425,10 +1510,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa 0x40(%rsp),$in5
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout6
movdqa 0x50(%rsp),$rndkey0
- $movkey 0x10-0x80($key),$rndkey1
+ $movkey 0x10-0x80($key),$rndkey1#real 1st-round key
aesenclast $in0,$inout7
- movups $inout0,($out) # store output
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 8 output blocks
movdqa $in1,$inout0
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
movdqa $in2,$inout1
@@ -1442,21 +1527,24 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa $rndkey0,$inout5
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
movups $inout7,0x70($out)
- lea 0x80($out),$out
-
+ lea 0x80($out),$out # $out+=8*16
+
sub \$8,$len
- jnc .Lctr32_loop8
+ jnc .Lctr32_loop8 # loop if $len-=8 didn't borrow
- add \$8,$len
- jz .Lctr32_done
+ add \$8,$len # restore real remainig $len
+ jz .Lctr32_done # done if ($len==0)
lea -0x80($key),$key
.Lctr32_tail:
+ # note that at this point $inout0..5 are populated with
+ # counter values xor-ed with 0-round key
lea 16($key),$key
cmp \$4,$len
jb .Lctr32_loop3
je .Lctr32_loop4
+ # if ($len>4) compute 7 E(counter)
shl \$4,$rounds
movdqa 0x60(%rsp),$inout6
pxor $inout7,$inout7
@@ -1464,14 +1552,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
$movkey 16($key),$rndkey0
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout1
- lea 32-16($key,$rounds),$key
+ lea 32-16($key,$rounds),$key# prepare for .Lenc_loop8_enter
neg %rax
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout2
- add \$16,%rax
+ add \$16,%rax # prepare for .Lenc_loop8_enter
movups ($inp),$in0
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout3
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4
- movups 0x10($inp),$in1
+ movups 0x10($inp),$in1 # pre-load input
movups 0x20($inp),$in2
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout6
@@ -1482,7 +1570,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor $in0,$inout0
movdqu 0x40($inp),$in0
pxor $in1,$inout1
- movdqu $inout0,($out)
+ movdqu $inout0,($out) # store output
pxor $in2,$inout2
movdqu $inout1,0x10($out)
pxor $in3,$inout3
@@ -1491,17 +1579,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout3,0x30($out)
movdqu $inout4,0x40($out)
cmp \$6,$len
- jb .Lctr32_done
+ jb .Lctr32_done # $len was 5, stop store
movups 0x50($inp),$in1
xorps $in1,$inout5
movups $inout5,0x50($out)
- je .Lctr32_done
+ je .Lctr32_done # $len was 6, stop store
movups 0x60($inp),$in2
xorps $in2,$inout6
movups $inout6,0x60($out)
- jmp .Lctr32_done
+ jmp .Lctr32_done # $len was 7, stop store
.align 32
.Lctr32_loop4:
@@ -1515,7 +1603,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
jnz .Lctr32_loop4
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout0
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout1
- movups ($inp),$in0
+ movups ($inp),$in0 # load input
movups 0x10($inp),$in1
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout2
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout3
@@ -1523,14 +1611,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups 0x30($inp),$in3
xorps $in0,$inout0
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store output
xorps $in1,$inout1
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
pxor $in2,$inout2
movdqu $inout2,0x20($out)
pxor $in3,$inout3
movdqu $inout3,0x30($out)
- jmp .Lctr32_done
+ jmp .Lctr32_done # $len was 4, stop store
.align 32
.Lctr32_loop3:
@@ -1545,48 +1633,79 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout1
aesenclast $rndkey1,$inout2
- movups ($inp),$in0
+ movups ($inp),$in0 # load input
xorps $in0,$inout0
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store output
cmp \$2,$len
- jb .Lctr32_done
+ jb .Lctr32_done # $len was 1, stop store
movups 0x10($inp),$in1
xorps $in1,$inout1
movups $inout1,0x10($out)
- je .Lctr32_done
+ je .Lctr32_done # $len was 2, stop store
movups 0x20($inp),$in2
xorps $in2,$inout2
- movups $inout2,0x20($out)
- jmp .Lctr32_done
-
-.align 16
-.Lctr32_one_shortcut:
- movups ($ivp),$inout0
- movups ($inp),$in0
- mov 240($key),$rounds # key->rounds
-___
- &aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
-$code.=<<___;
- xorps $in0,$inout0
- movups $inout0,($out)
- jmp .Lctr32_done
+ movups $inout2,0x20($out) # $len was 3, stop store
-.align 16
.Lctr32_done:
+ xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear regiser bank
+ xor $key0,$key0
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+ pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
+ pxor %xmm7,%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack
+ pxor %xmm8,%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm9,%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm10,%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm11,%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm12,%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm13,%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm14,%xmm14
+ movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm15,%xmm15
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps -0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp) # clear stack
movaps -0x90(%rbp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x90(%rbp)
movaps -0x80(%rbp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x80(%rbp)
movaps -0x70(%rbp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x70(%rbp)
movaps -0x60(%rbp),%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x60(%rbp)
movaps -0x50(%rbp),%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x50(%rbp)
movaps -0x40(%rbp),%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x40(%rbp)
movaps -0x30(%rbp),%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x30(%rbp)
movaps -0x20(%rbp),%xmm14
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x20(%rbp)
movaps -0x10(%rbp),%xmm15
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x10(%rbp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___;
lea (%rbp),%rsp
@@ -1619,7 +1738,7 @@ aesni_xts_encrypt:
and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax)
+ movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax) # offload everything
movaps %xmm7,-0x98(%rax)
movaps %xmm8,-0x88(%rax)
movaps %xmm9,-0x78(%rax)
@@ -1679,7 +1798,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movaps $rndkey1,0x60(%rsp) # save round[0]^round[last]
sub \$16*6,$len
- jc .Lxts_enc_short
+ jc .Lxts_enc_short # if $len-=6*16 borrowed
mov \$16+96,$rounds
lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key # end of key schedule
@@ -1694,7 +1813,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 # load input
movdqa $rndkey0,$twmask
movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1
- pxor @tweak[0],$inout0
+ pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 # input^=tweak^round[0]
movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2
pxor @tweak[1],$inout1
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
@@ -1713,10 +1832,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
lea `16*6`($inp),$inp
pxor $twmask,$inout5
- pxor $twres, at tweak[0]
+ pxor $twres, at tweak[0] # calclulate tweaks^round[last]
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4
pxor $twres, at tweak[1]
- movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^last round key
+ movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^round[last]
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout5
$movkey 48($key_),$rndkey1
pxor $twres, at tweak[2]
@@ -1757,7 +1876,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
$movkey -80($key,%rax),$rndkey0
jnz .Lxts_enc_loop6
- movdqa (%r8),$twmask
+ movdqa (%r8),$twmask # start calculating next tweak
movdqa $twres,$twtmp
paddd $twres,$twres
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout0
@@ -1851,15 +1970,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesenclast `16*5`(%rsp),$inout5
pxor $twres, at tweak[5]
- lea `16*6`($out),$out
- movups $inout0,`-16*6`($out) # write output
+ lea `16*6`($out),$out # $out+=6*16
+ movups $inout0,`-16*6`($out) # store 6 output blocks
movups $inout1,`-16*5`($out)
movups $inout2,`-16*4`($out)
movups $inout3,`-16*3`($out)
movups $inout4,`-16*2`($out)
movups $inout5,`-16*1`($out)
sub \$16*6,$len
- jnc .Lxts_enc_grandloop
+ jnc .Lxts_enc_grandloop # loop if $len-=6*16 didn't borrow
mov \$16+96,$rounds
sub $rnds_,$rounds
@@ -1867,34 +1986,36 @@ $code.=<<___;
shr \$4,$rounds # restore original value
.Lxts_enc_short:
+ # at the point @tweak[0..5] are populated with tweak values
mov $rounds,$rnds_ # backup $rounds
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[0]
- add \$16*6,$len
- jz .Lxts_enc_done
+ add \$16*6,$len # restore real remaining $len
+ jz .Lxts_enc_done # done if ($len==0)
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[1]
cmp \$0x20,$len
- jb .Lxts_enc_one
+ jb .Lxts_enc_one # $len is 1*16
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[2]
- je .Lxts_enc_two
+ je .Lxts_enc_two # $len is 2*16
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[3]
cmp \$0x40,$len
- jb .Lxts_enc_three
+ jb .Lxts_enc_three # $len is 3*16
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[4]
- je .Lxts_enc_four
+ je .Lxts_enc_four # $len is 4*16
- movdqu ($inp),$inout0
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # $len is 5*16
movdqu 16*1($inp),$inout1
movdqu 16*2($inp),$inout2
pxor @tweak[0],$inout0
movdqu 16*3($inp),$inout3
pxor @tweak[1],$inout1
movdqu 16*4($inp),$inout4
- lea 16*5($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*5($inp),$inp # $inp+=5*16
pxor @tweak[2],$inout2
pxor @tweak[3],$inout3
pxor @tweak[4],$inout4
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
call _aesni_encrypt6
@@ -1902,35 +2023,35 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa @tweak[5], at tweak[0]
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
- movdqu $inout0,($out)
+ movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks
xorps @tweak[3],$inout3
movdqu $inout1,16*1($out)
xorps @tweak[4],$inout4
movdqu $inout2,16*2($out)
movdqu $inout3,16*3($out)
movdqu $inout4,16*4($out)
- lea 16*5($out),$out
+ lea 16*5($out),$out # $out+=5*16
jmp .Lxts_enc_done
.align 16
.Lxts_enc_one:
movups ($inp),$inout0
- lea 16*1($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*1($inp),$inp # inp+=1*16
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
___
&aesni_generate1("enc",$key,$rounds);
$code.=<<___;
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
movdqa @tweak[1], at tweak[0]
- movups $inout0,($out)
- lea 16*1($out),$out
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block
+ lea 16*1($out),$out # $out+=1*16
jmp .Lxts_enc_done
.align 16
.Lxts_enc_two:
movups ($inp),$inout0
movups 16($inp),$inout1
- lea 32($inp),$inp
+ lea 32($inp),$inp # $inp+=2*16
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
@@ -1939,9 +2060,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
movdqa @tweak[2], at tweak[0]
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks
movups $inout1,16*1($out)
- lea 16*2($out),$out
+ lea 16*2($out),$out # $out+=2*16
jmp .Lxts_enc_done
.align 16
@@ -1949,7 +2070,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups ($inp),$inout0
movups 16*1($inp),$inout1
movups 16*2($inp),$inout2
- lea 16*3($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*3($inp),$inp # $inp+=3*16
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
@@ -1960,10 +2081,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa @tweak[3], at tweak[0]
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks
movups $inout1,16*1($out)
movups $inout2,16*2($out)
- lea 16*3($out),$out
+ lea 16*3($out),$out # $out+=3*16
jmp .Lxts_enc_done
.align 16
@@ -1973,7 +2094,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups 16*2($inp),$inout2
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
movups 16*3($inp),$inout3
- lea 16*4($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*4($inp),$inp # $inp+=4*16
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
xorps @tweak[3],$inout3
@@ -1984,17 +2105,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa @tweak[4], at tweak[0]
pxor @tweak[1],$inout1
pxor @tweak[2],$inout2
- movdqu $inout0,($out)
+ movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks
pxor @tweak[3],$inout3
movdqu $inout1,16*1($out)
movdqu $inout2,16*2($out)
movdqu $inout3,16*3($out)
- lea 16*4($out),$out
+ lea 16*4($out),$out # $out+=4*16
jmp .Lxts_enc_done
.align 16
.Lxts_enc_done:
- and \$15,$len_
+ and \$15,$len_ # see if $len%16 is 0
jz .Lxts_enc_ret
mov $len_,$len
@@ -2021,18 +2142,60 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout0,-16($out)
.Lxts_enc_ret:
+ xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+ pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
+ pxor %xmm7,%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack
+ pxor %xmm8,%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm9,%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm10,%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm11,%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm12,%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm13,%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm14,%xmm14
+ pxor %xmm15,%xmm15
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps -0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp) # clear stack
movaps -0x90(%rbp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x90(%rbp)
movaps -0x80(%rbp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x80(%rbp)
movaps -0x70(%rbp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x70(%rbp)
movaps -0x60(%rbp),%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x60(%rbp)
movaps -0x50(%rbp),%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x50(%rbp)
movaps -0x40(%rbp),%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x40(%rbp)
movaps -0x30(%rbp),%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x30(%rbp)
movaps -0x20(%rbp),%xmm14
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x20(%rbp)
movaps -0x10(%rbp),%xmm15
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x10(%rbp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___;
lea (%rbp),%rsp
@@ -2053,7 +2216,7 @@ aesni_xts_decrypt:
and \$-16,%rsp # Linux kernel stack can be incorrectly seeded
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax)
+ movaps %xmm6,-0xa8(%rax) # offload everything
movaps %xmm7,-0x98(%rax)
movaps %xmm8,-0x88(%rax)
movaps %xmm9,-0x78(%rax)
@@ -2116,7 +2279,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movaps $rndkey1,0x60(%rsp) # save round[0]^round[last]
sub \$16*6,$len
- jc .Lxts_dec_short
+ jc .Lxts_dec_short # if $len-=6*16 borrowed
mov \$16+96,$rounds
lea 32($key_,$rnds_),$key # end of key schedule
@@ -2131,7 +2294,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu `16*0`($inp),$inout0 # load input
movdqa $rndkey0,$twmask
movdqu `16*1`($inp),$inout1
- pxor @tweak[0],$inout0
+ pxor @tweak[0],$inout0 # intput^=tweak^round[0]
movdqu `16*2`($inp),$inout2
pxor @tweak[1],$inout1
aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0
@@ -2150,7 +2313,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lea `16*6`($inp),$inp
pxor $twmask,$inout5
- pxor $twres, at tweak[0]
+ pxor $twres, at tweak[0] # calclulate tweaks^round[last]
aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4
pxor $twres, at tweak[1]
movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^last round key
@@ -2194,7 +2357,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
$movkey -80($key,%rax),$rndkey0
jnz .Lxts_dec_loop6
- movdqa (%r8),$twmask
+ movdqa (%r8),$twmask # start calculating next tweak
movdqa $twres,$twtmp
paddd $twres,$twres
aesdec $rndkey1,$inout0
@@ -2288,15 +2451,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
aesdeclast `16*5`(%rsp),$inout5
pxor $twres, at tweak[5]
- lea `16*6`($out),$out
- movups $inout0,`-16*6`($out) # write output
+ lea `16*6`($out),$out # $out+=6*16
+ movups $inout0,`-16*6`($out) # store 6 output blocks
movups $inout1,`-16*5`($out)
movups $inout2,`-16*4`($out)
movups $inout3,`-16*3`($out)
movups $inout4,`-16*2`($out)
movups $inout5,`-16*1`($out)
sub \$16*6,$len
- jnc .Lxts_dec_grandloop
+ jnc .Lxts_dec_grandloop # loop if $len-=6*16 didn't borrow
mov \$16+96,$rounds
sub $rnds_,$rounds
@@ -2304,31 +2467,32 @@ $code.=<<___;
shr \$4,$rounds # restore original value
.Lxts_dec_short:
+ # at the point @tweak[0..5] are populated with tweak values
mov $rounds,$rnds_ # backup $rounds
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[0]
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[1]
- add \$16*6,$len
- jz .Lxts_dec_done
+ add \$16*6,$len # restore real remaining $len
+ jz .Lxts_dec_done # done if ($len==0)
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[2]
cmp \$0x20,$len
- jb .Lxts_dec_one
+ jb .Lxts_dec_one # $len is 1*16
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[3]
- je .Lxts_dec_two
+ je .Lxts_dec_two # $len is 2*16
pxor $rndkey0, at tweak[4]
cmp \$0x40,$len
- jb .Lxts_dec_three
- je .Lxts_dec_four
+ jb .Lxts_dec_three # $len is 3*16
+ je .Lxts_dec_four # $len is 4*16
- movdqu ($inp),$inout0
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # $len is 5*16
movdqu 16*1($inp),$inout1
movdqu 16*2($inp),$inout2
pxor @tweak[0],$inout0
movdqu 16*3($inp),$inout3
pxor @tweak[1],$inout1
movdqu 16*4($inp),$inout4
- lea 16*5($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*5($inp),$inp # $inp+=5*16
pxor @tweak[2],$inout2
pxor @tweak[3],$inout3
pxor @tweak[4],$inout4
@@ -2338,7 +2502,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
- movdqu $inout0,($out)
+ movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 5 output blocks
xorps @tweak[3],$inout3
movdqu $inout1,16*1($out)
xorps @tweak[4],$inout4
@@ -2347,7 +2511,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout3,16*3($out)
pcmpgtd @tweak[5],$twtmp
movdqu $inout4,16*4($out)
- lea 16*5($out),$out
+ lea 16*5($out),$out # $out+=5*16
pshufd \$0x13,$twtmp, at tweak[1] # $twres
and \$15,$len_
jz .Lxts_dec_ret
@@ -2361,23 +2525,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Lxts_dec_one:
movups ($inp),$inout0
- lea 16*1($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*1($inp),$inp # $inp+=1*16
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
___
&aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rounds);
$code.=<<___;
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
movdqa @tweak[1], at tweak[0]
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store one output block
movdqa @tweak[2], at tweak[1]
- lea 16*1($out),$out
+ lea 16*1($out),$out # $out+=1*16
jmp .Lxts_dec_done
.align 16
.Lxts_dec_two:
movups ($inp),$inout0
movups 16($inp),$inout1
- lea 32($inp),$inp
+ lea 32($inp),$inp # $inp+=2*16
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
@@ -2387,9 +2551,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa @tweak[2], at tweak[0]
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
movdqa @tweak[3], at tweak[1]
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 2 output blocks
movups $inout1,16*1($out)
- lea 16*2($out),$out
+ lea 16*2($out),$out # $out+=2*16
jmp .Lxts_dec_done
.align 16
@@ -2397,7 +2561,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups ($inp),$inout0
movups 16*1($inp),$inout1
movups 16*2($inp),$inout2
- lea 16*3($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*3($inp),$inp # $inp+=3*16
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
@@ -2409,10 +2573,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
movdqa @tweak[4], at tweak[1]
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
- movups $inout0,($out)
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store 3 output blocks
movups $inout1,16*1($out)
movups $inout2,16*2($out)
- lea 16*3($out),$out
+ lea 16*3($out),$out # $out+=3*16
jmp .Lxts_dec_done
.align 16
@@ -2422,7 +2586,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups 16*2($inp),$inout2
xorps @tweak[0],$inout0
movups 16*3($inp),$inout3
- lea 16*4($inp),$inp
+ lea 16*4($inp),$inp # $inp+=4*16
xorps @tweak[1],$inout1
xorps @tweak[2],$inout2
xorps @tweak[3],$inout3
@@ -2434,17 +2598,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @tweak[1],$inout1
movdqa @tweak[5], at tweak[1]
pxor @tweak[2],$inout2
- movdqu $inout0,($out)
+ movdqu $inout0,($out) # store 4 output blocks
pxor @tweak[3],$inout3
movdqu $inout1,16*1($out)
movdqu $inout2,16*2($out)
movdqu $inout3,16*3($out)
- lea 16*4($out),$out
+ lea 16*4($out),$out # $out+=4*16
jmp .Lxts_dec_done
.align 16
.Lxts_dec_done:
- and \$15,$len_
+ and \$15,$len_ # see if $len%16 is 0
jz .Lxts_dec_ret
.Lxts_dec_done2:
mov $len_,$len
@@ -2482,18 +2646,60 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout0,($out)
.Lxts_dec_ret:
+ xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+ pxor %xmm6,%xmm6
+ pxor %xmm7,%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp) # clear stack
+ pxor %xmm8,%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm9,%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm10,%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm11,%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm12,%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm13,%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
+ pxor %xmm14,%xmm14
+ pxor %xmm15,%xmm15
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps -0xa0(%rbp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,-0xa0(%rbp) # clear stack
movaps -0x90(%rbp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x90(%rbp)
movaps -0x80(%rbp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x80(%rbp)
movaps -0x70(%rbp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x70(%rbp)
movaps -0x60(%rbp),%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x60(%rbp)
movaps -0x50(%rbp),%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x50(%rbp)
movaps -0x40(%rbp),%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x40(%rbp)
movaps -0x30(%rbp),%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x30(%rbp)
movaps -0x20(%rbp),%xmm14
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x20(%rbp)
movaps -0x10(%rbp),%xmm15
+ movaps %xmm0,-0x10(%rbp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x00(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___;
lea (%rbp),%rsp
@@ -2548,7 +2754,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
jnc .Lcbc_enc_loop
add \$16,$len
jnz .Lcbc_enc_tail
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
movups $inout0,($ivp)
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
jmp .Lcbc_ret
.Lcbc_enc_tail:
@@ -2568,6 +2778,27 @@ $code.=<<___;
#--------------------------- CBC DECRYPT ------------------------------#
.align 16
.Lcbc_decrypt:
+ cmp \$16,$len
+ jne .Lcbc_decrypt_bulk
+
+ # handle single block without allocating stack frame,
+ # useful in ciphertext stealing mode
+ movdqu ($inp),$inout0 # load input
+ movdqu ($ivp),$inout1 # load iv
+ movdqa $inout0,$inout2 # future iv
+___
+ &aesni_generate1("dec",$key,$rnds_);
+$code.=<<___;
+ pxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # clear register bank
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
+ movdqu $inout2,($ivp) # store iv
+ xorps $inout1,$inout0 # ^=iv
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1
+ movups $inout0,($out) # store output
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
+ jmp .Lcbc_ret
+.align 16
+.Lcbc_decrypt_bulk:
lea (%rsp),%rax
push %rbp
sub \$$frame_size,%rsp
@@ -2609,11 +2840,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
cmp \$0x70,$len
jbe .Lcbc_dec_six_or_seven
- and \$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r9d # isolate XSAVE+MOVBE
- sub \$0x50,$len
+ and \$`1<<26|1<<22`,%r9d # isolate XSAVE+MOVBE
+ sub \$0x50,$len # $len is biased by -5*16
cmp \$`1<<22`,%r9d # check for MOVBE without XSAVE
- je .Lcbc_dec_loop6_enter
- sub \$0x20,$len
+ je .Lcbc_dec_loop6_enter # [which denotes Atom Silvermont]
+ sub \$0x20,$len # $len is biased by -7*16
lea 0x70($key),$key # size optimization
jmp .Lcbc_dec_loop8_enter
.align 16
@@ -2740,7 +2971,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movaps $inout7,$inout0
lea -0x70($key),$key
add \$0x70,$len
- jle .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+ jle .Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected
movups $inout7,($out)
lea 0x10($out),$out
cmp \$0x50,$len
@@ -2759,14 +2990,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout0,($out)
pxor $in1,$inout2
movdqu $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
pxor $in2,$inout3
movdqu $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
pxor $in3,$inout4
movdqu $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
pxor $in4,$inout5
movdqu $inout4,0x40($out)
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
lea 0x50($out),$out
movdqa $inout5,$inout0
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
.align 16
@@ -2781,16 +3017,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout0,($out)
pxor $in1,$inout2
movdqu $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
pxor $in2,$inout3
movdqu $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
pxor $in3,$inout4
movdqu $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
pxor $in4,$inout5
movdqu $inout4,0x40($out)
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
pxor $inout7,$inout6
movdqu $inout5,0x50($out)
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
lea 0x60($out),$out
movdqa $inout6,$inout0
+ pxor $inout6,$inout6
+ pxor $inout7,$inout7
jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
.align 16
@@ -2834,31 +3077,31 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqa $inout5,$inout0
add \$0x50,$len
- jle .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
+ jle .Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected
movups $inout5,($out)
lea 0x10($out),$out
.Lcbc_dec_tail:
movups ($inp),$inout0
sub \$0x10,$len
- jbe .Lcbc_dec_one
+ jbe .Lcbc_dec_one # $len is 1*16 or less
movups 0x10($inp),$inout1
movaps $inout0,$in0
sub \$0x10,$len
- jbe .Lcbc_dec_two
+ jbe .Lcbc_dec_two # $len is 2*16 or less
movups 0x20($inp),$inout2
movaps $inout1,$in1
sub \$0x10,$len
- jbe .Lcbc_dec_three
+ jbe .Lcbc_dec_three # $len is 3*16 or less
movups 0x30($inp),$inout3
movaps $inout2,$in2
sub \$0x10,$len
- jbe .Lcbc_dec_four
+ jbe .Lcbc_dec_four # $len is 4*16 or less
- movups 0x40($inp),$inout4
+ movups 0x40($inp),$inout4 # $len is 5*16 or less
movaps $inout3,$in3
movaps $inout4,$in4
xorps $inout5,$inout5
@@ -2869,12 +3112,17 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout0,($out)
pxor $in1,$inout2
movdqu $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
pxor $in2,$inout3
movdqu $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
pxor $in3,$inout4
movdqu $inout3,0x30($out)
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
lea 0x40($out),$out
movdqa $inout4,$inout0
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
sub \$0x10,$len
jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
@@ -2896,6 +3144,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor $in0,$inout1
movdqu $inout0,($out)
movdqa $inout1,$inout0
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
lea 0x10($out),$out
jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
.align 16
@@ -2908,7 +3157,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout0,($out)
pxor $in1,$inout2
movdqu $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
movdqa $inout2,$inout0
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
lea 0x20($out),$out
jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
.align 16
@@ -2921,41 +3172,71 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu $inout0,($out)
pxor $in1,$inout2
movdqu $inout1,0x10($out)
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
pxor $in2,$inout3
movdqu $inout2,0x20($out)
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
movdqa $inout3,$inout0
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
lea 0x30($out),$out
jmp .Lcbc_dec_tail_collected
.align 16
+.Lcbc_dec_clear_tail_collected:
+ pxor $inout1,$inout1 # clear register bank
+ pxor $inout2,$inout2
+ pxor $inout3,$inout3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+ pxor $inout4,$inout4 # %xmm6..9
+ pxor $inout5,$inout5
+ pxor $inout6,$inout6
+ pxor $inout7,$inout7
+___
+$code.=<<___;
.Lcbc_dec_tail_collected:
movups $iv,($ivp)
and \$15,$len
jnz .Lcbc_dec_tail_partial
movups $inout0,($out)
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
jmp .Lcbc_dec_ret
.align 16
.Lcbc_dec_tail_partial:
movaps $inout0,(%rsp)
+ pxor $inout0,$inout0
mov \$16,%rcx
mov $out,%rdi
sub $len,%rcx
lea (%rsp),%rsi
- .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb
+ .long 0x9066A4F3 # rep movsb
+ movdqa $inout0,(%rsp)
.Lcbc_dec_ret:
+ xorps $rndkey0,$rndkey0 # %xmm0
+ pxor $rndkey1,$rndkey1
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm6
+ movaps %xmm0,0x10(%rsp) # clear stack
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm7
+ movaps %xmm0,0x20(%rsp)
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm8
+ movaps %xmm0,0x30(%rsp)
movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm9
+ movaps %xmm0,0x40(%rsp)
movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm10
+ movaps %xmm0,0x50(%rsp)
movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm11
+ movaps %xmm0,0x60(%rsp)
movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm12
+ movaps %xmm0,0x70(%rsp)
movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm13
+ movaps %xmm0,0x80(%rsp)
movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm14
+ movaps %xmm0,0x90(%rsp)
movaps 0xa0(%rsp),%xmm15
+ movaps %xmm0,0xa0(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___;
lea (%rbp),%rsp
@@ -2965,8 +3246,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
.size ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
___
}
-# int $PREFIX_set_[en|de]crypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey,
+# int ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *inp,
# int bits, AES_KEY *key)
+#
+# input: $inp user-supplied key
+# $bits $inp length in bits
+# $key pointer to key schedule
+# output: %eax 0 denoting success, -1 or -2 - failure (see C)
+# *$key key schedule
+#
{ my ($inp,$bits,$key) = @_4args;
$bits =~ s/%r/%e/;
@@ -3003,7 +3291,9 @@ ${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key:
$movkey ($key),%xmm0 # inverse middle
aesimc %xmm0,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
$movkey %xmm0,($inp)
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
.Ldec_key_ret:
add \$8,%rsp
ret
@@ -3020,6 +3310,22 @@ ___
# Agressively optimized in respect to aeskeygenassist's critical path
# and is contained in %xmm0-5 to meet Win64 ABI requirement.
#
+# int ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *inp,
+# int bits, AES_KEY * const key);
+#
+# input: $inp user-supplied key
+# $bits $inp length in bits
+# $key pointer to key schedule
+# output: %eax 0 denoting success, -1 or -2 - failure (see C)
+# $bits rounds-1 (used in aesni_set_decrypt_key)
+# *$key key schedule
+# $key pointer to key schedule (used in
+# aesni_set_decrypt_key)
+#
+# Subroutine is frame-less, which means that only volatile registers
+# are used. Note that it's declared "abi-omnipotent", which means that
+# amount of volatile registers is smaller on Windows.
+#
$code.=<<___;
.globl ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
.type ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
@@ -3033,9 +3339,11 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
test $key,$key
jz .Lenc_key_ret
+ mov \$`1<<28|1<<11`,%r10d # AVX and XOP bits
movups ($inp),%xmm0 # pull first 128 bits of *userKey
xorps %xmm4,%xmm4 # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
- lea 16($key),%rax
+ and OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r10d
+ lea 16($key),%rax # %rax is used as modifiable copy of $key
cmp \$256,$bits
je .L14rounds
cmp \$192,$bits
@@ -3045,6 +3353,9 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
.L10rounds:
mov \$9,$bits # 10 rounds for 128-bit key
+ cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, bit no XOP
+ je .L10rounds_alt
+
$movkey %xmm0,($key) # round 0
aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm0,%xmm1 # round 1
call .Lkey_expansion_128_cold
@@ -3072,9 +3383,79 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
jmp .Lenc_key_ret
.align 16
+.L10rounds_alt:
+ movdqa .Lkey_rotate(%rip),%xmm5
+ mov \$8,%r10d
+ movdqa .Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
+ movdqu %xmm0,($key)
+ jmp .Loop_key128
+
+.align 16
+.Loop_key128:
+ pshufb %xmm5,%xmm0
+ aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm0
+ pslld \$1,%xmm4
+ lea 16(%rax),%rax
+
+ movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
+
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
+ movdqu %xmm0,-16(%rax)
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
+
+ dec %r10d
+ jnz .Loop_key128
+
+ movdqa .Lkey_rcon1b(%rip),%xmm4
+
+ pshufb %xmm5,%xmm0
+ aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm0
+ pslld \$1,%xmm4
+
+ movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
+
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
+ movdqu %xmm0,(%rax)
+
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm2
+ pshufb %xmm5,%xmm0
+ aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm0
+
+ movdqa %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
+
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
+ movdqu %xmm0,16(%rax)
+
+ mov $bits,96(%rax) # 240($key)
+ xor %eax,%eax
+ jmp .Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align 16
.L12rounds:
movq 16($inp),%xmm2 # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
mov \$11,$bits # 12 rounds for 192
+ cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, but no XOP
+ je .L12rounds_alt
+
$movkey %xmm0,($key) # round 0
aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 1,2
call .Lkey_expansion_192a_cold
@@ -3098,10 +3479,54 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
jmp .Lenc_key_ret
.align 16
+.L12rounds_alt:
+ movdqa .Lkey_rotate192(%rip),%xmm5
+ movdqa .Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4
+ mov \$8,%r10d
+ movdqu %xmm0,($key)
+ jmp .Loop_key192
+
+.align 16
+.Loop_key192:
+ movq %xmm2,0(%rax)
+ movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
+ pshufb %xmm5,%xmm2
+ aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm2
+ pslld \$1, %xmm4
+ lea 24(%rax),%rax
+
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm0
+
+ pshufd \$0xff,%xmm0,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
+
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm2
+ movdqu %xmm0,-16(%rax)
+
+ dec %r10d
+ jnz .Loop_key192
+
+ mov $bits,32(%rax) # 240($key)
+ xor %eax,%eax
+ jmp .Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align 16
.L14rounds:
movups 16($inp),%xmm2 # remaning half of *userKey
mov \$13,$bits # 14 rounds for 256
lea 16(%rax),%rax
+ cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, but no XOP
+ je .L14rounds_alt
+
$movkey %xmm0,($key) # round 0
$movkey %xmm2,16($key) # round 1
aeskeygenassist \$0x1,%xmm2,%xmm1 # round 2
@@ -3136,9 +3561,69 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
jmp .Lenc_key_ret
.align 16
+.L14rounds_alt:
+ movdqa .Lkey_rotate(%rip),%xmm5
+ movdqa .Lkey_rcon1(%rip),%xmm4
+ mov \$7,%r10d
+ movdqu %xmm0,0($key)
+ movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
+ movdqu %xmm2,16($key)
+ jmp .Loop_key256
+
+.align 16
+.Loop_key256:
+ pshufb %xmm5,%xmm2
+ aesenclast %xmm4,%xmm2
+
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm0
+ pslld \$1,%xmm4
+
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm0
+ movdqu %xmm0,(%rax)
+
+ dec %r10d
+ jz .Ldone_key256
+
+ pshufd \$0xff,%xmm0,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
+ aesenclast %xmm3,%xmm2
+
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm3
+ pslldq \$4,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm1
+
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm2
+ movdqu %xmm2,16(%rax)
+ lea 32(%rax),%rax
+ movdqa %xmm2,%xmm1
+
+ jmp .Loop_key256
+
+.Ldone_key256:
+ mov $bits,16(%rax) # 240($key)
+ xor %eax,%eax
+ jmp .Lenc_key_ret
+
+.align 16
.Lbad_keybits:
mov \$-2,%rax
.Lenc_key_ret:
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm3
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
add \$8,%rsp
ret
.LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key:
@@ -3228,6 +3713,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
.long 0x87,0,1,0
.Lincrement1:
.byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1
+.Lkey_rotate:
+ .long 0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d
+.Lkey_rotate192:
+ .long 0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605
+.Lkey_rcon1:
+ .long 1,1,1,1
+.Lkey_rcon1b:
+ .long 0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b
.asciz "AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 64
@@ -3345,7 +3838,7 @@ cbc_se_handler:
mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip
- lea .Lcbc_decrypt(%rip),%r10
+ lea .Lcbc_decrypt_bulk(%rip),%r10
cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<"prologue" label
jb .Lcommon_seh_tail
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
index 1e93f86..95ebae3 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -24,8 +24,12 @@
#
# CBC enc CBC dec CTR
# Apple A7 2.39 1.20 1.20
-# Cortex-A53 2.45 1.87 1.94
-# Cortex-A57 3.64 1.34 1.32
+# Cortex-A53 1.32 1.29 1.46
+# Cortex-A57(*) 1.95 0.85 0.93
+# Denver 1.96 0.86 0.80
+#
+# (*) original 3.64/1.34/1.32 results were for r0p0 revision
+# and are still same even for updated module;
$flavour = shift;
open STDOUT,">".shift;
@@ -308,17 +312,17 @@ ${prefix}_${dir}crypt:
.Loop_${dir}c:
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
- vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
aes$mc $inout,$inout
+ vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
subs $rounds,$rounds,#2
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
- vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
aes$mc $inout,$inout
+ vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
b.gt .Loop_${dir}c
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
- vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
aes$mc $inout,$inout
+ vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
veor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
@@ -336,6 +340,7 @@ my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12");
my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1);
+my ($key4,$key5,$key6,$key7)=("x6","x12","x14",$key);
### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule
@@ -385,16 +390,42 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor $rndzero_n_last,q8,$rndlast
b.eq .Lcbc_enc128
+ vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_]
+ add $key_,$key,#16
+ add $key4,$key,#16*4
+ add $key5,$key,#16*5
+ aese $dat,q8
+ aesmc $dat,$dat
+ add $key6,$key,#16*6
+ add $key7,$key,#16*7
+ b .Lenter_cbc_enc
+
+.align 4
.Loop_cbc_enc:
aese $dat,q8
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat,$dat
- subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
+ vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
+.Lenter_cbc_enc:
aese $dat,q9
- vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat,$dat
- b.gt .Loop_cbc_enc
+ aese $dat,$in0
+ aesmc $dat,$dat
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key4]
+ cmp $rounds,#4
+ aese $dat,$in1
+ aesmc $dat,$dat
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key5]
+ b.eq .Lcbc_enc192
+
+ aese $dat,q8
+ aesmc $dat,$dat
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key6]
+ aese $dat,q9
+ aesmc $dat,$dat
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key7]
+ nop
+.Lcbc_enc192:
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
subs $len,$len,#16
@@ -403,7 +434,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
cclr $step,eq
aese $dat,q10
aesmc $dat,$dat
- add $key_,$key,#16
aese $dat,q11
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step
@@ -412,16 +442,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
aese $dat,q13
aesmc $dat,$dat
- vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key_] // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
aese $dat,q14
aesmc $dat,$dat
aese $dat,q15
-
- mov $cnt,$rounds
veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast
- vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc
+ vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
b .Lcbc_done
.align 5
@@ -483,79 +511,78 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop3x_cbc_dec:
aesd $dat0,q8
- aesd $dat1,q8
- aesd $dat2,q8
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat0,q9
- aesd $dat1,q9
- aesd $dat2,q9
- vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_cbc_dec
aesd $dat0,q8
- aesd $dat1,q8
- aesd $dat2,q8
- veor $tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
+ veor $tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast
+ subs $len,$len,#0x30
veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
+ mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
aesd $dat0,q9
- aesd $dat1,q9
- aesd $dat2,q9
- veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
- subs $len,$len,#0x30
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
- vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
- mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
- aesd $dat0,q12
- aesd $dat1,q12
- aesd $dat2,q12
+ veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
// are loaded with last "words"
+ vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
+ mov $key_,$key
+ aesd $dat0,q12
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
- mov $key_,$key
- aesd $dat0,q13
- aesd $dat1,q13
- aesd $dat2,q13
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
+ aesd $dat0,q13
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q14
- aesd $dat1,q14
- aesd $dat2,q14
- vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
+ aesd $dat1,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
+ vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q15
aesd $dat1,q15
aesd $dat2,q15
-
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
veor $tmp0,$tmp0,$dat0
veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
veor $dat2,$dat2,$tmp2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
- vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
- vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
+ vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
+ vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
b.hs .Loop3x_cbc_dec
@@ -566,39 +593,39 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lcbc_dec_tail:
aesd $dat1,q8
- aesd $dat2,q8
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat1,q9
- aesd $dat2,q9
- vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lcbc_dec_tail
aesd $dat1,q8
- aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q9
- aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q12
- aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
cmn $len,#0x20
aesd $dat1,q13
- aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast
aesd $dat1,q14
- aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
+ aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
aesd $dat1,q15
@@ -699,70 +726,69 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 4
.Loop3x_ctr32:
aese $dat0,q8
- aese $dat1,q8
- aese $dat2,q8
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
+ aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
- aese $dat1,q9
- aese $dat2,q9
- vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
+ aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_ctr32
aese $dat0,q8
- aese $dat1,q8
- aese $dat2,q8
- mov $key_,$key
aesmc $tmp0,$dat0
- vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
+ aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $tmp1,$dat1
- aesmc $dat2,$dat2
+ vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec
- aese $tmp0,q9
+ aese $dat2,q8
+ aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
- aese $tmp1,q9
- aese $dat2,q9
vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec
+ aese $tmp0,q9
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
- vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
+ aese $tmp1,q9
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
+ vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
+ mov $key_,$key
+ aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $tmp2,$dat2
vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec
add $tctr0,$ctr,#1
aese $tmp0,q12
+ aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q12
- aese $tmp2,q12
+ aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
add $tctr1,$ctr,#2
- aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
- aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
+ aese $tmp2,q12
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
add $ctr,$ctr,#3
aese $tmp0,q13
+ aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q13
- aese $tmp2,q13
+ aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
veor $in2,$in2,$rndlast
rev $tctr0,$tctr0
- aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
- aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
+ aese $tmp2,q13
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
vmov.32 ${dat0}[3], $tctr0
rev $tctr1,$tctr1
aese $tmp0,q14
+ aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q14
- aese $tmp2,q14
+ aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
vmov.32 ${dat1}[3], $tctr1
rev $tctr2,$ctr
- aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
- aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
+ aese $tmp2,q14
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
vmov.32 ${dat2}[3], $tctr2
subs $len,$len,#3
@@ -770,13 +796,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
aese $tmp1,q15
aese $tmp2,q15
- mov $cnt,$rounds
veor $in0,$in0,$tmp0
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
+ vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
veor $in1,$in1,$tmp1
+ mov $cnt,$rounds
+ vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
veor $in2,$in2,$tmp2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
- vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
- vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$in2},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop3x_ctr32
@@ -788,40 +815,40 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lctr32_tail:
aese $dat0,q8
- aese $dat1,q8
- vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
+ vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
- aese $dat1,q9
- vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
+ vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lctr32_tail
aese $dat0,q8
- aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q9
- aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],$step
aese $dat0,q12
- aese $dat1,q12
- vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp]
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q12
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
+ vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp]
aese $dat0,q13
- aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
- aese $dat0,q14
- aese $dat1,q14
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
+ aese $dat0,q14
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
+ aese $dat1,q14
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
aese $dat0,q15
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile
index 2e2a097..330fe81 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 70c2b8e..7e26704 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
else {
ret = a->length;
i = a->data[0];
+ if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
+ neg = 0;
if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0;
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
p += a->length - 1;
i = a->length;
/* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */
- while (!*n) {
+ while (!*n && i > 1) {
*(p--) = 0;
n--;
i--;
@@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (BN_is_negative(bn))
+ if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn))
ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
else
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
index 02300df..5389c04 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -464,3 +464,21 @@ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
{
ameth->pkey_ctrl = pkey_ctrl;
}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+ int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *a,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey),
+ int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1,
+ X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig))
+{
+ ameth->item_sign = item_sign;
+ ameth->item_verify = item_verify;
+}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
index 11b582d..6574923 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
#define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val) {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val}
#define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX 20
+/* Maximum number of nested sequences */
+#define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH 50
/* Input formats */
@@ -110,13 +112,16 @@ typedef struct {
int exp_count;
} tag_exp_arg;
+static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
+ int *perr);
static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class,
int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok);
static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag,
int *pclass);
-static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf);
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
+ int depth, int *perr);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype);
static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len);
@@ -133,6 +138,16 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf)
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
{
+ int err = 0;
+ ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err);
+ if (err)
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
+ int *perr)
+{
ASN1_TYPE *ret;
tag_exp_arg asn1_tags;
tag_exp_type *etmp;
@@ -152,17 +167,22 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
asn1_tags.imp_class = -1;
asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
asn1_tags.exp_count = 0;
- if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0)
+ if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) {
+ *perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG;
return NULL;
+ }
if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
|| (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) {
if (!cnf) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3,
- ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG);
+ *perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG;
return NULL;
}
- ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf);
+ if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) {
+ *perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr);
} else
ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype);
@@ -280,7 +300,7 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
int tmp_tag, tmp_class;
if (elem == NULL)
- return 0;
+ return -1;
for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) {
/* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */
@@ -353,7 +373,7 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
break;
case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT:
- if(!vstart) {
+ if (!vstart) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
return -1;
}
@@ -435,7 +455,8 @@ static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass)
/* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */
-static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
+ int depth, int *perr)
{
ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL;
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL;
@@ -454,7 +475,8 @@ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
ASN1_TYPE *typ =
- ASN1_generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf);
+ generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf,
+ depth + 1, perr);
if (!typ)
goto bad;
if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ))
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index 7e2f28e..96110c5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
/* We want multipart/signed */
/* Generate a random boundary */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
+ return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
c = bound[i] & 0xf;
if (c < 10)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
index 4a73ca9..31949b8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
- if(!p)
+ if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
- if(!p)
+ if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
index 7d2964f..b0c73be 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
else
asn1_cb = 0;
- if (!combine)
- *pval = NULL;
-
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
index 7c54f9d..5e7d53e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1);
- if(!seqtt)
+ if (!seqtt)
return 0;
tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt);
if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld,
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
index 55319ac..5f266a2 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
/* Save start position */
q = *pp;
- if(!a || *a == NULL) {
+ if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
goto err;
return ret;
err:
- if(freeret) {
+ if (freeret) {
X509_free(ret);
if (a)
*a = NULL;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile
index d01bfaa..6dd2015 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bf/Makefile
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile
index c395d80..ef526f6 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/Makefile
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index c2cf6e6..7c81e25 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -704,32 +704,29 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
/* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */
assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL);
- if (buffer) {
- while (*currlen >= *maxlen) {
- if (*buffer == NULL) {
- if (*maxlen == 0)
- *maxlen = 1024;
- *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
- if(!*buffer) {
- /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
- return;
- }
- if (*currlen > 0) {
- assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
- memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
- }
- *sbuffer = NULL;
- } else {
- *maxlen += 1024;
- *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
- if(!*buffer) {
- /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
- return;
- }
+ /* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */
+ assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
+
+ if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
+ *maxlen += 1024;
+ if (*buffer == NULL) {
+ *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
+ if (!*buffer) {
+ /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (*currlen > 0) {
+ assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
+ memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
+ }
+ *sbuffer = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+ if (!*buffer) {
+ /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
+ return;
}
}
- /* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */
- assert(*sbuffer != NULL || *buffer != NULL);
}
if (*currlen < *maxlen) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
index da88a8a..a04f32a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
#if 1
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
num = (n & 0x07);
if (outl > num)
@@ -178,7 +179,8 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = nt->lwn;
nt->lwn = 0;
} else {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
num = (n & 7);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
index 5267010..07934f8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
@@ -536,8 +536,10 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
/* copy app data */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
- &bio->ex_data))
+ &bio->ex_data)) {
+ BIO_free(new_bio);
goto err;
+ }
if (ret == NULL) {
eoc = new_bio;
@@ -549,8 +551,8 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
}
return (ret);
err:
- if (ret != NULL)
- BIO_free(ret);
+ BIO_free_all(ret);
+
return (NULL);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index 388d90d..7fcd831 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -303,16 +303,17 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
- timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
- timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
- if (timeleft.tv_usec < 0) {
+ if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) {
+ timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec;
timeleft.tv_sec--;
- timeleft.tv_usec += 1000000;
+ } else {
+ timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
}
-
- if (timeleft.tv_sec < 0) {
+ if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) {
timeleft.tv_sec = 0;
timeleft.tv_usec = 1;
+ } else {
+ timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
}
/*
@@ -896,7 +897,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
perror("setsockopt");
ret = -1;
}
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTUDISCOVER)
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined (IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE)
if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
(ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER,
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
@@ -1012,7 +1013,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
*/
sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
- if(!authchunks) {
+ if (!authchunks) {
BIO_vfree(bio);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -1352,7 +1353,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
(socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen);
if (!authchunks) {
- BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR);
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen));
@@ -1423,8 +1424,8 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) {
char *tmp;
data->saved_message.bio = b;
- if(!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
- BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR);
+ if (!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
if (data->saved_message.data)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
index 5361dc8..61dce05 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: bn_prime.h depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
index a1357de..263ac02 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ld [$ap+12], $t3
or $t0, $aj, $aj
add $ap, 16, $ap
- stxa $aj, [$anp]0xe2 ! converted ap[0]
+ stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[0]
mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0]
umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
sllx $t1, 32, $aj
add $ap, 8, $ap
or $t0, $aj, $aj
- stxa $aj, [$anp]0xe2 ! converted ap[j]
+ stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[j]
ld [$np+0], $t2 ! np[j]
addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj
addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1
- stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1]
+ stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1]
add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++
brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st
@@ -182,12 +182,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1
addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1
- stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1]
+ stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1]
add $tp, 8, $tp
addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1
addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit
- stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2
+ stx $hi1, [$tp]
add $tp, 8, $tp
ba .Louter
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index fa22c30..820de3d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -3226,11 +3226,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
bn_get_bits5:
- mov $inp,%r10
+ lea 0($inp),%r10
+ lea 1($inp),%r11
mov $num,%ecx
- shr \$3,$num
- movzw (%r10,$num),%eax
- and \$7,%ecx
+ shr \$4,$num
+ and \$15,%ecx
+ lea -8(%ecx),%eax
+ cmp \$11,%ecx
+ cmova %r11,%r10
+ cmova %eax,%ecx
+ movzw (%r10,$num,2),%eax
shrl %cl,%eax
and \$31,%eax
ret
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
index 78709d3..5696965 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
* wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \
BN_ULONG *_not_const; \
memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \
+ /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */ \
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); \
memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \
(_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \
@@ -892,6 +893,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR 135
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR 136
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT 137
+# define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT 145
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT 118
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT 109
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME 124
@@ -907,12 +909,14 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_F_BN_NEW 113
# define BN_F_BN_RAND 114
# define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122
+# define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT 146
# define BN_F_BN_USUB 115
/* Reason codes. */
# define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3 100
# define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL 101
# define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG 114
+# define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL 118
# define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS 102
# define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO 103
# define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR 104
@@ -920,6 +924,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110
# define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106
# define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115
+# define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT 119
# define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111
# define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107
# define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
index faa7e22..e7a7038 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/bn/bn_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"},
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"},
{0, NULL}
};
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"},
@@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"},
+ {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index aeee49a..cfa1c7c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -450,8 +450,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[])
d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2;
d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
z[n] ^= (zz << d0);
- tmp_ulong = zz >> d1;
- if (d0 && tmp_ulong)
+ if (d0 && (tmp_ulong = zz >> d1))
z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong;
}
@@ -694,9 +693,10 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
# else
{
- int i, ubits = BN_num_bits(u), vbits = BN_num_bits(v), /* v is copy
- * of p */
- top = p->top;
+ int i;
+ int ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
+ int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */
+ int top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
@@ -740,8 +740,12 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
ubits--;
}
- if (ubits <= BN_BITS2 && udp[0] == 1)
- break;
+ if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) {
+ if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */
+ goto err;
+ if (udp[0] == 1)
+ break;
+ }
if (ubits < vbits) {
i = ubits;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
index 7cd5883..00f4f09 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
# endif
# elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
-# if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4
+# if __GNUC__>4 || (__GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4)
/* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */
# define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
# define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
index 4dcaae3..ab10b95 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
@@ -71,7 +71,12 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
char *buf;
char *p;
- buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
+ if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
+ /* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
+ } else {
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
+ }
if (buf == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index 7ac71ec..f9fb2e9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
time_t tim;
+ if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (bits == 0) {
BN_zero(rnd);
return 1;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
unsigned char c;
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
if (c >= 128 && i > 0)
buf[i] = buf[i - 1];
else if (c < 42)
@@ -168,7 +174,7 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
#endif
- if (top != -1) {
+ if (top >= 0) {
if (top) {
if (bit == 0) {
buf[0] = 1;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
index 4f3e8ff..9673d9a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
@@ -137,6 +137,11 @@ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
r->neg = a->neg;
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL)
@@ -174,6 +179,11 @@ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
rb = n % BN_BITS2;
lb = BN_BITS2 - rb;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile
index 2efba47..352efb8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/buffer/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c b/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
index d287e34..eff3e08 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a)
return;
if (a->data != NULL) {
- memset(a->data, 0, (unsigned int)a->max);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->max);
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
}
OPENSSL_free(a);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile
index 60e8960..ab1225e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/camellia/Makefile
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile
index f3f4859..4c4b5e9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cast/Makefile
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile
index 54e7cc3..6a28408 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cmac/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c b/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c
index c5597a3..774e6dc 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cmac/cmac.c
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile
index 644fef3..6f3a832 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/Makefile
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
index f8a6cba..2cfcdb2 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
@@ -362,6 +363,9 @@ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+ rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
+ if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
return 0;
} else {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index 076b545..a8322dc 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
return 0;
}
tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
- if(!tmp)
+ if (!tmp)
return 0;
/* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
@@ -297,8 +297,9 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
/* Add random padding to end */
- if (olen > inlen + 4)
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen);
+ if (olen > inlen + 4
+ && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
+ return 0;
/* Encrypt twice */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
index 8729e3f..b39ed48 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
- while (f != upto);
+ while (f && f != upto);
} else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile
index efda832..a1e9464 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/comp/Makefile
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile
index 78bb324..d5f5c58 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/conf/Makefile
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
index 98526d7..ca0e3cc 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -825,8 +825,6 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
- (void)GetDesktopWindow(); /* return value is ignored */
-
h = GetProcessWindowStation();
if (h == NULL)
return -1;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile
index 060c647..8b5166c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/des/Makefile
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/des.c b/openssl/crypto/des/des.c
index 2bff281..586aed7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/des/des.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/des/des.c
@@ -455,8 +455,10 @@ void doencryption(void)
rem = l % 8;
len = l - rem;
if (feof(DES_IN)) {
- for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--)
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1);
+ for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
+ goto problems;
+ }
buf[l++] = rem;
ex = 1;
len += rem;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
index b4eecc3..bfaabde 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
const unsigned char *cp;
static int start = 1;
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
if (outbuf == NULL) {
outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BSIZE + HDRSIZE);
if (outbuf == NULL)
@@ -132,7 +135,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
if (len < 8) {
cp = shortbuf;
memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
rnum = 8;
} else {
cp = buf;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile
index f447907..46fa5ac 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
index c6bfc2d..ac72468 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
- if(!str) {
+ if (!str) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index b3a3147..b58e3fa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
ret = 0;
Zlen = DH_size(dh);
Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen);
- if(!Z) {
+ if (!Z) {
goto err;
}
if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile
index 5fef4ca..8109201 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 8920036..5a328aa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
goto err;
if (!seed_len) {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
+ goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
} else {
seed_is_random = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 665f40a..f0ec8fa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
#define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
- if((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
+ if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \
(a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \
(m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
- if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
+ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
#define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
- if((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
+ if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \
(m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
- if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
+ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile
index fb2709e..36b8ead 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
index d2a48bb..09b8eaf 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
* honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any
* error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as
* "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard
- * "if(DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
+ * "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
* times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return
* value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-)
*/
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
index 0eff96e..d0794b8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
{
int len = strlen(filename);
char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
- if(not_translated)
+ if (not_translated)
strcpy(not_translated, filename);
return (not_translated);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ebcdic.c b/openssl/crypto/ebcdic.c
index 4b7652c..fd6df92 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ebcdic.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ebcdic.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-# if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(__DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX)
+# if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(__DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX) || defined(__clang__)
static void *dummy = &dummy;
# endif
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile
index 0d9f3ab..359ef4e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
index 5b21574..84379fc 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -30,20 +30,24 @@
# Further optimization by <appro at openssl.org>:
#
-# this/original
-# Opteron +12-49%
-# Bulldozer +14-45%
-# P4 +18-46%
-# Westmere +12-34%
-# Sandy Bridge +9-35%
-# Ivy Bridge +9-35%
-# Haswell +8-37%
-# Broadwell +18-58%
-# Atom +15-50%
-# VIA Nano +43-160%
+# this/original with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM(*)
+# Opteron +12-49% +110-150%
+# Bulldozer +14-45% +175-210%
+# P4 +18-46% n/a :-(
+# Westmere +12-34% +80-87%
+# Sandy Bridge +9-35% +110-120%
+# Ivy Bridge +9-35% +110-125%
+# Haswell +8-37% +140-160%
+# Broadwell +18-58% +145-210%
+# Atom +15-50% +130-180%
+# VIA Nano +43-160% +300-480%
+#
+# (*) "without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM" refers to build with
+# "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128";
#
# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
-# on benchmark.
+# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, relatively fastest
+# server-side operation. Keep in mind that +100% means 2x improvement.
$flavour = shift;
$output = shift;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
index 98edfdf..6d3178f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -1097,6 +1097,12 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 148
# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT 149
# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 150
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE 240
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE 243
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL 241
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW 244
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS 245
+# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL 242
# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_192 203
# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_224 204
# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_256 205
@@ -1208,11 +1214,6 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW 227
# define EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW 236
# define EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW 237
-# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE 240
-# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL 241
-# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL 242
-# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE 243
-# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW 244
# define EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY 152
# define EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE 222
# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL 197
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
index c245d88..0d04cc6 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
}
/* test required by X9.62 */
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) {
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index b4b0e9f..4ad8494 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
{
int ret = 0, ok = 0;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
- size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len;
+ size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len, bn_len;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
@@ -1130,18 +1130,32 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
priv_key->version = a->version;
- buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key);
+ bn_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key);
+
+ /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
+
+ buf_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(a->group) + 7) / 8;
+
+ if (bn_len > buf_len) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
if (buffer == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer)) {
+ if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer + buf_len - bn_len)) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ if (buf_len - bn_len > 0) {
+ memset(buffer, 0, buf_len - bn_len);
+ }
+
if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(priv_key->privateKey, buffer, buf_len)) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c
index d3f5349..dd6f0ac 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_check.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx)) {
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
index 13b32c7..6fe5baa 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/ec/ec_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -89,6 +89,13 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECParameters_print_fp"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT), "ECPKParameters_print"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECPKParameters_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE), "ecp_nistz256_get_affine"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE),
+ "ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_points_mul"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS), "ecp_nistz256_set_words"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_192), "ECP_NIST_MOD_192"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_224), "ECP_NIST_MOD_224"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_256), "ECP_NIST_MOD_256"},
@@ -239,12 +246,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW), "NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW), "NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW"},
- {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE), "ecp_nistz256_get_affine"},
- {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_points_mul"},
- {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul"},
- {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE),
- "ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute"},
- {ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY), "o2i_ECPublicKey"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL), "PKEY_EC_CTRL"},
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
index ebdffc8..55ce3fe 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
goto err;
/* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) {
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index 697eeb5..969fd14 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -459,14 +459,6 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
-/* method functions in ec2_mult.c */
-int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
- const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
- const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
- BN_CTX *);
-int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
/* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */
int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 6ffd9fc..3ffa112 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -970,6 +970,13 @@ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point);
}
+/*
+ * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return
+ * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values:
+ * 1: The point is on the curve
+ * 0: The point is not on the curve
+ * -1: An error occurred
+ */
int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c
index 515b262..df9b37a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/eck_prn.c
@@ -346,12 +346,14 @@ static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *name, const unsigned char *buf,
if (buf == NULL)
return 1;
- if (off) {
+ if (off > 0) {
if (off > 128)
off = 128;
memset(str, ' ', off);
if (BIO_write(fp, str, off) <= 0)
return 0;
+ } else {
+ off = 0;
}
if (BIO_printf(fp, "%s", name) <= 0)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index 2cd6599..ca44d0a 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -222,6 +222,18 @@ static BN_ULONG is_one(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS])
return is_zero(res);
}
+static int ecp_nistz256_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG words[P256_LIMBS])
+ {
+ if (bn_wexpand(a, P256_LIMBS) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(a->d, words, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * P256_LIMBS);
+ a->top = P256_LIMBS;
+ bn_correct_top(a);
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a);
void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r,
@@ -557,13 +569,14 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(BN_ULONG out[P256_LIMBS],
}
/* r = sum(scalar[i]*point[i]) */
-static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
+static int ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
P256_POINT *r,
const BIGNUM **scalar,
const EC_POINT **point,
int num, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- int i, j;
+
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
unsigned int index;
unsigned char (*p_str)[33] = NULL;
const unsigned int window_size = 5;
@@ -589,6 +602,7 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
P256_POINT *row = table[i];
+ /* This is an unusual input, we don't guarantee constant-timeness. */
if ((BN_num_bits(scalar[i]) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar[i])) {
BIGNUM *mod;
@@ -697,6 +711,7 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &h);
}
+ ret = 1;
err:
if (table_storage)
OPENSSL_free(table_storage);
@@ -704,6 +719,7 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
OPENSSL_free(p_str);
if (scalars)
OPENSSL_free(scalars);
+ return ret;
}
/* Coordinates of G, for which we have precomputed tables */
@@ -742,6 +758,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
EC_POINT *P = NULL, *T = NULL;
const EC_POINT *generator;
EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp;
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
int i, j, k, ret = 0;
size_t w;
@@ -771,7 +788,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
if (ctx == NULL) {
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
}
@@ -802,30 +819,41 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
P = EC_POINT_new(group);
T = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if (P == NULL || T == NULL)
+ goto err;
/*
* The zero entry is implicitly infinity, and we skip it, storing other
* values with -1 offset.
*/
- EC_POINT_copy(T, generator);
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(T, generator))
+ goto err;
for (k = 0; k < 64; k++) {
- EC_POINT_copy(P, T);
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(P, T))
+ goto err;
for (j = 0; j < 37; j++) {
/*
- * It would be faster to use
- * ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine and make multiple
- * points affine at the same time.
+ * It would be faster to use EC_POINTs_make_affine and
+ * make multiple points affine at the same time.
*/
- ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(group, P, ctx);
- ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j]
- [k].X, &P->X);
- ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j]
- [k].Y, &P->Y);
- for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
- ec_GFp_simple_dbl(group, P, P, ctx);
+ if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, P, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j][k].X,
+ &P->X) ||
+ !ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j][k].Y,
+ &P->Y)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE,
+ EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+ if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
}
- ec_GFp_simple_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx);
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx))
+ goto err;
}
pre_comp->group = group;
@@ -849,6 +877,8 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
err:
if (ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+
if (pre_comp)
ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free(pre_comp);
if (precomp_storage)
@@ -1102,6 +1132,9 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL;
const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
unsigned int index = 0;
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM **new_scalars = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT **new_points = NULL;
const unsigned int window_size = 7;
const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1;
unsigned int wvalue;
@@ -1115,6 +1148,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
+
if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0))
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
@@ -1125,13 +1159,13 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
}
- /* Need 256 bits for space for all coordinates. */
- bn_wexpand(&r->X, P256_LIMBS);
- bn_wexpand(&r->Y, P256_LIMBS);
- bn_wexpand(&r->Z, P256_LIMBS);
- r->X.top = P256_LIMBS;
- r->Y.top = P256_LIMBS;
- r->Z.top = P256_LIMBS;
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (scalar) {
generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
@@ -1156,8 +1190,10 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
goto err;
if (!ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine
- (pre_comp_generator, group, pre_comp->precomp[0], ctx))
+ (pre_comp_generator, group, pre_comp->precomp[0], ctx)) {
+ EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator);
goto err;
+ }
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp_generator, ctx))
preComputedTable = (const PRECOMP256_ROW *)pre_comp->precomp;
@@ -1255,20 +1291,16 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
* Without a precomputed table for the generator, it has to be
* handled like a normal point.
*/
- const BIGNUM **new_scalars;
- const EC_POINT **new_points;
-
new_scalars = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(BIGNUM *));
if (!new_scalars) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
new_points = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(EC_POINT *));
if (!new_points) {
- OPENSSL_free(new_scalars);
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
memcpy(new_scalars, scalars, num * sizeof(BIGNUM *));
@@ -1286,27 +1318,31 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
if (p_is_infinity)
out = &p.p;
- ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx);
+ if (!ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx))
+ goto err;
if (!p_is_infinity)
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&p.p, &p.p, out);
}
- if (no_precomp_for_generator) {
- OPENSSL_free(points);
- OPENSSL_free(scalars);
+ /* Not constant-time, but we're only operating on the public output. */
+ if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->X, p.p.X) ||
+ !ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Y, p.p.Y) ||
+ !ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Z, p.p.Z)) {
+ goto err;
}
-
- memcpy(r->X.d, p.p.X, sizeof(p.p.X));
- memcpy(r->Y.d, p.p.Y, sizeof(p.p.Y));
- memcpy(r->Z.d, p.p.Z, sizeof(p.p.Z));
- bn_correct_top(&r->X);
- bn_correct_top(&r->Y);
- bn_correct_top(&r->Z);
+ r->Z_is_one = is_one(p.p.Z) & 1;
ret = 1;
- err:
+err:
+ if (ctx)
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ if (new_points)
+ OPENSSL_free(new_points);
+ if (new_scalars)
+ OPENSSL_free(new_scalars);
return ret;
}
@@ -1319,6 +1355,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group,
BN_ULONG x_aff[P256_LIMBS];
BN_ULONG y_aff[P256_LIMBS];
BN_ULONG point_x[P256_LIMBS], point_y[P256_LIMBS], point_z[P256_LIMBS];
+ BN_ULONG x_ret[P256_LIMBS], y_ret[P256_LIMBS];
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
@@ -1337,19 +1374,17 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group,
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(x_aff, z_inv2, point_x);
if (x != NULL) {
- bn_wexpand(x, P256_LIMBS);
- x->top = P256_LIMBS;
- ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x->d, x_aff);
- bn_correct_top(x);
+ ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x_ret, x_aff);
+ if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(x, x_ret))
+ return 0;
}
if (y != NULL) {
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(z_inv3, z_inv3, z_inv2);
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(y_aff, z_inv3, point_y);
- bn_wexpand(y, P256_LIMBS);
- y->top = P256_LIMBS;
- ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y->d, y_aff);
- bn_correct_top(y);
+ ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y_ret, y_aff);
+ if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(y, y_ret))
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
index e5cec8b..1bc3f39 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
}
/* test required by X9.62 */
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) {
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c
index a18b327..fede530 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ec/ectest.c
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) {
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
ABORT;
fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x");
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "0100000000000000000001F4C8F927AED3CA752257"))
ABORT;
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831"))
ABORT;
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn
(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D"))
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E"
"84F3B9CAC2FC632551"))
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
"FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973"))
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5"
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
ABORT; /* P = -2Q */
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
# define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
ABORT;
# endif
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) {
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
# ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
ABORT;
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
ABORT; /* P = -2Q */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile
index df1b03a..1b31ba1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdh/Makefile
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile
index e89e0c0..4ce00e8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
index b2d78f3..0f301f8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
int nid, ret = 0;
/* fill digest values with some random data */
- if (!RAND_pseudo_bytes(digest, 20) ||
- !RAND_pseudo_bytes(wrong_digest, 20)) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digest, 20) <= 0 ||
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(wrong_digest, 20) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
index 2ee6c72..426388e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile
index 862b23b..b6f3ef1 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/err/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
index c9afca7..aaaad98 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/Makefile
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index a455034..5c32e35 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -491,7 +491,8 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b)
* FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all,
* particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured.
*/
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0)
+ goto berr;
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size);
longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size);
ctx->buf_len += md->digest->md_size;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 8161b26..33cbed8 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/err.h>
# include <string.h>
@@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
/* Save the AAD for later use */
- if (arg != 13)
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
@@ -1455,7 +1456,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
/* Retrieve tag */
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
/* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
- if (memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
goto err;
}
@@ -1895,7 +1896,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
unsigned char tag[16];
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
- if (!memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M))
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M))
rv = len;
}
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index e0127a9..8330964 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ typedef struct {
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
defined(__INTEL__) )
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[3];
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
# define AESNI_CAPABLE (1<<(57-32))
int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
@@ -845,7 +845,12 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
{
unsigned char *p = ptr;
- unsigned int len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return -1;
+
+ len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (ctx->encrypt) {
key->payload_length = len;
@@ -862,8 +867,6 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
- len);
} else {
- if (arg > 13)
- arg = 13;
memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg);
key->payload_length = arg;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
index 30398c7..b1c586e 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ typedef struct {
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
defined(__INTEL__) )
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[3];
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
# define AESNI_CAPABLE (1<<(57-32))
int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
@@ -813,6 +813,11 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
unsigned char *p = ptr;
unsigned int len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return -1;
+
+ len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+
if (ctx->encrypt) {
key->payload_length = len;
if ((key->aux.tls_ver =
@@ -828,8 +833,6 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
- len);
} else {
- if (arg > 13)
- arg = 13;
memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg);
key->payload_length = arg;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
index 301d93e..96f272e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
@@ -447,7 +447,8 @@ static int des_ede3_wrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
memcpy(out + inl + 8, sha1tmp, 8);
OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
/* Generate random IV */
- RAND_bytes(ctx->iv, 8);
+ if (RAND_bytes(ctx->iv, 8) <= 0)
+ return -1;
memcpy(out, ctx->iv, 8);
/* Encrypt everything after IV in place */
des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx, out + 8, out + 8, inl + 8);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
index 80735d3..2da1117 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/objects.h>
# include <openssl/rc4.h>
@@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
MD5_Update(&key->md, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD5_Final(mac, &key->md);
- if (memcmp(out + plen, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + plen, mac, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH))
return 0;
} else {
MD5_Update(&key->md, out + md5_off, len - md5_off);
@@ -258,7 +259,12 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
{
unsigned char *p = ptr;
- unsigned int len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return -1;
+
+ len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (!ctx->encrypt) {
len -= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c
index d1d8a07..c361d1f 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
unsigned int total = 0;
*outl = 0;
- if (inl == 0)
+ if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
/* We parse the input data */
for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
- /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */
+ /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream a lot */
if (ln >= 80) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h
index 47abbac..39ab793 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@
# define EVP_PKS_RSA 0x0100
# define EVP_PKS_DSA 0x0200
# define EVP_PKS_EC 0x0400
-# define EVP_PKT_EXP 0x1000 /* <= 512 bit key */
# define EVP_PKEY_NONE NID_undef
# define EVP_PKEY_RSA NID_rsaEncryption
@@ -424,6 +423,9 @@ struct evp_cipher_st {
# define EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT 0x1b
# define EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE 0x1c
+/* RFC 5246 defines additional data to be 13 bytes in length */
+# define EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN 13
+
typedef struct {
unsigned char *out;
const unsigned char *inp;
@@ -1121,6 +1123,19 @@ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
int (*pkey_ctrl) (EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
long arg1, void *arg2));
+void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
+ int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *a,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey),
+ int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1,
+ X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig));
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED 0
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN (1<<1)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c b/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c
index caabbf4..ba9dfff 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/evp/p_seal.c
@@ -82,8 +82,9 @@ int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
return 1;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0)
return 0;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)
+ && RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) <= 0)
+ return 0;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv))
return 0;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile
index 0e91709..52e39e5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/hmac/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
index 1fc9e2c..51a0a3e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -97,12 +97,18 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
return FIPS_hmac_init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL);
}
#endif
+ /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */
+ if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0))
+ return 0;
if (md != NULL) {
reset = 1;
ctx->md = md;
- } else
+ } else if (ctx->md) {
md = ctx->md;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
if (key != NULL) {
reset = 1;
@@ -117,7 +123,8 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
&ctx->key_length))
goto err;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(len >= 0 && len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
+ if (len < 0 || len > (int)sizeof(ctx->key))
+ return 0;
memcpy(ctx->key, key, len);
ctx->key_length = len;
}
@@ -161,6 +168,9 @@ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine)
return FIPS_hmac_update(ctx, data, len);
#endif
+ if (!ctx->md)
+ return 0;
+
return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
}
@@ -173,6 +183,9 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
return FIPS_hmac_final(ctx, md, len);
#endif
+ if (!ctx->md)
+ goto err;
+
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
goto err;
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx))
@@ -191,6 +204,7 @@ void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
+ ctx->md = NULL;
}
int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
@@ -242,6 +256,7 @@ unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len,
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c);
return md;
err:
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&c);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
index 3d130a0..271d0eb 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static struct test_st {
unsigned char data[64];
int data_len;
unsigned char *digest;
-} test[4] = {
+} test[8] = {
{
"", 0, "More text test vectors to stuff up EBCDIC machines :-)", 54,
(unsigned char *)"e9139d1e6ee064ef8cf514fc7dc83e86",
@@ -113,10 +113,27 @@ static struct test_st {
0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd
}, 50, (unsigned char *)"56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6",
},
+ {
+ "", 0, "My test data", 12,
+ (unsigned char *)"61afdecb95429ef494d61fdee15990cabf0826fc"
+ },
+ {
+ "", 0, "My test data", 12,
+ (unsigned char *)"2274b195d90ce8e03406f4b526a47e0787a88a65479938f1a5baa3ce0f079776"
+ },
+ {
+ "123456", 6, "My test data", 12,
+ (unsigned char *)"bab53058ae861a7f191abe2d0145cbb123776a6369ee3f9d79ce455667e411dd"
+ },
+ {
+ "12345", 5, "My test data again", 12,
+ (unsigned char *)"7dbe8c764c068e3bcd6e6b0fbcd5e6fc197b15bb"
+ }
};
# endif
-static char *pt(unsigned char *md);
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len);
+
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
@@ -124,6 +141,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
char *p;
# endif
int err = 0;
+ HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx2;
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int len;
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
printf("test skipped: MD5 disabled\n");
@@ -139,27 +159,172 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
p = pt(HMAC(EVP_md5(),
test[i].key, test[i].key_len,
- test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL));
+ test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL),
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[i].digest) != 0) {
- printf("error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i);
+ printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i);
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[i].digest);
err++;
} else
printf("test %d ok\n", i);
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_MD5 */
+
+/* test4 */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD and key (test 4)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test5;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test5;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty key (test 4)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test5;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test5;
+ }
+ printf("test 4 ok\n");
+test5:
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
+ printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with invalid key len(test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ printf("Error finalising data (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ p = pt(buf, len);
+ if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) {
+ printf("Error calculating interim HMAC on test 5\n");
+ printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest);
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Should disallow changing MD without a new key (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) {
+ printf("Error updating HMAC with data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ printf("Error finalising data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ p = pt(buf, len);
+ if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[5].digest) != 0) {
+ printf("Error calculating 2nd interim HMAC on test 5\n");
+ printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[5].digest);
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
+ printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC with key (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) {
+ printf("Error updating HMAC with data (new key) (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ printf("Error finalising data (new key) (test 5)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto test6;
+ }
+ p = pt(buf, len);
+ if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[6].digest) != 0) {
+ printf("error calculating HMAC on test 5\n");
+ printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[6].digest);
+ err++;
+ } else {
+ printf("test 5 ok\n");
+ }
+test6:
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 6)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) {
+ printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 6)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&ctx2, &ctx)) {
+ printf("Failed to copy HMAC_CTX (test 6)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx2, buf, &len)) {
+ printf("Error finalising data (test 6)\n");
+ err++;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ p = pt(buf, len);
+ if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[7].digest) != 0) {
+ printf("Error calculating HMAC on test 6\n");
+ printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[7].digest);
+ err++;
+ } else {
+ printf("test 6 ok\n");
+ }
+end:
EXIT(err);
return (0);
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-static char *pt(unsigned char *md)
+static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len)
{
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
static char buf[80];
- for (i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]);
return (buf);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile
index 8af0acd..3dc23e4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/idea/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile
index 110c49c..5193fd9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/jpake/Makefile
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ install:
chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
done;
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile
index 1407739..8b9a01a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/krb5/Makefile
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile
index 82bddac..c7f4365 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/lhash/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile
index 17f878a..b630110 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/md2/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile
index e6f1e44..3ee4361 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/md4/Makefile
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile
index 390e5f1..f5240da 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/md5/Makefile
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile
index 1415531..c2d0c5b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/mdc2/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/mem.c b/openssl/crypto/mem.c
index 2ce3e89..fdad49b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/mem.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/mem.c
@@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char *file, int line)
{
char *ret = CRYPTO_malloc(strlen(str) + 1, file, line);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
strcpy(ret, str);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile
index cbcbfad..a7863d9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/Makefile
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl b/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
index 54a1ac4..0b9cd73 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
@@ -16,12 +16,17 @@
# other assembly modules. Just like aesv8-armx.pl this module
# supports both AArch32 and AArch64 execution modes.
#
+# July 2014
+#
+# Implement 2x aggregated reduction [see ghash-x86.pl for background
+# information].
+#
# Current performance in cycles per processed byte:
#
# PMULL[2] 32-bit NEON(*)
-# Apple A7 1.76 5.62
-# Cortex-A53 1.45 8.39
-# Cortex-A57 2.22 7.61
+# Apple A7 0.92 5.62
+# Cortex-A53 1.01 8.39
+# Cortex-A57 1.17 7.61
#
# (*) presented for reference/comparison purposes;
@@ -37,7 +42,7 @@ $inc="x12";
{
my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("q$_",(0..3));
-my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$H,$Hhl)=map("q$_",(8..14));
+my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hhl,$H2)=map("q$_",(8..14));
$code=<<___;
#include "arm_arch.h"
@@ -47,114 +52,277 @@ ___
$code.=".arch armv8-a+crypto\n" if ($flavour =~ /64/);
$code.=".fpu neon\n.code 32\n" if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+################################################################################
+# void gcm_init_v8(u128 Htable[16],const u64 H[2]);
+#
+# input: 128-bit H - secret parameter E(K,0^128)
+# output: precomputed table filled with degrees of twisted H;
+# H is twisted to handle reverse bitness of GHASH;
+# only few of 16 slots of Htable[16] are used;
+# data is opaque to outside world (which allows to
+# optimize the code independently);
+#
$code.=<<___;
.global gcm_init_v8
.type gcm_init_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_init_v8:
- vld1.64 {$t1},[x1] @ load H
- vmov.i8 $t0,#0xe1
+ vld1.64 {$t1},[x1] @ load input H
+ vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1
+ vshl.i64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 @ 0xc2.0
vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
- vshl.i64 $t0,$t0,#57
- vshr.u64 $t2,$t0,#63
- vext.8 $t0,$t2,$t0,#8 @ t0=0xc2....01
+ vshr.u64 $t2,$xC2,#63
vdup.32 $t1,${t1}[1]
- vshr.u64 $t3,$IN,#63
+ vext.8 $t0,$t2,$xC2,#8 @ t0=0xc2....01
+ vshr.u64 $t2,$IN,#63
vshr.s32 $t1,$t1,#31 @ broadcast carry bit
- vand $t3,$t3,$t0
+ vand $t2,$t2,$t0
vshl.i64 $IN,$IN,#1
- vext.8 $t3,$t3,$t3,#8
+ vext.8 $t2,$t2,$t2,#8
vand $t0,$t0,$t1
- vorr $IN,$IN,$t3 @ H<<<=1
- veor $IN,$IN,$t0 @ twisted H
- vst1.64 {$IN},[x0]
+ vorr $IN,$IN,$t2 @ H<<<=1
+ veor $H,$IN,$t0 @ twisted H
+ vst1.64 {$H},[x0],#16 @ store Htable[0]
+
+ @ calculate H^2
+ vext.8 $t0,$H,$H,#8 @ Karatsuba pre-processing
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$H
+ veor $t0,$t0,$H
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$H
+ vpmull.p64 $Xm,$t0,$t0
+
+ vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
+ veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
+ vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase
+
+ vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+ vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
+ veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
+
+ vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+ veor $t2,$t2,$Xh
+ veor $H2,$Xl,$t2
+
+ vext.8 $t1,$H2,$H2,#8 @ Karatsuba pre-processing
+ veor $t1,$t1,$H2
+ vext.8 $Hhl,$t0,$t1,#8 @ pack Karatsuba pre-processed
+ vst1.64 {$Hhl-$H2},[x0] @ store Htable[1..2]
ret
.size gcm_init_v8,.-gcm_init_v8
-
+___
+################################################################################
+# void gcm_gmult_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16]);
+#
+# input: Xi - current hash value;
+# Htable - table precomputed in gcm_init_v8;
+# output: Xi - next hash value Xi;
+#
+$code.=<<___;
.global gcm_gmult_v8
.type gcm_gmult_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_gmult_v8:
vld1.64 {$t1},[$Xi] @ load Xi
- vmov.i8 $t3,#0xe1
- vld1.64 {$H},[$Htbl] @ load twisted H
- vshl.u64 $t3,$t3,#57
+ vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1
+ vld1.64 {$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl] @ load twisted H, ...
+ vshl.u64 $xC2,$xC2,#57
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
#endif
- vext.8 $Hhl,$H,$H,#8
- mov $len,#0
vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
- mov $inc,#0
- veor $Hhl,$Hhl,$H @ Karatsuba pre-processing
- mov $inp,$Xi
- b .Lgmult_v8
-.size gcm_gmult_v8,.-gcm_gmult_v8
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo�Xi.lo
+ veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi�Xi.hi
+ vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)�(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+
+ vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
+ veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
+ vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction
+
+ vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+ vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
+ veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
+
+ vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+ veor $t2,$t2,$Xh
+ veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2
+
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+ vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+ vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
+ vst1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ write out Xi
+
+ ret
+.size gcm_gmult_v8,.-gcm_gmult_v8
+___
+################################################################################
+# void gcm_ghash_v8(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16],const u8 *inp,size_t len);
+#
+# input: table precomputed in gcm_init_v8;
+# current hash value Xi;
+# pointer to input data;
+# length of input data in bytes, but divisible by block size;
+# output: next hash value Xi;
+#
+$code.=<<___;
.global gcm_ghash_v8
.type gcm_ghash_v8,%function
.align 4
gcm_ghash_v8:
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
+___
+$code.=<<___;
vld1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ load [rotated] Xi
- subs $len,$len,#16
- vmov.i8 $t3,#0xe1
- mov $inc,#16
- vld1.64 {$H},[$Htbl] @ load twisted H
- cclr $inc,eq
- vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
- vshl.u64 $t3,$t3,#57
- vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] inp
- vext.8 $Hhl,$H,$H,#8
+ @ "[rotated]" means that
+ @ loaded value would have
+ @ to be rotated in order to
+ @ make it appear as in
+ @ alorithm specification
+ subs $len,$len,#32 @ see if $len is 32 or larger
+ mov $inc,#16 @ $inc is used as post-
+ @ increment for input pointer;
+ @ as loop is modulo-scheduled
+ @ $inc is zeroed just in time
+ @ to preclude oversteping
+ @ inp[len], which means that
+ @ last block[s] are actually
+ @ loaded twice, but last
+ @ copy is not processed
+ vld1.64 {$H-$Hhl},[$Htbl],#32 @ load twisted H, ..., H^2
+ vmov.i8 $xC2,#0xe1
+ vld1.64 {$H2},[$Htbl]
+ cclr $inc,eq @ is it time to zero $inc?
+ vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ rotate Xi
+ vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],#16 @ load [rotated] I[0]
+ vshl.u64 $xC2,$xC2,#57 @ compose 0xc2.0 constant
#ifndef __ARMEB__
+ vrev64.8 $t0,$t0
vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl
+#endif
+ vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 @ rotate I[0]
+ b.lo .Lodd_tail_v8 @ $len was less than 32
+___
+{ my ($Xln,$Xmn,$Xhn,$In) = map("q$_",(4..7));
+ #######
+ # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+ # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+ # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+ #
+$code.=<<___;
+ vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[1]
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
#endif
- veor $Hhl,$Hhl,$H @ Karatsuba pre-processing
- vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
- b .Loop_v8
+ vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
+ veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ I[i]^=Xi
+ vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H�Ii+1
+ veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In
+ b .Loop_mod2x_v8
.align 4
-.Loop_v8:
+.Loop_mod2x_v8:
+ vext.8 $t2,$IN,$IN,#8
+ subs $len,$len,#32 @ is there more data?
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.lo�Xi.lo
+ cclr $inc,lo @ is it time to zero $inc?
+
+ vpmull.p64 $Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
+ veor $t2,$t2,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hi�Xi.hi
+ veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xln @ accumulate
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)�(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+ vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+2]
+
+ veor $Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
+ cclr $inc,eq @ is it time to zero $inc?
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xmn
+
+ vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
+ veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
+ vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+3]
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+ vrev64.8 $t0,$t0
+#endif
+ veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
+ vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction
+
+#ifndef __ARMEB__
+ vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
+#endif
+ vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
+ vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
+ vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
+ vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8
+ veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
+ vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H�Ii+1
+ veor $IN,$IN,$Xh @ accumulate $IN early
+
+ vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
+ veor $IN,$IN,$t2
+ veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing
+ veor $IN,$IN,$Xl
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In
+ b.hs .Loop_mod2x_v8 @ there was at least 32 more bytes
+
+ veor $Xh,$Xh,$t2
+ vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8 @ re-construct $IN
+ adds $len,$len,#32 @ re-construct $len
+ veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xh @ re-construct $Xl
+ b.eq .Ldone_v8 @ is $len zero?
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.Lodd_tail_v8:
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi
- veor $t1,$t1,$t2 @ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
+ veor $t1,$t0,$t2 @ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
-.Lgmult_v8:
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo�Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi�Xi.hi
- subs $len,$len,#16
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)�(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
- cclr $inc,eq
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t1
- vld1.64 {$t1},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] inp
veor $Xm,$Xm,$t2
- vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$t3 @ 1st phase
+ vpmull.p64 $t2,$Xl,$xC2 @ 1st phase of reduction
vmov $Xh#lo,$Xm#hi @ Xh|Xm - 256-bit result
vmov $Xm#hi,$Xl#lo @ Xm is rotated Xl
-#ifndef __ARMEB__
- vrev64.8 $t1,$t1
-#endif
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
- vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
- vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase
- vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$t3
+ vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$Xl,$xC2
veor $t2,$t2,$Xh
veor $Xl,$Xl,$t2
- b.hs .Loop_v8
+.Ldone_v8:
#ifndef __ARMEB__
vrev64.8 $Xl,$Xl
#endif
vext.8 $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,#8
vst1.64 {$Xl},[$Xi] @ write out Xi
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
+ vldmia sp!,{d8-d15} @ 32-bit ABI says so
+___
+$code.=<<___;
ret
.size gcm_ghash_v8,.-gcm_ghash_v8
___
@@ -222,7 +390,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
s/\b[wx]([0-9]+)\b/r$1/go; # new->old registers
s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers
- s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary
+ s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary
# fix up remainig new-style suffixes
s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;
@@ -234,7 +402,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
s/^(\s+)b\./$1b/o or
s/^(\s+)ret/$1bx\tlr/o;
- print $_,"\n";
+ print $_,"\n";
}
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 24a84a7..e299131 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void gcm_gmult_1bit(u64 Xi[2], const u64 H[2])
defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
# define GHASH_ASM_X86_OR_64
# define GCM_FUNCREF_4BIT
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
void gcm_init_clmul(u128 Htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]);
void gcm_gmult_clmul(u64 Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]);
@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *tag,
ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= ctx->EK0.u[1];
if (tag && len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi))
- return memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len);
+ return CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len);
else
return -1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h b/openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
index 900f54c..fe14ec7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
@@ -38,36 +38,36 @@ typedef unsigned char u8;
#if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
# if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
-# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret=(x); \
+# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_=(x); \
asm ("bswapq %0" \
- : "+r"(ret)); ret; })
-# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret=(x); \
+ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; })
+# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_=(x); \
asm ("bswapl %0" \
- : "+r"(ret)); ret; })
+ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; })
# elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
-# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo=(u64)(x)>>32,hi=(x); \
+# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x); \
asm ("bswapl %0; bswapl %1" \
- : "+r"(hi),"+r"(lo)); \
- (u64)hi<<32|lo; })
-# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret=(x); \
+ : "+r"(hi_),"+r"(lo_)); \
+ (u64)hi_<<32|lo_; })
+# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_=(x); \
asm ("bswapl %0" \
- : "+r"(ret)); ret; })
+ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; })
# elif defined(__aarch64__)
-# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret; \
+# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_; \
asm ("rev %0,%1" \
- : "=r"(ret) : "r"(x)); ret; })
-# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret; \
+ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_; })
+# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_; \
asm ("rev %w0,%w1" \
- : "=r"(ret) : "r"(x)); ret; })
+ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_; })
# elif (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
-# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo=(u64)(x)>>32,hi=(x); \
+# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x); \
asm ("rev %0,%0; rev %1,%1" \
- : "+r"(hi),"+r"(lo)); \
- (u64)hi<<32|lo; })
-# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret; \
+ : "+r"(hi_),"+r"(lo_)); \
+ (u64)hi_<<32|lo_; })
+# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_; \
asm ("rev %0,%1" \
- : "=r"(ret) : "r"((u32)(x))); \
- ret; })
+ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"((u32)(x))); \
+ ret_; })
# endif
# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
# if _MSC_VER>=1300
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile
index a8aedbd..f93d2f9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/Makefile
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: obj_dat.h obj_mac.h obj_xref.h depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c
index c6774f4..2485992 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/o_names.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type,
d.names =
OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof *d.names);
/* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */
- if(d.names) {
+ if (d.names) {
d.n = 0;
OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
index 5cd755d..aca382a 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
@@ -400,6 +400,8 @@ static int obj_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *ap, const unsigned int *bp)
j = (a->length - b->length);
if (j)
return (j);
+ if (a->length == 0)
+ return 0;
return (memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length));
}
@@ -415,6 +417,9 @@ int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
if (a->nid != 0)
return (a->nid);
+ if (a->length == 0)
+ return NID_undef;
+
if (added != NULL) {
ad.type = ADDED_DATA;
ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* XXX: ugly but harmless */
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README
index 4d74550..cb1d216 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.README
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ The basic syntax for adding an object is as follows:
1 2 3 4 : shortName : Long Name
- If the long name doesn't contain spaces, or no short name
- exists, the long name is used as basis for the base name
- in C. Otherwise, the short name is used.
+ If Long Name contains only word characters and hyphen-minus
+ (0x2D) or full stop (0x2E) then Long Name is used as basis
+ for the base name in C. Otherwise, the shortName is used.
The base name (let's call it 'base') will then be used to
create the C macros SN_base, LN_base, NID_base and OBJ_base.
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Then there are some extra commands:
!Alias foo 1 2 3 4
- This juts makes a name foo for an OID. The C macro
+ This just makes a name foo for an OID. The C macro
OBJ_foo will be created as a result.
!Cname foo
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
index d0ed459..389dc34 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/objects/objects.pl
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while (<IN>)
$myoid = &process_oid($myoid);
}
- if ($Cname eq "" && !($myln =~ / /))
+ if ($Cname eq "" && ($myln =~ /^[_A-Za-z][\w.-]*$/ ))
{
$Cname = $myln;
$Cname =~ s/\./_/g;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile
index 60c414c..96a1b15 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/Makefile
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
index 849cb2f..c19648c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
@@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts,
ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
if (val)
memcpy(tmpval, val, len);
- else
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len);
+ else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0)
+ goto err;
if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,
&os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE))
goto err;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index 6c0ccb5..d4a257c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
{
X509 *signer, *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
int i, ret = 0;
ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
@@ -107,10 +108,20 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
}
if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
int init_res;
- if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
- else
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
+ if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
+ untrusted = NULL;
+ } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
+ untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ untrusted = bs->certs;
+ }
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
if (!init_res) {
ret = -1;
OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
@@ -161,6 +172,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
end:
if (chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ if (bs->certs && certs)
+ sk_X509_free(untrusted);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index 4f20b97..7cc19dc 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000201fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000203fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2a-fips 19 Mar 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2c-fips 12 Jun 2015"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2c 12 Jun 2015"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile
index 7691f83..65de60e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pem/Makefile
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
index b98c76c..5747c73 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid,
if (kstr == buf)
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, klen);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+ if (p8 == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (isder)
ret = i2d_PKCS8_bio(bp, p8);
else
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile
index 3a7498f..be5f8c5 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/Makefile
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 256b210..5ab4bf2 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
# include <stdio.h>
# include "cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
# include <openssl/hmac.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
return 0;
}
if ((maclen != (unsigned int)p12->mac->dinfo->digest->length)
- || memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen))
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen))
return 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile
index effe05f..decf5e0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/Makefile
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 31a1b98..c8d7db0 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -445,6 +445,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
switch (i) {
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ /*
+ * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
+ * field and optional content.
+ * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
+ * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
+ */
data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
@@ -456,6 +462,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
@@ -468,6 +475,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
@@ -481,6 +489,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
goto err;
}
+ /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
+ if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* We will be checking the signature */
if (md_sk != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
@@ -623,7 +637,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
etmp = NULL;
}
#if 1
- if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL)) {
+ if (in_bio != NULL) {
bio = in_bio;
} else {
# if 0
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile
index fb36a0c..a59b5a9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/pqueue/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile
index 27694aa..df44369 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
index 02148d5..706ab1e 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (DosQuerySysState) {
char *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(256 * 1024);
- if(!buffer)
+ if (!buffer)
return 0;
if (DosQuerySysState(0x1F, 0, 0, 0, buffer, 256 * 1024) == 0) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile
index 8a9d49a..b3727a4 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rc2/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile
index 76860ae..7434ff7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rc4/Makefile
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile
index 8a8b00e..6ca0037 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rc5/Makefile
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile
index 25140b2..1c3f094 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ripemd/Makefile
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile
index af487b6..e292e84 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/Makefile
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index ddda0dd..2036355 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -254,8 +254,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
return ret;
ret = sltmp;
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
+ }
memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile
index 4bc55e4..70d3d45 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/seed/Makefile
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile
index a8c0cf7..de6cdde 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/Makefile
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl
index deb1238..c04432a 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl
@@ -14,10 +14,14 @@
#
# hardware-assisted software(*)
# Apple A7 2.31 4.13 (+14%)
-# Cortex-A53 2.19 8.73 (+108%)
+# Cortex-A53 2.24 8.03 (+97%)
# Cortex-A57 2.35 7.88 (+74%)
+# Denver 2.13 3.97 (+0%)(**)
+# X-Gene 8.80 (+200%)
#
# (*) Software results are presented mostly for reference purposes.
+# (**) Keep in mind that Denver relies on binary translation, which
+# optimizes compiler output at run-time.
$flavour = shift;
open STDOUT,">".shift;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
index f14c9c3..4fee74d 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+#
+# Permission to use under GPL terms is granted.
# ====================================================================
# SHA256 block procedure for ARMv4. May 2007.
@@ -151,10 +153,24 @@ ___
}
$code=<<___;
-#include "arm_arch.h"
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+# include "arm_arch.h"
+#else
+# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
+# define __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ 7
+#endif
.text
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
.code 32
+#else
+.syntax unified
+# ifdef __thumb2__
+.thumb
+# else
+.code 32
+# endif
+#endif
.type K256,%object
.align 5
@@ -177,7 +193,7 @@ K256:
.word 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
.size K256,.-K256
.word 0 @ terminator
-#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
.LOPENSSL_armcap:
.word OPENSSL_armcap_P-sha256_block_data_order
#endif
@@ -186,9 +202,12 @@ K256:
.global sha256_block_data_order
.type sha256_block_data_order,%function
sha256_block_data_order:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
sub r3,pc,#8 @ sha256_block_data_order
- add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp
-#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+#else
+ adr r3,sha256_block_data_order
+#endif
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
ldr r12,[r3,r12] @ OPENSSL_armcap_P
tst r12,#ARMV8_SHA256
@@ -196,6 +215,7 @@ sha256_block_data_order:
tst r12,#ARMV7_NEON
bne .LNEON
#endif
+ add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp
stmdb sp!,{$ctx,$inp,$len,r4-r11,lr}
ldmia $ctx,{$A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H}
sub $Ktbl,r3,#256+32 @ K256
@@ -213,6 +233,9 @@ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
$code.=".Lrounds_16_xx:\n";
for (;$i<32;$i++) { &BODY_16_XX($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+ ite eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
+#endif
ldreq $t3,[sp,#16*4] @ pull ctx
bne .Lrounds_16_xx
@@ -429,16 +452,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
.arch armv7-a
.fpu neon
+.global sha256_block_data_order_neon
.type sha256_block_data_order_neon,%function
.align 4
sha256_block_data_order_neon:
.LNEON:
stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
+ sub $H,sp,#16*4+16
+ adr $Ktbl,K256
+ bic $H,$H,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores
mov $t2,sp
- sub sp,sp,#16*4+16 @ alloca
- sub $Ktbl,r3,#256+32 @ K256
- bic sp,sp,#15 @ align for 128-bit stores
+ mov sp,$H @ alloca
+ add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp
vld1.8 {@X[0]},[$inp]!
vld1.8 {@X[1]},[$inp]!
@@ -490,11 +516,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
ldr $t0,[sp,#72]
sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#256 @ rewind $Ktbl
teq $inp,$t0
+ it eq
subeq $inp,$inp,#64 @ avoid SEGV
vld1.8 {@X[0]},[$inp]! @ load next input block
vld1.8 {@X[1]},[$inp]!
vld1.8 {@X[2]},[$inp]!
vld1.8 {@X[3]},[$inp]!
+ it ne
strne $inp,[sp,#68]
mov $Xfer,sp
___
@@ -526,10 +554,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
str $D,[$t1],#4
stmia $t1,{$E-$H}
+ ittte ne
movne $Xfer,sp
ldrne $t1,[sp,#0]
eorne $t2,$t2,$t2
ldreq sp,[sp,#76] @ restore original sp
+ itt ne
eorne $t3,$B,$C
bne .L_00_48
@@ -548,13 +578,26 @@ my ($W0,$W1,$ABCD_SAVE,$EFGH_SAVE)=map("q$_",(12..15));
my $Ktbl="r3";
$code.=<<___;
-#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
+
+# ifdef __thumb2__
+# define INST(a,b,c,d) .byte c,d|0xc,a,b
+# else
+# define INST(a,b,c,d) .byte a,b,c,d
+# endif
+
.type sha256_block_data_order_armv8,%function
.align 5
sha256_block_data_order_armv8:
.LARMv8:
vld1.32 {$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx]
- sub $Ktbl,r3,#sha256_block_data_order-K256
+# ifdef __thumb2__
+ adr $Ktbl,.LARMv8
+ sub $Ktbl,$Ktbl,#.LARMv8-K256
+# else
+ adrl $Ktbl,K256
+# endif
+ add $len,$inp,$len,lsl#6 @ len to point at the end of inp
.Loop_v8:
vld1.8 {@MSG[0]- at MSG[1]},[$inp]!
@@ -607,6 +650,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
vadd.i32 $ABCD,$ABCD,$ABCD_SAVE
vadd.i32 $EFGH,$EFGH,$EFGH_SAVE
+ it ne
bne .Loop_v8
vst1.32 {$ABCD,$EFGH},[$ctx]
@@ -619,11 +663,19 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
.asciz "SHA256 block transform for ARMv4/NEON/ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 2
-#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
+#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
#endif
___
+open SELF,$0;
+while(<SELF>) {
+ next if (/^#!/);
+ last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/);
+ print;
+}
+close SELF;
+
{ my %opcode = (
"sha256h" => 0xf3000c40, "sha256h2" => 0xf3100c40,
"sha256su0" => 0xf3ba03c0, "sha256su1" => 0xf3200c40 );
@@ -638,7 +690,7 @@ ___
# since ARMv7 instructions are always encoded little-endian.
# correct solution is to use .inst directive, but older
# assemblers don't implement it:-(
- sprintf ".byte\t0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x\t@ %s %s",
+ sprintf "INST(0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x,0x%02x)\t@ %s %s",
$word&0xff,($word>>8)&0xff,
($word>>16)&0xff,($word>>24)&0xff,
$mnemonic,$arg;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
index bd7a0a5..f7b36b9 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
+++ b/openssl/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@
#
# SHA256-hw SHA256(*) SHA512
# Apple A7 1.97 10.5 (+33%) 6.73 (-1%(**))
-# Cortex-A53 2.38 15.6 (+110%) 10.1 (+190%(***))
+# Cortex-A53 2.38 15.5 (+115%) 10.0 (+150%(***))
# Cortex-A57 2.31 11.6 (+86%) 7.51 (+260%(***))
+# Denver 2.01 10.5 (+26%) 6.70 (+8%)
+# X-Gene 20.0 (+100%) 12.8 (+300%(***))
#
# (*) Software SHA256 results are of lesser relevance, presented
# mostly for informational purposes.
@@ -25,7 +27,7 @@
# (***) Super-impressive coefficients over gcc-generated code are
# indication of some compiler "pathology", most notably code
# generated with -mgeneral-regs-only is significanty faster
-# and lags behind assembly only by 50-90%.
+# and the gap is only 40-90%.
$flavour=shift;
$output=shift;
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile
index ddf6748..414af7b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/srp/Makefile
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ srptest: top srptest.c $(LIB)
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 701b5cd..50f75d7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -497,7 +497,8 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
goto err;
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ goto err;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key));
@@ -549,7 +550,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
}
if (*salt == NULL) {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
} else {
@@ -609,7 +611,8 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
srp_bn_print(g);
if (*salt == NULL) {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto err;
*salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile
index 5327692..b069c93 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/stack/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile
index 0dcfd78..5bc7ca7 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/store/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
index 28884c2..cc8cf25 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
int i;
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE));
- if(!lock_cs) {
+ if (!lock_cs) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
return;
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
# else
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(rwlock_t));
# endif
- if(!lock_cs) {
+ if (!lock_cs) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
return;
}
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
char filename[20];
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *));
- if(!lock_cs) {
+ if (!lock_cs) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
return;
}
@@ -328,11 +328,11 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t));
lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
- if(!lock_cs || !lock_count) {
+ if (!lock_cs || !lock_count) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
- if(lock_cs)
+ if (lock_cs)
OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
- if(lock_count)
+ if (lock_count)
OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
return;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile
index c182345..cf991ef 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ts/Makefile
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tags:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile
index e6f3033..4f70b19 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/txt_db/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile
index a685659..b28fcca 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/ui/Makefile
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile
index f4d46e4..befd6d6 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/Makefile
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile
index cfbb59c..01aa3bf 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/Makefile
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index ff1fa97..b0d6539 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
static void cleanup(X509_OBJECT *a)
{
+ if (!a)
+ return;
if (a->type == X509_LU_X509) {
X509_free(a->data.x509);
} else if (a->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 1196a2a..8ce41f9 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -187,11 +187,11 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL;
+ X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth, i, ok = 0;
- int num;
+ int num, j, retry;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
@@ -276,91 +276,128 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
break;
}
+ /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
+ j = num;
/*
* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
* We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
* complain.
*/
- /*
- * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
- */
-
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
- if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
- /* we have a self signed certificate */
- if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
- /*
- * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find
- * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible
- * impersonation.
- */
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
- if (ok == 1)
- X509_free(xtmp);
- bad_chain = 1;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ do {
+ /*
+ * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+ */
+ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+ if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
+ /* we have a self signed certificate */
+ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
+ * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
+ * possible impersonation.
+ */
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+ if (ok == 1)
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ bad_chain = 1;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We have a match: replace certificate with store
+ * version so we get any trust settings.
+ */
+ X509_free(x);
+ x = xtmp;
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ }
} else {
/*
- * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so
- * we get any trust settings.
+ * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
*/
- X509_free(x);
- x = xtmp;
- (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
- ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ num--;
+ j--;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
}
- } else {
- /*
- * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
- */
- chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
- ctx->last_untrusted--;
- num--;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
}
- }
-
- /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
- for (;;) {
- /* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num)
- break;
+ /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If we have enough, we break */
+ if (depth < num)
+ break;
+ /* If we are self signed, we break */
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
+ break;
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- /* If we are self signed, we break */
- if (cert_self_signed(x))
- break;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ return ok;
+ if (ok == 0)
+ break;
+ x = xtmp;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ num++;
+ }
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+ i = check_trust(ctx);
- if (ok < 0)
- return ok;
- if (ok == 0)
- break;
+ /* If explicitly rejected error */
+ if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ goto end;
+ /*
+ * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
+ * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
+ * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
+ * chain checking
+ */
+ retry = 0;
+ if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
+ && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+ while (j-- > 1) {
+ xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+ /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+ */
+ X509_free(xtmp);
- x = xtmp;
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+ * alternate chain
+ */
+ while (num > j) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ num--;
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ }
+ retry = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
- num++;
- }
+ } while (retry);
- /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
-
- i = check_trust(ctx);
-
- /* If explicitly rejected error */
- if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- goto end;
/*
* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
* self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
@@ -1751,47 +1788,84 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, remaining;
p = buff1;
- i = ctm->length;
+ remaining = ctm->length;
str = (char *)ctm->data;
+ /*
+ * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+ * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ */
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
return 0;
memcpy(p, str, 10);
p += 10;
str += 10;
+ remaining -= 10;
} else {
- if (i < 13)
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
return 0;
memcpy(p, str, 12);
p += 12;
str += 12;
+ remaining -= 12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
*(p++) = '0';
*(p++) = '0';
} else {
+ /* SS (seconds) */
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ return 0;
*(p++) = *(str++);
*(p++) = *(str++);
- /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
- if (*str == '.') {
+ remaining -= 2;
+ /*
+ * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+ * Can we just kill them altogether?
+ */
+ if (remaining && *str == '.') {
str++;
- while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
- str++;
+ remaining--;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+ break;
+ }
}
}
*(p++) = 'Z';
*(p++) = '\0';
- if (*str == 'Z')
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+ if (!remaining)
+ return 0;
+ if (*str == 'Z') {
+ if (remaining != 1)
+ return 0;
offset = 0;
- else {
+ } else {
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+ if (remaining != 5)
+ return 0;
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+ return 0;
offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
if (*str == '-')
@@ -2169,6 +2243,8 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
index a6f0df5..bd8613c 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
@@ -432,6 +432,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
/* Allow partial chains if at least one certificate is in trusted store */
# define X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0x80000
+/*
+ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
+ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.2b. Setting this flag
+ * will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
+ */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS 0x100000
# define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1
# define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index 3222394..1ea0c69 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -172,16 +172,17 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *paramid;
- param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
+
+ param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *param);
if (!param)
return NULL;
- paramid = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
+ paramid = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *paramid);
if (!paramid) {
OPENSSL_free(param);
return NULL;
}
- memset(param, 0, sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM));
- memset(paramid, 0, sizeof(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID));
+ memset(param, 0, sizeof *param);
+ memset(paramid, 0, sizeof *paramid);
param->id = paramid;
x509_verify_param_zero(param);
return param;
@@ -189,6 +190,8 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
+ if (param == NULL)
+ return;
x509_verify_param_zero(param);
OPENSSL_free(param->id);
OPENSSL_free(param);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c
index 0331752..9219f75 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509type.c
@@ -121,9 +121,6 @@ int X509_certificate_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
}
}
- /* /8 because it's 1024 bits we look for, not bytes */
- if (EVP_PKEY_size(pk) <= 1024 / 8)
- ret |= EVP_PKT_EXP;
if (pkey == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
return (ret);
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile
index cdbfd52..9791b77 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/Makefile
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+update: depend
+
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
@@ -535,26 +537,18 @@ v3_purp.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
v3_purp.o: ../cryptlib.h v3_purp.c
v3_scts.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/comp.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/hmac.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/kssl.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/srtp.h ../../include/openssl/ssl.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/tls1.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h ../../ssl/ssl_locl.h ../cryptlib.h
-v3_scts.o: v3_scts.c
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+v3_scts.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+v3_scts.o: ../cryptlib.h v3_scts.c
v3_skey.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
v3_skey.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
v3_skey.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
index 807867b..22ec202 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -584,24 +584,26 @@ static int do_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx)
static int do_dirname(GENERAL_NAME *gen, char *value, X509V3_CTX *ctx)
{
- int ret;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk;
- X509_NAME *nm;
+ int ret = 0;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
if (!(nm = X509_NAME_new()))
- return 0;
+ goto err;
sk = X509V3_get_section(ctx, value);
if (!sk) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_DO_DIRNAME, X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "section=", value);
- X509_NAME_free(nm);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
/* FIXME: should allow other character types... */
ret = X509V3_NAME_from_section(nm, sk, MBSTRING_ASC);
if (!ret)
- X509_NAME_free(nm);
+ goto err;
gen->d.dirn = nm;
- X509V3_section_free(ctx, sk);
+err:
+ if (ret == 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(nm);
+ X509V3_section_free(ctx, sk);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
index dca6ab2..0febc1b 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -230,11 +230,11 @@ static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
goto merr;
if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
goto merr;
- if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
+ if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if(!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
+ if (!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
goto merr;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value,
strlen(cnf->value)))
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
goto merr;
- if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
+ if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) {
cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i);
if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) {
- if(!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
+ if (!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
goto merr;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value,
strlen(cnf->value)))
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
index 9a4c3eb..6e0b8d6 100755
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
@@ -60,7 +60,16 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */
+#define TLSEXT_hash_sha256 4
+
+#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1
+#define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa 3
+
+
+#define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \
+ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2)
#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN64)) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
# define SCT_TIMESTAMP unsigned __int64
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
index ed6099e..bdd7b95 100644
--- a/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+++ b/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -285,6 +285,10 @@ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line)
int state;
/* We are going to modify the line so copy it first */
linebuf = BUF_strdup(line);
+ if (linebuf == NULL) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
state = HDR_NAME;
ntmp = NULL;
/* Go through all characters */
@@ -807,7 +811,7 @@ static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len,
*/
if (p[i] == '*') {
int atstart = (state & LABEL_START);
- int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + i] == '.');
+ int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + 1] == '.');
/*-
* At most one wildcard per pattern.
* No wildcards in IDNA labels.
diff --git a/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c b/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c
index acc688a..5682e91 100644
--- a/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c
+++ b/openssl/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c
@@ -761,7 +761,8 @@ SSL_CTX *tls_create_ctx(struct tls_create_ctx_args a, void *apparg)
if (tls_dhe1024 == NULL) {
int i;
- RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i);
+ if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i) <= 0)
+ goto err_return;
/*
* make sure that i is non-negative -- pick one of the provided
* seeds
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
index e9280bc..1c26e3b 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
@@ -365,10 +365,8 @@ e.g. DES-CBC3-SHA. In these cases, RSA authentication is used.
SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
- SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
- SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod
index 76dbf2c..4eaedbc 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
[B<-print>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-md digest>]
[B<-[cipher]>]
[B<-nointern>]
@@ -419,7 +420,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
address matches that specified in the From: address.
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
@@ -655,4 +656,6 @@ Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> was first added
to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
+
=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
index d5cce54..e125915 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod
@@ -277,6 +277,59 @@ priority and B</tmp> used if neither is defined:
# The above value is used if TEMP isn't in the environment
tmpfile=${ENV::TEMP}/tmp.filename
+Simple OpenSSL library configuration example to enter FIPS mode:
+
+ # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any)
+ # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al.
+ openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section
+
+ [openssl_conf_section]
+ # Configuration module list
+ alg_section = evp_sect
+
+ [evp_sect]
+ # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode if supported
+ fips_mode = yes
+
+Note: in the above example you will get an error in non FIPS capable versions
+of OpenSSL.
+
+More complex OpenSSL library configuration. Add OID and don't enter FIPS mode:
+
+ # Default appname: should match "appname" parameter (if any)
+ # supplied to CONF_modules_load_file et al.
+ openssl_conf = openssl_conf_section
+
+ [openssl_conf_section]
+ # Configuration module list
+ alg_section = evp_sect
+ oid_section = new_oids
+
+ [evp_sect]
+ # This will have no effect as FIPS mode is off by default.
+ # Set to "yes" to enter FIPS mode, if supported
+ fips_mode = no
+
+ [new_oids]
+ # New OID, just short name
+ newoid1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+ # New OID shortname and long name
+ newoid2 = New OID 2 long name, 1.2.3.4.2
+
+The above examples can be used with with any application supporting library
+configuration if "openssl_conf" is modified to match the appropriate "appname".
+
+For example if the second sample file above is saved to "example.cnf" then
+the command line:
+
+ OPENSSL_CONF=example.cnf openssl asn1parse -genstr OID:1.2.3.4.1
+
+will output:
+
+ 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 4 prim: OBJECT :newoid1
+
+showing that the OID "newoid1" has been added as "1.2.3.4.1".
+
=head1 BUGS
Currently there is no way to include characters using the octal B<\nnn>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
index 6e27cf5..1cd4c76 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ check if the parameters are valid primes and generator.
=item B<-2>, B<-5>
-The generator to use, either 2 or 5. 2 is the default. If present then the
-input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead.
+The generator to use, either 2 or 5. If present then the
+input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If not
+present but B<numbits> is present, parameters are generated with the
+default generator 2.
=item B<-rand> I<file(s)>
@@ -85,9 +87,10 @@ all others.
=item I<numbits>
this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size
-I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If not present then a value of 512
-is used. If this option is present then the input file is ignored and
-parameters are generated instead.
+I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If this option is present then
+the input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If
+this option is not present but a generator (B<-2> or B<-5>) is
+present, parameters are generated with a default length of 2048 bits.
=item B<-noout>
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
index 2372b37..4639502 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
[B<-path>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]]
[B<-VAfile file>]
[B<-validity_period n>]
[B<-status_age n>]
@@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ connection timeout to the OCSP responder in seconds
file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
the signature on the OCSP response.
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=item B<-verify_other file>
file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate
@@ -379,3 +384,9 @@ second file.
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem
-reqin req.der -respout resp.der
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index aad59b1..84d0527 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-pass arg>]
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-reconnect>]
[B<-pause>]
[B<-showcerts>]
@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ also used when building the client certificate chain.
A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
@@ -361,4 +362,8 @@ information whenever a session is renegotiated.
L<sess_id(1)|sess_id(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)>
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
+
=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
index b37f410..baca779 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
[B<-state>]
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-nocert>]
[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
[B<-serverpref>]
@@ -174,6 +175,10 @@ and to use when attempting to build the server certificate chain. The list
is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
a certificate is requested.
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=item B<-state>
prints out the SSL session states.
@@ -406,4 +411,8 @@ unknown cipher suites a client says it supports.
L<sess_id(1)|sess_id(1)>, L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)>
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
+
=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod
index d39a59a..d5618c8 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
[B<-pk7out>]
[B<-[cipher]>]
[B<-in file>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-certfile file>]
[B<-signer file>]
[B<-recip file>]
@@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
address matches that specified in the From: address.
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
@@ -441,5 +442,6 @@ structures may cause parsing errors.
The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first
added in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod b/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod
index df01534..df1b86d 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
[B<-extended_crl>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-untrusted file>]
[B<-help>]
[B<-issuer_checks>]
@@ -124,6 +125,14 @@ Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not
+trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can
+be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that
+only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the
+behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions.
+
=item B<-policy_print>
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
@@ -425,4 +434,8 @@ B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes.
L<x509(1)|x509(1)>
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b.
+
=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
index d6b975c..bd6bc86 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0,
it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of
the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random
numbers will always have 2*B<bits> length. If B<bottom> is true, the
-number will be odd.
+number will be odd. The value of B<bits> must be zero or greater. If B<bits> is
+1 then B<top> cannot also be 1.
BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by
this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod
index b7c47b9..a32cca2 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ BN_mask_bits() truncates B<a> to an B<n> bit number
shorter than B<n> bits.
BN_lshift() shifts B<a> left by B<n> bits and places the result in
-B<r> (C<r=a*2^n>). BN_lshift1() shifts B<a> left by one and places
-the result in B<r> (C<r=2*a>).
+B<r> (C<r=a*2^n>). Note that B<n> must be non-negative. BN_lshift1() shifts
+B<a> left by one and places the result in B<r> (C<r=2*a>).
BN_rshift() shifts B<a> right by B<n> bits and places the result in
-B<r> (C<r=a/2^n>). BN_rshift1() shifts B<a> right by one and places
-the result in B<r> (C<r=a/2>).
+B<r> (C<r=a/2^n>). Note that B<n> must be non-negative. BN_rshift1() shifts
+B<a> right by one and places the result in B<r> (C<r=a/2>).
For the shift functions, B<r> and B<a> may be the same variable.
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
index 5d60595..a9b6bb0 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ If the total key and IV length is less than the digest length and
B<MD5> is used then the derivation algorithm is compatible with PKCS#5 v1.5
otherwise a non standard extension is used to derive the extra data.
-Newer applications should use more standard algorithms such as PBKDF2 as
-defined in PKCS#5v2.1 for key derivation.
+Newer applications should use a more modern algorithm such as PBKDF2 as
+defined in PKCS#5v2.1 and provided by PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.
=head1 KEY DERIVATION ALGORITHM
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index 347d48d..44792f9 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -197,6 +197,12 @@ verification. If this flag is set then additional status codes will be sent
to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
without assuming they are hard errors.
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
+chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
+chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
+alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
+will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.2b.
+
=head1 NOTES
The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
@@ -233,6 +239,6 @@ L<X509_check_ip(3)|X509_check_ip(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-TBA
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2b
=cut
diff --git a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
index 21e9fe3..763eb6f 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/crypto/pem.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,29 @@
=head1 NAME
-PEM, PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_read_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_write_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_read_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_write_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_wri [...]
+PEM, PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey, PEM_read_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey,
+PEM_write_PrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid, PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid,
+PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_read_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY, PEM_write_PUBKEY,
+PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_RSAPublicKey, PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey,
+PEM_write_RSAPublicKey, PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY,
+PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey, PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey,
+PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY,
+PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY, PEM_read_bio_DSAparams, PEM_read_DSAparams,
+PEM_write_bio_DSAparams, PEM_write_DSAparams, PEM_read_bio_DHparams,
+PEM_read_DHparams, PEM_write_bio_DHparams, PEM_write_DHparams,
+PEM_read_bio_X509, PEM_read_X509, PEM_write_bio_X509, PEM_write_X509,
+PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX, PEM_read_X509_AUX, PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX,
+PEM_write_X509_AUX, PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_read_X509_REQ,
+PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ, PEM_write_X509_REQ, PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW,
+PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW, PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_read_X509_CRL,
+PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL, PEM_write_X509_CRL, PEM_read_bio_PKCS7, PEM_read_PKCS7,
+PEM_write_bio_PKCS7, PEM_write_PKCS7, PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE,
+PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE - PEM routines
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -239,7 +261,8 @@ SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public
key is not DSA.
The B<DSAparams> functions process DSA parameters using a DSA
-structure. The parameters are encoded using a foobar structure.
+structure. The parameters are encoded using a Dss-Parms structure
+as defined in RFC2459.
The B<DHparams> functions process DH parameters using a DH
structure. The parameters are encoded using a PKCS#3 DHparameter
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
index f4d191c..2bb4403 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
=head1 NAME
-SSL_COMP_add_compression_method - handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods
+SSL_COMP_add_compression_method, SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods - handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ SSL_COMP_add_compression_method - handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods
int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm);
+ +void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void);
+
=head1 DESCRIPTION
SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() adds the compression method B<cm> with
@@ -17,6 +19,10 @@ the identifier B<id> to the list of available compression methods. This
list is globally maintained for all SSL operations within this application.
It cannot be set for specific SSL_CTX or SSL objects.
+SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() frees the internal table of
+compression methods that were built internally, and possibly
+augmented by adding SSL_COMP_add_compression_method().
+
=head1 NOTES
The TLS standard (or SSLv3) allows the integration of compression methods
@@ -38,8 +44,8 @@ its own compression methods and will unconditionally activate compression
when a matching identifier is found. There is no way to restrict the list
of compression methods supported on a per connection basis.
-The OpenSSL library has the compression methods B<COMP_rle()> and (when
-especially enabled during compilation) B<COMP_zlib()> available.
+If enabled during compilation, the OpenSSL library will have the
+COMP_zlib() compression method available.
=head1 WARNINGS
diff --git a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
index 7a27eef..b754c16 100644
--- a/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+++ b/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ negotiation is being saved.
If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
-this option.
+secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
+attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
+computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
+application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
+The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
@@ -74,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during
the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
-is mandatory.
+openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
+guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current
+Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
-recommended.
+L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
+parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
+attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
+and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
+applications.
An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
-key lengths.
+can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
+Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
+parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
+cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
+B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
+parameters in the callback.
=head1 EXAMPLES
-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
+Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
partly left out.)
- ...
- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
- FILE *paramfile;
+ Command-line parameter generation:
+ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
+
+ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
...
- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
+ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
+ ...
+
+ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
+ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
+ FILE *paramfile;
+ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
if (paramfile) {
- dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fclose(paramfile);
+ } else {
+ /* Error. */
}
- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
- if (paramfile) {
- dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- fclose(paramfile);
+ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
+ /* Error. */
}
- ...
-
- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
-
- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
- {
- DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
-
- switch (keylength) {
- case 512:
- if (!dh_512)
- dh_512 = get_dh512();
- dh_tmp = dh_512;
- break;
- case 1024:
- if (!dh_1024)
- dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
- dh_tmp = dh_1024;
- break;
- default:
- /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
- setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
- }
- return(dh_tmp);
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
+ /* Error. */
}
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ ...
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/openssl/e_os2.h b/openssl/e_os2.h
index 613607f..7be9989 100644
--- a/openssl/e_os2.h
+++ b/openssl/e_os2.h
@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ extern "C" {
# undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
# define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
# endif
+# if defined(_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN64)
+# undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64)
+# define OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64
+# endif
+# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINNT)
# undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
# define OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT
@@ -121,7 +127,7 @@ extern "C" {
# endif
/* Anything that tries to look like Microsoft is "Windows" */
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINNT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
# undef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
# define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS
diff --git a/openssl/engines/Makefile b/openssl/engines/Makefile
index da6c875..2058ff4 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/engines/Makefile
@@ -146,12 +146,15 @@ lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
@target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
-depend:
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
- fi
- @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
+update: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile b/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile
index 2f36580..17e1efb 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/Makefile
@@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ links:
tests:
-depend:
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
- else \
- $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC); \
- fi
+update: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
files:
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
@@ -261,8 +262,9 @@ gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
-gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
gost_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c
index 3201b64..80ef58f 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* e_gost_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA GOST_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_CTRL), "GOST_IMIT_CTRL"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL), "GOST_IMIT_FINAL"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_UPDATE), "GOST_IMIT_UPDATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN), "GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01), "PARAM_COPY_GOST01"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST94), "PARAM_COPY_GOST94"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT), "PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT"},
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h
index 92be558..a2018ec 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/e_gost_err.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void ERR_GOST_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
# define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_CTRL 114
# define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL 140
# define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_UPDATE 115
+# define GOST_F_GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN 142
# define GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01 116
# define GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST94 117
# define GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_DECRYPT 118
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c
index 2b96694..9536295 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost2001.c
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid)
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
int ok = 0;
+ if(!ctx) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -48,6 +53,10 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid)
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if(!p || !a || !b || !x || !y || !q) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
while (params->nid != NID_undef && params->nid != nid)
params++;
if (params->nid == NID_undef) {
@@ -55,18 +64,33 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid)
GOST_R_UNSUPPORTED_PARAMETER_SET);
goto err;
}
- BN_hex2bn(&p, params->p);
- BN_hex2bn(&a, params->a);
- BN_hex2bn(&b, params->b);
+ if(!BN_hex2bn(&p, params->p)
+ || !BN_hex2bn(&a, params->a)
+ || !BN_hex2bn(&b, params->b)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
grp = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx);
+ if(!grp) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
P = EC_POINT_new(grp);
+ if(!P) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- BN_hex2bn(&x, params->x);
- BN_hex2bn(&y, params->y);
- EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(grp, P, x, y, ctx);
- BN_hex2bn(&q, params->q);
+ if(!BN_hex2bn(&x, params->x)
+ || !BN_hex2bn(&y, params->y)
+ || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(grp, P, x, y, ctx)
+ || !BN_hex2bn(&q, params->q)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_KEYS
fprintf(stderr, "Set params index %d oid %s\nq=",
(params - R3410_2001_paramset), OBJ_nid2sn(params->nid));
@@ -74,16 +98,23 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid)
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
- EC_GROUP_set_generator(grp, P, q, NULL);
+ if(!EC_GROUP_set_generator(grp, P, q, NULL)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(grp, params->nid);
-
- EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, grp);
+ if(!EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, grp)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_FILL_GOST2001_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
ok = 1;
err:
- EC_POINT_free(P);
- EC_GROUP_free(grp);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (P) EC_POINT_free(P);
+ if (grp) EC_GROUP_free(grp);
+ if (ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
return ok;
}
@@ -94,7 +125,7 @@ int fill_GOST2001_params(EC_KEY *eckey, int nid)
*/
DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
- DSA_SIG *newsig = NULL;
+ DSA_SIG *newsig = NULL, *ret = NULL;
BIGNUM *md = hashsum2bn(dgst);
BIGNUM *order = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
@@ -103,6 +134,10 @@ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey)
NULL, *e = NULL;
EC_POINT *C = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if(!ctx || !md) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
OPENSSL_assert(dlen == 32);
newsig = DSA_SIG_new();
@@ -111,11 +146,25 @@ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey)
goto err;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+ if(!group) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx);
+ if(!order || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
+ if(!priv_key) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx);
+ if(!e || !BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_SIGN
fprintf(stderr, "digest as bignum=");
BN_print_fp(stderr, md);
@@ -128,55 +177,80 @@ DSA_SIG *gost2001_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, EC_KEY *eckey)
}
k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
C = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if(!k || !C) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
do {
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN,
GOST_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATOR_FAILED);
- DSA_SIG_free(newsig);
- newsig = NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, C, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- DSA_SIG_free(newsig);
- newsig = NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!X)
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!r)
+ r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!X || !r) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, C, X, NULL, ctx)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- DSA_SIG_free(newsig);
- newsig = NULL;
goto err;
}
- if (!r)
- r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx);
+
+ if(!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
while (BN_is_zero(r));
/* s = (r*priv_key+k*e) mod order */
if (!tmp)
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, r, order, ctx);
if (!tmp2)
tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- BN_mod_mul(tmp2, k, e, order, ctx);
if (!s)
s = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- BN_mod_add(s, tmp, tmp2, order, ctx);
+ if (!tmp || !tmp2 || !s) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if(!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, r, order, ctx)
+ || !BN_mod_mul(tmp2, k, e, order, ctx)
+ || !BN_mod_add(s, tmp, tmp2, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
while (BN_is_zero(s));
newsig->s = BN_dup(s);
newsig->r = BN_dup(r);
+ if(!newsig->s || !newsig->r) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = newsig;
err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(C);
- BN_free(md);
- return newsig;
+ if(ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (C) EC_POINT_free(C);
+ if (md) BN_free(md);
+ if (!ret && newsig) {
+ DSA_SIG_free(newsig);
+ }
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -196,6 +270,11 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
int ok = 0;
+ if(!ctx || !group) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -205,9 +284,17 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
R = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if(!order || !e || !z1 || !z2 || !tmp || !X || !R || !v) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx);
pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
+ if(!pub_key || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_zero(sig->r) ||
(BN_cmp(sig->s, order) >= 1) || (BN_cmp(sig->r, order) >= 1)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY,
@@ -217,19 +304,28 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
}
md = hashsum2bn(dgst);
- BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx);
+ if(!md || !BN_mod(e, md, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_SIGN
fprintf(stderr, "digest as bignum: ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, md);
fprintf(stderr, "\ndigest mod q: ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, e);
#endif
- if (BN_is_zero(e))
- BN_one(e);
+ if (BN_is_zero(e) && !BN_one(e)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
v = BN_mod_inverse(v, e, order, ctx);
- BN_mod_mul(z1, sig->s, v, order, ctx);
- BN_sub(tmp, order, sig->r);
- BN_mod_mul(z2, tmp, v, order, ctx);
+ if(!v
+ || !BN_mod_mul(z1, sig->s, v, order, ctx)
+ || !BN_sub(tmp, order, sig->r)
+ || !BN_mod_mul(z2, tmp, v, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_SIGN
fprintf(stderr, "\nInverted digest value: ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, v);
@@ -239,6 +335,10 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
BN_print_fp(stderr, z2);
#endif
C = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if (!C) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, C, z1, pub_key, z2, ctx)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -247,7 +347,10 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- BN_mod(R, X, order, ctx);
+ if(!BN_mod(R, X, order, ctx)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef DEBUG_SIGN
fprintf(stderr, "\nX=");
BN_print_fp(stderr, X);
@@ -261,10 +364,12 @@ int gost2001_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
ok = 1;
}
err:
- EC_POINT_free(C);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_free(md);
+ if (C) EC_POINT_free(C);
+ if (ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (md) BN_free(md);
return ok;
}
@@ -287,6 +392,10 @@ int gost2001_compute_public(EC_KEY *ec)
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if(!ctx) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (!(priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec))) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
@@ -294,6 +403,10 @@ int gost2001_compute_public(EC_KEY *ec)
}
pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if(!pub_key) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -304,9 +417,11 @@ int gost2001_compute_public(EC_KEY *ec)
}
ok = 256;
err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (pub_key) EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+ if (ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
return ok;
}
@@ -320,7 +435,13 @@ int gost2001_keygen(EC_KEY *ec)
{
BIGNUM *order = BN_new(), *d = BN_new();
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
- EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL);
+
+ if(!group || !EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(order);
+ return 0;
+ }
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(d, order)) {
@@ -332,7 +453,13 @@ int gost2001_keygen(EC_KEY *ec)
}
}
while (BN_is_zero(d));
- EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec, d);
+
+ if(!EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec, d)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST2001_KEYGEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(order);
+ return 0;
+ }
BN_free(d);
BN_free(order);
return gost2001_compute_public(ec);
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c
index 85f4bc8..ce57f17 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx);
gost_ctx cctx;
int key_is_ephemeral = 1;
+ int tmp_outlen;
EVP_PKEY *mykey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(ctx);
/* Do not use vizir cipher parameters with cryptopro */
@@ -174,12 +175,13 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
}
ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(param->nid);
- *outlen = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt, out ? &out : NULL);
- if (*outlen <= 0) {
+ tmp_outlen = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt, out ? &out : NULL);
+ if (tmp_outlen <= 0) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST94CP_ENCRYPT,
GOST_R_ERROR_PACKING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO);
goto err;
}
+ *outlen = tmp_outlen;
if (!key_is_ephemeral) {
/* Set control "public key from client certificate used" */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 3, NULL) <=
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c
index 713a0fa..b7c5354 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c
@@ -115,7 +115,10 @@ static int decode_gost_algor_params(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_ALGOR *palg)
}
param_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(gkp->key_params);
GOST_KEY_PARAMS_free(gkp);
- EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, pkey_nid);
+ if(!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, pkey_nid)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_DECODE_GOST_ALGOR_PARAMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
switch (pkey_nid) {
case NID_id_GostR3410_94:
{
@@ -552,9 +555,19 @@ static int param_copy_gost01(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
}
if (!eto) {
eto = EC_KEY_new();
- EVP_PKEY_assign(to, EVP_PKEY_base_id(from), eto);
+ if(!eto) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(!EVP_PKEY_assign(to, EVP_PKEY_base_id(from), eto)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if(!EC_KEY_set_group(eto, EC_KEY_get0_group(efrom))) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- EC_KEY_set_group(eto, EC_KEY_get0_group(efrom));
if (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eto)) {
gost2001_compute_public(eto);
}
@@ -729,8 +742,21 @@ static int pub_encode_gost01(X509_PUBKEY *pub, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
}
X = BN_new();
Y = BN_new();
- EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec),
- pub_key, X, Y, NULL);
+ if(!X || !Y) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_ENCODE_GOST01, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if(X) BN_free(X);
+ if(Y) BN_free(Y);
+ BN_free(order);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec),
+ pub_key, X, Y, NULL)) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_ENCODE_GOST01, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ BN_free(X);
+ BN_free(Y);
+ BN_free(order);
+ return 0;
+ }
data_len = 2 * BN_num_bytes(order);
BN_free(order);
databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c
index a2c7cf2..4a79a85 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_mac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
long keylen;
int ret;
unsigned char *keybuf = string_to_hex(value, &keylen);
- if (keylen != 32) {
+ if (!keybuf || keylen != 32) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL_STR,
GOST_R_INVALID_MAC_KEY_LENGTH);
OPENSSL_free(keybuf);
diff --git a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c
index 0116e47..07ad921 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "gost_params.h"
#include "gost_lcl.h"
@@ -52,11 +53,16 @@ void dump_dsa_sig(const char *message, DSA_SIG *sig)
DSA_SIG *gost_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *k = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL;
- DSA_SIG *newsig = DSA_SIG_new();
+ DSA_SIG *newsig = NULL, *ret = NULL;
BIGNUM *md = hashsum2bn(dgst);
/* check if H(M) mod q is zero */
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if(!ctx) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ newsig = DSA_SIG_new();
if (!newsig) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, GOST_R_NO_MEMORY);
goto err;
@@ -64,6 +70,10 @@ DSA_SIG *gost_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if(!tmp || !k || !tmp2) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_mod(tmp, md, dsa->q, ctx);
if (BN_is_zero(tmp)) {
BN_one(md);
@@ -76,24 +86,41 @@ DSA_SIG *gost_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
BN_rand_range(k, dsa->q);
/* generate r = (a^x mod p) mod q */
BN_mod_exp(tmp, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx);
- if (!(newsig->r))
+ if (!(newsig->r)) {
newsig->r = BN_new();
+ if(!newsig->r) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
BN_mod(newsig->r, tmp, dsa->q, ctx);
}
while (BN_is_zero(newsig->r));
/* generate s = (xr + k(Hm)) mod q */
BN_mod_mul(tmp, dsa->priv_key, newsig->r, dsa->q, ctx);
BN_mod_mul(tmp2, k, md, dsa->q, ctx);
- if (!newsig->s)
+ if (!newsig->s) {
newsig->s = BN_new();
+ if(!newsig->s) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
BN_mod_add(newsig->s, tmp, tmp2, dsa->q, ctx);
}
while (BN_is_zero(newsig->s));
+
+ ret = newsig;
err:
BN_free(md);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return newsig;
+ if(ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if(!ret && newsig) {
+ DSA_SIG_free(newsig);
+ }
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -135,17 +162,21 @@ int pack_sign_cp(DSA_SIG *s, int order, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen)
int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
{
- BIGNUM *md, *tmp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *md = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
BIGNUM *q2 = NULL;
BIGNUM *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *z1 = NULL, *z2 = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp2 = NULL, *tmp3 = NULL;
- int ok;
+ int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if(!ctx) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (BN_cmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 1 || BN_cmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 1) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, GOST_R_SIGNATURE_PARTS_GREATER_THAN_Q);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
md = hashsum2bn(dgst);
@@ -157,6 +188,10 @@ int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if(!tmp || !v || !q2 || !z1 || !z2 || !tmp2 || !tmp3 || !u) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
BN_mod(tmp, md, dsa->q, ctx);
if (BN_is_zero(tmp)) {
@@ -172,15 +207,18 @@ int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
BN_mod_exp(tmp2, dsa->pub_key, z2, dsa->p, ctx);
BN_mod_mul(tmp3, tmp, tmp2, dsa->p, ctx);
BN_mod(u, tmp3, dsa->q, ctx);
- ok = BN_cmp(u, sig->r);
+ ok = (BN_cmp(u, sig->r) == 0);
- BN_free(md);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (ok != 0) {
+ if (!ok) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY, GOST_R_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH);
}
- return (ok == 0);
+err:
+ if(md) BN_free(md);
+ if(ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ return ok;
}
/*
@@ -190,13 +228,24 @@ int gost_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
int gost94_compute_public(DSA *dsa)
{
/* Now fill algorithm parameters with correct values */
- BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
if (!dsa->g) {
GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, GOST_R_KEY_IS_NOT_INITALIZED);
return 0;
}
- /* Compute public key y = a^x mod p */
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if(!ctx) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
dsa->pub_key = BN_new();
+ if(!dsa->pub_key) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST94_COMPUTE_PUBLIC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Compute public key y = a^x mod p */
BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
@@ -243,6 +292,10 @@ int fill_GOST94_params(DSA *dsa, int nid)
int gost_sign_keygen(DSA *dsa)
{
dsa->priv_key = BN_new();
+ if(!dsa->priv_key) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_SIGN_KEYGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
BN_rand_range(dsa->priv_key, dsa->q);
return gost94_compute_public(dsa);
}
diff --git a/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c b/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c
index 1005dfc..8a23763 100644
--- a/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c
+++ b/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c
@@ -712,10 +712,12 @@ static EVP_PKEY *sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
/* set public big nums */
rsatmp->e = BN_new();
rsatmp->n = BN_new();
+ if(!rsatmp->e || !rsatmp->n)
+ goto err;
bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- if (!rsatmp->e || rsatmp->e->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) ||
- !rsatmp->n || rsatmp->n->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
+ if (rsatmp->e->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) ||
+ rsatmp->n->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
goto err;
ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el,
(unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d,
@@ -752,15 +754,16 @@ static EVP_PKEY *sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
dsatmp->p = BN_new();
dsatmp->q = BN_new();
dsatmp->g = BN_new();
+ if(!dsatmp->pub_key || !dsatmp->p || !dsatmp->q || !dsatmp->g)
+ goto err;
bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- if (!dsatmp->pub_key
- || dsatmp->pub_key->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
- || !dsatmp->p || dsatmp->p->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
- || !dsatmp->q || dsatmp->q->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)
- || !dsatmp->g || dsatmp->g->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
+ if (dsatmp->pub_key->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+ || dsatmp->p->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+ || dsatmp->q->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)
+ || dsatmp->g->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
goto err;
ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el,
@@ -1038,10 +1041,12 @@ static DSA_SIG *surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen,
}
psign->r = BN_new();
psign->s = BN_new();
+ if(!psign->r || !psign->s)
+ goto err;
bn_expand2(psign->r, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
bn_expand2(psign->s, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- if (!psign->r || psign->r->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
- !psign->s || psign->s->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+ if (psign->r->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
+ psign->s->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
goto err;
ret = p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg, flen, from,
(unsigned long *)psign->r->d,
@@ -1070,9 +1075,9 @@ static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
char msg[64] = "ENGINE_modexp";
if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp) {
SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MODEXP, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
- } else {
+ } else if (r) {
bn_expand2(r, m->top);
- if (r && r->dmax == m->top) {
+ if (r->dmax == m->top) {
/* do it */
ret = p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg,
m->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
diff --git a/openssl/openssl.spec b/openssl/openssl.spec
index 909f2bf..e6c7584 100644
--- a/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Release: 1
Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2a
+Version: 1.0.2c
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
index a7bd4ee..42f1af5 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/ssl/Makefile
@@ -89,12 +89,13 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-depend:
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
- else \
- $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC); \
- fi
+update: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
@@ -486,26 +487,27 @@ s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_pkt.c
s2_pkt.o: ssl_locl.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_srvr.c
+s2_srvr.o: ssl_locl.h
s3_both.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 2104800..b4ee7ab 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -489,6 +489,12 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
return i;
}
+ if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
@@ -873,6 +879,20 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
/* parse the message fragment header */
dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
+ len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+ /*
+ * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
+ * Fragments must not span records.
+ */
+ if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
+ al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*
* if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
* (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
@@ -883,10 +903,6 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
&& !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
- len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
- frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
-
if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
@@ -917,17 +933,16 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max)))
goto f_err;
- /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
- s->state = stn;
-
if (frag_len > 0) {
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
&p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
+
/*
- * XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets
+ * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
+ * that we have enough data in the record
*/
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
@@ -948,6 +963,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
}
*ok = 1;
+ s->state = stn;
/*
* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
@@ -1420,7 +1436,10 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ return -1;
+ }
r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
@@ -1454,7 +1473,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -1;
unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
@@ -1502,10 +1521,12 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
+ goto err;
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
+ goto err;
ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
if (ret >= 0) {
@@ -1518,6 +1539,7 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
}
+err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ret;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 1858263..4c2ccbf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
(s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -237,10 +238,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -249,12 +252,14 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -433,6 +438,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
@@ -564,6 +570,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -571,6 +578,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -751,6 +759,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
goto end;
/* break; */
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
@@ -842,5 +851,6 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 940ca69..fe30ec7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
/*
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index eafa012..655333a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -252,6 +254,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -273,6 +276,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
#endif
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -486,7 +490,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
- || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
@@ -661,11 +665,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
} else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num = 0;
@@ -688,15 +695,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- /*
- * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
- * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
- * to set this here because we don't know if we're
- * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
- /* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
@@ -713,11 +711,10 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
- * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
- * In a full handshake, we end up here through
- * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
- * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
+ * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
+ * cautious.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
@@ -767,6 +764,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -795,6 +793,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -875,6 +874,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
goto end;
/* break; */
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
@@ -933,6 +933,7 @@ int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 614b9a3..7a61888 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -576,6 +576,20 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
s->s2->padding = p;
s->s2->mac_data = &(s->s2->wbuf[3]);
s->s2->wact_data = &(s->s2->wbuf[3 + mac_size]);
+
+ /*
+ * It would be clearer to write this as follows:
+ * if (mac_size + len + p > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER)
+ * However |len| is user input that could in theory be very large. We
+ * know |mac_size| and |p| are small, so to avoid any possibility of
+ * overflow we write it like this.
+ *
+ * In theory this should never fail because the logic above should have
+ * modified |len| if it is too big. But we are being cautious.
+ */
+ if (len > (SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER - (mac_size + p))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
/* we copy the data into s->s2->wbuf */
memcpy(s->s2->wact_data, buf, len);
if (p)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index 19bb48c..4289272 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
# include <stdio.h>
# include <openssl/bio.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
@@ -372,12 +373,15 @@ int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
{
int is_export, i, n, keya;
- unsigned int ek;
+ unsigned int num_encrypted_key_bytes, key_length;
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char decrypt_good;
+ size_t j;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) {
@@ -465,12 +469,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
return (0);
}
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) {
- is_export = 1;
- ek = 8;
- } else
- ek = 5;
-
/*
* The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
* 1 byte message type
@@ -484,12 +482,27 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
*
* If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
* are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
- * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
- * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
- * must be zero).
+ * this portion is in |num_encrypted_key_bytes|. If the cipher is not an
+ * export cipher, then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear
+ * key length must be zero).
*/
- if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
- (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+ key_length = (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ if (key_length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) {
+ is_export = 1;
+ num_encrypted_key_bytes = 8;
+ } else if (is_export) {
+ num_encrypted_key_bytes = 5;
+ } else {
+ num_encrypted_key_bytes = key_length;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s2->tmp.clear + num_encrypted_key_bytes != key_length) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
@@ -499,64 +512,49 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
* Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
* bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
*/
- if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
- (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+ if (s->s2->tmp.enc < num_encrypted_key_bytes) {
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
return -1;
}
+ /*
+ * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+ * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+ * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
+ */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
- /* bad decrypt */
-# if 1
+ ERR_clear_error();
/*
* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
* secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
*/
- if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
- || (is_export && i != (int)ek))) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- if (is_export)
- i = ek;
- else
- i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
-# else
- if (i < 0) {
- error = 1;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- }
- /* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */
- else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear + i !=
- EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))) {
- error = 1;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS);
- }
- if (error) {
- ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
- return (-1);
+ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(i, (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes);
+ for (j = 0; j < num_encrypted_key_bytes; j++) {
+ p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j] =
+ constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[s->s2->tmp.clear + j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
-# endif
- if (is_export)
- i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ s->session->master_key_length = (int)key_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, key_length);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, key_length);
- if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->session->master_key_length = i;
- memcpy(s->session->master_key, p, (unsigned int)i);
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
index c92fd72..019e21c 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender, slen,
s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
- if (i == 0)
+ if (i <= 0)
return 0;
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index f31dc04..a0edcef 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) {
/* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
+ if ((CRYPTO_memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
!(padding_length & 1)) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
}
@@ -639,12 +639,22 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
if (k > 0) {
if (is_sslv3) {
+ unsigned overhang;
+
/*
* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
* the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
- * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5).
+ * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
+ * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
+ * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
+ * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
+ * in case
*/
- unsigned overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
+ if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return;
+ }
+ overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
md_transform(md_state.c, header);
memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 91053d5..2346ce5 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@
#endif
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
@@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
@@ -245,10 +249,12 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -263,6 +269,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -317,12 +324,24 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
+ ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or PSK */
if (!
(s->s3->tmp.
new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
@@ -358,6 +377,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
@@ -381,6 +401,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
@@ -472,6 +493,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -479,6 +501,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -553,7 +576,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
@@ -612,6 +636,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
goto end;
/* break; */
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
@@ -659,9 +684,17 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
- !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
+ if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ /*
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+ * "ticket" without a session ID.
+ */
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
@@ -853,6 +886,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -924,7 +958,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
- s->version = s->method->version;
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
}
if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
@@ -952,10 +986,19 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*
- * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
- * secret
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+ * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+ * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+ * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+ * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+ * server wants to resume.
*/
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+ s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
@@ -964,12 +1007,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
- s->hit = 1;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
- if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
@@ -980,12 +1026,13 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
- }
- /* a miss or crap from the other end */
- if (!s->hit) {
+ } else {
/*
- * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
- * we don't stuff up other people
+ * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+ * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+ * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+ * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
@@ -1113,6 +1160,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -1298,8 +1346,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
@@ -1621,6 +1671,13 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
rsa = NULL;
}
@@ -1965,6 +2022,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -2140,7 +2198,10 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
+ goto done;
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
if (ca_sk != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
@@ -2175,6 +2236,38 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
+ if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+ s->session);
+ } else {
+ /* We carry on if this fails */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
@@ -2217,6 +2310,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -2277,6 +2371,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
#endif
@@ -2298,12 +2393,32 @@ int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
ret = 1;
return (ret);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT *scert)
+{
+ DH *dh_srvr = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
+ int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
+
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ if (spkey) {
+ dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
+ }
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return dh_srvr;
+}
+#endif
+
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
@@ -2546,25 +2661,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
- if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
- else {
- /* we get them from the cert */
- int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
- EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
- dh_srvr = NULL;
- if (idx >= 0)
- spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
- if (spkey) {
- dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
- }
- if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ } else {
+ dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(scert);
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
goto err;
- }
}
+
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
/* Use client certificate key */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
@@ -2624,8 +2728,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
DH_free(dh_clnt);
-
- /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
}
#endif
@@ -2847,7 +2949,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
- RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32);
+ if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
@@ -3061,6 +3166,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -3189,6 +3295,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -3252,6 +3359,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
@@ -3312,6 +3420,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
}
@@ -3326,6 +3435,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int pkey_bits;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
@@ -3333,6 +3443,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
+ int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
@@ -3375,6 +3486,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -3392,40 +3504,82 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
- !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rsa != NULL) {
+ /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
- !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
- } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# endif
-#endif
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ int dh_size;
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+ } else {
+ DH *dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(sc);
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ goto f_err;
+ dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh_srvr->p);
+ DH_free(dh_srvr);
+ }
+
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- if (rsa == NULL
- || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
@@ -3433,14 +3587,21 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- if (dh == NULL
- || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
} else
#endif
{
@@ -3451,12 +3612,62 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
}
return (1);
f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (0);
}
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
+ * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
+ * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
+ * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
+ * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
+ * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
+ * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
+ !s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
+ * so permit appropriate message length.
+ * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
+ * and not its length.
+ */
+ s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return -1;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
@@ -3479,8 +3690,8 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT &&
- * !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 28129f6..5db349a 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
/* The DH ciphers */
/* Cipher 0B */
{
- 1,
+ 0,
SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kDHd,
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
/* Cipher 0E */
{
- 1,
+ 0,
SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kDHr,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 221ae03..603c285 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -361,11 +361,22 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
if (version != s->version) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
- && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ /*
+ * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
+ * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
+ * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
+ * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
+ * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
+ */
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* Send back error using their minor version number :-)
*/
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ }
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
@@ -708,7 +719,7 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
packlen *= 4;
wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
- if(!wb->buf) {
+ if (!wb->buf) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index c016139..8885694 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
@@ -273,11 +274,13 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
@@ -285,6 +288,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -303,6 +307,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -320,6 +325,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
} else {
/*
@@ -379,6 +385,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
@@ -529,9 +536,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
skip = 1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
+ }
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
@@ -621,11 +631,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
} else {
int offset = 0;
int dgst_num;
@@ -639,9 +652,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
* CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
* step
*/
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
+ }
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
int dgst_size;
@@ -657,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
dgst_size =
EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
@@ -667,15 +684,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- /*
- * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
- * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
- * to set this here because we don't know if we're
- * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
@@ -695,11 +703,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
/*
- * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
- * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
- * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
- * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
+ * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
+ * cautious.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
@@ -718,10 +725,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
- * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
- * In a full handshake, we end up here through
- * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
- * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
+ * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
@@ -771,6 +776,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -787,6 +793,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
@@ -849,6 +856,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
goto end;
/* break; */
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
@@ -931,6 +939,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
+ * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
+ * for session id length
+ */
+ if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
@@ -962,6 +980,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
@@ -975,6 +999,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
+ if (p + j > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
@@ -1019,8 +1049,19 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
+ if (p + 1 > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
cookie_len = *(p++);
+ if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
@@ -1086,27 +1127,33 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
+ if (p + 2 > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
n2s(p, i);
- if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
- /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
+
+ if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
+
+ /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+ if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
- == NULL)) {
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
+ if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
@@ -1335,8 +1382,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
@@ -1424,8 +1471,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
@@ -1443,8 +1492,10 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
@@ -1479,6 +1530,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
*(p++) = sl;
@@ -1501,6 +1553,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
if ((p =
@@ -1508,6 +1561,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
#endif
@@ -1970,6 +2024,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -2063,6 +2118,7 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -2355,6 +2411,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+ int kerr = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
@@ -2458,23 +2515,27 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
}
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
}
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
}
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
&& (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
@@ -2491,7 +2552,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
}
}
@@ -2517,6 +2579,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
+
+ kclean:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
+ if (kerr)
+ goto err;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
@@ -2835,6 +2902,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->
session->master_key,
premaster_secret, 32);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
@@ -2867,6 +2935,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
@@ -2882,39 +2951,31 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+ /*
+ * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
+ * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
+ * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
+ * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
+ * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
+ * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
+ */
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
- peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
- } else {
- peer = NULL;
- pkey = NULL;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if (peer != NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (peer == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ peer = s->session->peer;
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
@@ -2923,12 +2984,6 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
@@ -3069,6 +3124,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
end:
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
@@ -3227,8 +3283,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (sk != NULL)
@@ -3248,12 +3306,14 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (0);
}
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (0);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
@@ -3287,11 +3347,15 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
* long
*/
- if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
+ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
- if (!senc)
+ if (!senc) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
@@ -3391,10 +3455,10 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
s2n(len - 6, p);
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
}
@@ -3406,6 +3470,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
@@ -3419,8 +3484,10 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
@@ -3463,6 +3530,7 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
@@ -3482,11 +3550,14 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
- if (n < 2)
+ if (n < 2) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+ }
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
@@ -3498,15 +3569,20 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
proto_len = p[0];
- if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
+ }
padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
- if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
+ }
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index a6d845d..6fe1a24 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1727,6 +1727,7 @@ extern "C" {
# define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000
# define SSL_ST_OK 0x03
# define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
+# define SSL_ST_ERR 0x05
# define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01
# define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02
@@ -2640,6 +2641,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107
# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108
# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109
+# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY 340
# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110
# define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111
# define SSL_F_READ_N 112
@@ -2670,6 +2672,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED 339
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132
# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213
@@ -2784,6 +2787,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
# define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 320
# define SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 321
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348
# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312
@@ -2904,6 +2908,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281
+# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372
# define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148
# define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149
# define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index ab3aa23..1a6030e 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* ssl/ssl_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED), "GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY), "GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY), "GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION), "i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N), "READ_N"},
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),
"ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "ssl3_check_client_hello"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "ssl3_client_hello"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "ssl3_connect"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "ssl3_ctrl"},
@@ -310,6 +312,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
"SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
"SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),
@@ -458,6 +461,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
"dh public value length is wrong"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"},
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index e9ad2bc..c0931e7 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1510,9 +1510,13 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return (NULL);
}
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
- else {
+ if(sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
sk = *skp;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
}
@@ -2326,7 +2330,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
if (dh_dsa_export)
emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
- if (emask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
+ if (mask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
mask_a |= SSL_aDH;
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
@@ -2832,6 +2836,12 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
return ("SSLv3");
else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
return ("SSLv2");
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return ("DTLSv0.9");
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return ("DTLSv1");
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return ("DTLSv1.2");
else
return ("unknown");
}
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 79b85b9..6c2c551 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len,
const unsigned char *limit);
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
@@ -1230,7 +1231,6 @@ int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b);
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 1e1002f..07e7379 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -227,6 +227,130 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
return (ss);
}
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+ dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+ * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+ dest->ciphers = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+ dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+ memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+ /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+ dest->prev = NULL;
+ dest->next = NULL;
+
+ dest->references = 1;
+
+ if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+
+ if (src->peer != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (src->psk_identity) {
+ dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+ if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(src->ciphers != NULL) {
+ dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+ if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+ &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ if (ticket != 0) {
+ dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+ if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+ dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (src->srp_username) {
+ dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
+ if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return dest;
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
unsigned int *len)
{
@@ -449,9 +573,14 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
int r;
#endif
- if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+ if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
goto err;
+ if (session_id + len > limit) {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (len == 0)
try_session_cache = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
index d725d78..1b9069f 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s)
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
str = "ok/accept SSL initialization";
break;
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ str = "error";
+ break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
str = "SSLv2 client start encryption";
@@ -496,6 +499,9 @@ const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s)
case SSL_ST_OK:
str = "SSLOK ";
break;
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ str = "SSLERR";
+ break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
str = "2CSENC";
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index 9f5d586..6737adf 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -692,7 +692,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
" -bytes <val> - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
fprintf(stderr,
- " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE\n");
+ " -dhe512 - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n");
fprintf(stderr,
" -dhe1024dsa - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe - disable DHE\n");
@@ -716,6 +718,10 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n");
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ fprintf(stderr, " -dtls1 - use DTLSv1\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -dtls12 - use DTLSv1.2\n");
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg - Server certificate file\n");
@@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int badop = 0;
int bio_pair = 0;
int force = 0;
- int tls1 = 0, ssl2 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
+ int dtls1 = 0, dtls12 = 0, tls1 = 0, ssl2 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
int client_auth = 0;
int server_auth = 0, i;
struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
@@ -897,7 +903,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
long bytes = 256L;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
- int dhe1024 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
+ int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
@@ -977,19 +983,19 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
debug = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0)
reuse = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024") == 0) {
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dhe1024 = 1;
+ dhe512 = 1;
#else
fprintf(stderr,
- "ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+ "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
#endif
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dhe1024dsa = 1;
#else
fprintf(stderr,
- "ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+ "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
#endif
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0)
no_dhe = 1;
@@ -1037,6 +1043,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
no_protocol = 1;
#endif
ssl3 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ dtls1 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls12") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ dtls12 = 1;
} else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
@@ -1172,8 +1188,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto end;
}
- if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+ if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 + dtls1 + dtls12 > 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls1 or -dtls12 should "
"be requested.\n");
EXIT(1);
}
@@ -1190,10 +1206,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto end;
}
- if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
+ if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && !dtls1 && !dtls12 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform "
"the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
- "or add one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
+ "or add one of ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls1, -dtls12, -reuse\n"
"to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
EXIT(1);
}
@@ -1271,6 +1287,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
meth = SSLv3_method();
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ if (dtls1)
+ meth = DTLSv1_method();
+ else if (dtls12)
+ meth = DTLSv1_2_method();
+ else
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
if (tls1)
meth = TLSv1_method();
@@ -1297,10 +1320,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
*/
SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
dh = get_dh1024dsa();
- } else if (dhe1024)
- dh = get_dh1024();
- else
+ } else if (dhe512)
dh = get_dh512();
+ else
+ dh = get_dh1024();
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh);
DH_free(dh);
}
@@ -1318,12 +1341,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
goto end;
}
- } else
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ } else {
nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-# else
- nid = NID_sect163r2;
-# endif
+ }
ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (ecdh == NULL) {
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 577885f..e2a8f86 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
count++;
}
- if(!count) {
+ if (!count) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
@@ -404,9 +404,9 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
}
#endif
/*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
*/
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
@@ -442,9 +442,9 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
}
#endif
/*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
*/
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- unsigned char buf[13], *seq;
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
@@ -827,7 +827,10 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
- pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
+ pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+ EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
+ if (pad <= 0)
+ return -1;
if (send) {
l += pad;
rec->length += pad;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index d85d26e..210a5e8 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -113,9 +113,11 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
+#endif
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
@@ -260,47 +262,68 @@ static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
};
-static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
-# endif
+/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
+static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
+ /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
+ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
# endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
+ /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
+ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
+ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
# endif
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ /*
+ * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
+ * via an explicit callback or parameters.
+ */
+ 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
-# endif
- 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
-# endif
- 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
# endif
- 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
};
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
@@ -474,8 +497,13 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
} else
# endif
{
- *pcurves = eccurves_default;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
+ if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
+ *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
+ pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
+ } else {
+ *pcurves = eccurves_all;
+ pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
+ }
}
}
}
@@ -565,6 +593,20 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
&num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
+
+ /*
+ * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
+ * are allowed.
+ */
+ if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
+ supp = eccurves_all;
+ num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
+ } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
+ pref = eccurves_all;
+ num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
+ }
+
k = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
@@ -761,6 +803,16 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
return 0;
+ if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
+ * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
+ * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
+ * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
+ * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
break;
@@ -1964,19 +2016,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ if (data == d + n)
goto ri_check;
+
+ if (data > (d + n - 2))
+ goto err;
+
n2s(data, len);
if (data > (d + n - len))
- goto ri_check;
+ goto err;
while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > (d + n))
- goto ri_check;
+ goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
# endif
@@ -2012,16 +2068,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
int servname_type;
int dsize;
- if (size < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (size < 2)
+ goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize > size)
+ goto err;
sdata = data;
while (dsize > 3) {
@@ -2029,18 +2081,16 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
n2s(sdata, len);
dsize -= 3;
- if (len > dsize) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (len > dsize)
+ goto err;
+
if (s->servername_done == 0)
switch (servname_type) {
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ goto err;
+
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
@@ -2074,31 +2124,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
dsize -= len;
}
- if (dsize != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize != 0)
+ goto err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+ goto err;
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
+ goto err;
}
# endif
@@ -2108,10 +2150,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
- ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
+ goto err;
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
@@ -2145,15 +2185,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
- ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
+ goto err;
+
if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ goto err;
+
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
@@ -2221,26 +2259,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
int dsize;
- if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
+ goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
- if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
+ goto err;
+ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
+ goto err;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- if (size < 5) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (size < 5)
+ goto err;
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
size--;
@@ -2250,35 +2280,26 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
/* Read in responder_id_list */
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize > size)
+ goto err;
while (dsize > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
- if (dsize < 4) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize < 4)
+ goto err;
n2s(data, idsize);
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
size -= 2 + idsize;
- if (dsize < 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize < 0)
+ goto err;
sdata = data;
data += idsize;
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
- if (!id) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!id)
+ goto err;
if (data != sdata) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
@@ -2295,16 +2316,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
- if (size < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (size < 2)
+ goto err;
n2s(data, dsize);
size -= 2;
- if (dsize != size) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dsize != size)
+ goto err;
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0) {
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
@@ -2314,10 +2331,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
+ goto err;
}
}
/*
@@ -2389,6 +2404,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
data += size;
}
+ /* Spurious data on the end */
+ if (data != d + n)
+ goto err;
+
*p = data;
ri_check:
@@ -2404,6 +2423,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
}
return 1;
+err:
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -3837,7 +3859,10 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ return -1;
+ }
r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3 + payload + padding);
@@ -3872,7 +3897,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -1;
unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
@@ -3920,10 +3945,16 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
if (ret >= 0) {
@@ -3935,6 +3966,7 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
}
+err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ret;
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
index d36cfa0..bb719ba 100644
--- a/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -454,7 +454,8 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
+ return -1;
s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
diff --git a/openssl/test/Makefile b/openssl/test/Makefile
index 3388679..a570fad 100644
--- a/openssl/test/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/test/Makefile
@@ -351,12 +351,13 @@ test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-depend:
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
- else \
- $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
- fi
+update: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
@@ -368,10 +369,10 @@ clean:
rm -f .rnd tmp.bntest tmp.bctest *.o *.obj *.dll lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff $(EXE) *.ss *.srl log dummytest
$(DLIBSSL):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=ssl all)
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
$(DLIBCRYPTO):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto all)
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
BUILD_CMD=shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
diff --git a/openssl/test/cms-test.pl b/openssl/test/cms-test.pl
index 51abeef..baa3b59 100644
--- a/openssl/test/cms-test.pl
+++ b/openssl/test/cms-test.pl
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ else
die "Error checking for EC2M support\n";
}
-system ("$ossl_path no-ecdh > $null_path");
+system ("$ossl_path no-ec > $null_path");
if ($? == 0)
{
$no_ecdh = 1;
@@ -453,6 +453,14 @@ my @smime_cms_param_tests = (
],
[
+"enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, key identifier",
+ "-encrypt -keyid -in smcont.txt"
+ . " -stream -out test.cms"
+ . " -recip $smdir/smec1.pem",
+ "-decrypt -recip $smdir/smec1.pem -in test.cms -out smtst.txt"
+ ],
+
+ [
"enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, ECDH, AES128, SHA256 KDF",
"-encrypt -in smcont.txt"
. " -stream -out test.cms"
diff --git a/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2f2a8f7..0000000
--- a/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c
new file mode 120000
index 0000000..2f2a8f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/openssl/test/testssl b/openssl/test/testssl
index e3b342b..ddebf08 100644
--- a/openssl/test/testssl
+++ b/openssl/test/testssl
@@ -101,6 +101,30 @@ $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
$ssltest $extra || exit 1
+echo test dtlsv1
+$ssltest -dtls1 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1 with server authentication
+$ssltest -dtls1 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1 with client authentication
+$ssltest -dtls1 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1 with both client and server authentication
+$ssltest -dtls1 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1.2
+$ssltest -dtls12 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1.2 with server authentication
+$ssltest -dtls12 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1.2 with client authentication
+$ssltest -dtls12 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test dtlsv1.2 with both client and server authentication
+$ssltest -dtls12 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'
$ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1
@@ -121,10 +145,9 @@ $ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify
$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth -app_verify $CA $extra || exit 1
-echo "Testing ciphersuites"
-for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do
- echo "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol"
- for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "RSA+$protocol" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+test_cipher() {
+ local cipher=$1
+ local protocol=$2
echo "Testing $cipher"
prot=""
if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then
@@ -135,7 +158,38 @@ for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do
echo "Failed $cipher"
exit 1
fi
+}
+
+echo "Testing ciphersuites"
+for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do
+ echo "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol"
+ for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "RSA+$protocol" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+ test_cipher $cipher $protocol
done
+ if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
+ echo "skipping RSA+DHE tests"
+ else
+ for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+ test_cipher $cipher $protocol
+ done
+ echo "testing connection with weak DH, expecting failure"
+ if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then
+ $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512 -ssl3
+ else
+ $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512
+ fi
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ echo "FAIL: connection with weak DH succeeded"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+ if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-ec; then
+ echo "skipping RSA+ECDHE tests"
+ else
+ for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EECDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+ test_cipher $cipher $protocol
+ done
+ fi
done
#############################################################################
diff --git a/openssl/test/tocsp b/openssl/test/tocsp
index 5fc291c..48e81bf 100755
--- a/openssl/test/tocsp
+++ b/openssl/test/tocsp
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ check_time="-attime 1355875200"
test_ocsp () {
$cmd base64 -d -in $ocspdir/$1 | \
- $cmd ocsp -respin - -partial_chain $check_time \
+ $cmd ocsp -respin - -partial_chain $check_time -trusted_first \
-CAfile $ocspdir/$2 -verify_other $ocspdir/$2 -CApath /dev/null
[ $? != $3 ] && exit 1
}
diff --git a/openssl/tools/Makefile b/openssl/tools/Makefile
index bb6fb71..c1a2f6b 100644
--- a/openssl/tools/Makefile
+++ b/openssl/tools/Makefile
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ tags:
errors:
+update: depend
+
depend:
dclean:
diff --git a/openssl/tools/c_rehash b/openssl/tools/c_rehash
index 4a0f0e1..6a27c02 100644
--- a/openssl/tools/c_rehash
+++ b/openssl/tools/c_rehash
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ my $symlink_exists=eval {symlink("",""); 1};
my $removelinks = 1;
## Parse flags.
-while ( $ARGV[0] =~ '-.*' ) {
+while ( $ARGV[0] =~ /^-/ ) {
my $flag = shift @ARGV;
last if ( $flag eq '--');
- if ( $flag =~ /-old/) {
+ if ( $flag eq '-old') {
$x509hash = "-subject_hash_old";
$crlhash = "-hash_old";
- } elsif ( $flag =~ /-h/) {
+ } elsif ( $flag eq '-h') {
help();
} elsif ( $flag eq '-n' ) {
$removelinks = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/tools/c_rehash.in b/openssl/tools/c_rehash.in
index 887e927..b086ff9 100644
--- a/openssl/tools/c_rehash.in
+++ b/openssl/tools/c_rehash.in
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ my $symlink_exists=eval {symlink("",""); 1};
my $removelinks = 1;
## Parse flags.
-while ( $ARGV[0] =~ '-.*' ) {
+while ( $ARGV[0] =~ /^-/ ) {
my $flag = shift @ARGV;
last if ( $flag eq '--');
- if ( $flag =~ /-old/) {
+ if ( $flag eq '-old') {
$x509hash = "-subject_hash_old";
$crlhash = "-hash_old";
- } elsif ( $flag =~ /-h/) {
+ } elsif ( $flag eq '-h') {
help();
} elsif ( $flag eq '-n' ) {
$removelinks = 0;
diff --git a/openssl/util/libeay.num b/openssl/util/libeay.num
index b977e4e..7f7487d 100644
--- a/openssl/util/libeay.num
+++ b/openssl/util/libeay.num
@@ -4413,3 +4413,4 @@ ECDSA_METHOD_get_app_data 4770 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host 4771 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EC_GROUP_get_mont_data 4772 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
i2d_re_X509_tbs 4773 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item 4774 EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl b/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
index 7d4491f..9b8abc0 100644
--- a/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ open(IN,"<$infile") || die "unable to open $infile:$!\n";
$_=<IN>;
for (;;)
{
- chop;
+ s/\s*$//; # was chop, didn't work in mixture of perls for Windows...
($key,$val)=/^([^=]+)=(.*)/;
if ($key eq "RELATIVE_DIRECTORY")
diff --git a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
index 7b6776d..09ebebe 100644
--- a/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/mkerr.pl
@@ -535,14 +535,21 @@ EOF
# First, read any existing reason string definitions:
my %err_reason_strings;
if (open(IN,"<$cfile")) {
+ my $line = "";
while (<IN>) {
- if (/\b(${lib}_R_\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) {
- $err_reason_strings{$1} = $2;
- }
- if (/\b${lib}_F_(\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) {
- if (!exists $ftrans{$1} && ($1 ne $2)) {
- print STDERR "WARNING: Mismatched function string $2\n";
- $ftrans{$1} = $2;
+ chomp;
+ $_ = $line . $_;
+ $line = "";
+ if (/{ERR_(FUNC|REASON)\(/) {
+ if (/\b(${lib}_R_\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) {
+ $err_reason_strings{$1} = $2;
+ } elsif (/\b${lib}_F_(\w*)\b.*\"(.*)\"/) {
+ if (!exists $ftrans{$1} && ($1 ne $2)) {
+ print STDERR "WARNING: Mismatched function string $2\n";
+ $ftrans{$1} = $2;
+ }
+ } else {
+ $line = $_;
}
}
}
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
index ed28e65..f7161d7 100644
--- a/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/BC-32.pl
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
local($ret,$_);
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- $n=&bname($targer);
+ $n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $files \$(APP_EX_OBJ), $target,, $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
diff --git a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
index 852eb30..da05e9d 100644
--- a/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+++ b/openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
my($target,$files,$dep_libs,$libs,$standalone)=@_;
local($ret,$_);
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- $n=&bname($targer);
+ $n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
if ($standalone == 1)
{
diff --git a/packages.txt b/packages.txt
index 4939cf8..d222c8e 100644
--- a/packages.txt
+++ b/packages.txt
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ libxcb git version
libxkbfile-1.0.8
mesa git version
mkfontscale git version
-openssl-1.0.2a
+openssl-1.0.2c
pixman git version
presentproto-1.0
pthreads-w32 cvs version
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